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Chapter 1
Introduction
There are some aspects of genomic information that are almost universally known:
• We, humans, inherit our genetic code from our parents.
• It encodes how our bodies build and maintain themselves.
• Our genetic code is unique to us.
We see these properties of the genome, for example, in the way we inherit physical features from our parents,
in the existence of genetic diseases, and in the uses forensic science makes of genetic markers for identification
purposes.
The development of technologies to read the genetic sequence has opened the door to new uses. For
example:
• A medical practitioner can prescribe a genome sequencing for a patient to diagnose a disease.
• A researcher can compare the genome of many individuals to find the common traits related to a
specific illness.
• An individual can use a service that establishes the origins of this particular person based on the
distribution of known mutations around the world.
In the past years, a sharp decrease in the price of genome sequencing has led to an increase in the amount
of generated information. The quantity of information generated during a genome sequencing depends on
its purpose, but it can realistically range from some gigabytes to some hundreds of gigabytes. The result of
this dynamic is the need for new compression mechanisms which will make it feasible to sustain the current
growth rate.
As we have seen, there are various uses for the data of a sequenced genome: it can be relevant to
multiple research studies, to diagnostics purposes, and to personalized medicine. To maximize the reusability
potential, there is the need to have a standardized way of representing genomic information. Two of the
working groups within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [1], MPEG [2] and the
Data processing and integration group within the Biotechnology technical committee [3], have identified the
necessity for a new standardized compressed representation of genomic information.
The usefulness of the genomic information is also a source of danger. If a bad actor gains access to an
individual’s genomic information, facts which have to remain secret such as diseases or predisposition to
them can be revealed. In fact, due to the inheritability of the genomic information, not only does this attack
affect the individual but also the individual’s blood relatives. The sensitivity of the genomic information
has led the MPEG group to include the protection of the genomic information as a requirement for the new
standard.
The here presented work contributes to answering how to protect the genomic information in the frame-
work of the new standard. The framework places specific requirements on the answer:
• The main goal is the usability of the file. Due to the nature of the data, in order for the data to be
usable, the standard must provide the best possible compression. We will consider the compression
strategy as fixed.
• The standard must be usable in current genomic pipelines. We cannot remove the ability to perform
actions that are available in current formats.
• The standard shall only rely on existing technologies that have already been specified in a standard.
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The question of how to protect the genomic information depends on other questions that we must address,
although they are not the primary target. We need to understand the nature of the data to protect, how to
represent it, and which actions a user can perform on it.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyze the context of the work and the parts of the specification we will consider
as prior work. These chapters present the nature of the data and how MPEG intends to represent it.
Once the data is encoded, a file format must structure it. Chapter 5 describes our proposal for the
format.
To facilitate further reusability of the data, it must also be accompanied by metadata. At the onset of
the here presented work, there is no proposed representation for the metadata. The metadata can be as
sensible as the genomic information, for example, due to information about the diagnosed diseases. Chapter
6 explains our proposal for metadata representation, and for a mechanism to secure it.
Chapter 7 also analyzes a possible attack on a security mechanism that was contributed to MPEG.
Furthermore, we present a mechanism to enable leaker identification. We can use this mechanism to protect
any genomic format. This leaker identification solution addresses a problem not covered by the other parts
of this work.
Finally, Chapter 8 analyzes how the new standard is used: we discuss our proposal for an Application
Programming Interface (API) and for a way to control who has access to which action. Furthermore, we
propose an alternative structuring of the data which optimizes API methods while maintaining region-based
encryption.
Chapter 2
Context
This chapter presents some of the characteristics of sequenced genomic data. It includes the main
aspects of sequencing technologies and the alignment of the information to a reference genome.
It summarizes the representation of the resulting information.
At the macroscopic level, our human level, we are used to bodies. Bodies are the sum of systems (e.g.,
locomotive system, digestive system), which are each composed of multiple organs. We can further divide
each organ into tissues, which are in their turn formed by cells. In order for the body to perform correctly,
the different systems need to perform metabolic processes. The cells need to be programmed to perform
these actions. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules store the code specifying these actions. We refer
to these DNA molecules as chromosomes. In a healthy human body, there are 23 pairs of chromosomes.
At specific time points of the lifecycle of the cell, the chromosomes are observable: at this point, we can
take a picture of them and group them by type. Figure 2.1 shows such a picture, a so-called karyotype.
In the example, it is from a female human. In diploid lifeforms, such as the human species, there are two
chromosomes of each type: one from the mother, the other from the father. In a healthy patient, all cells
share the same chromosomes. However, depending on the circumstances (e.g., gender, type of cells), only
certain regions of the chromosomes will be active.
A succession of nucleotides forms the DNA molecule. For this work, we can simplify our conception of
nucleotides and consider them as elementary building blocks of the DNA. The sequence of these building
blocks represents the code that our cells are following. There are four different nucleotides: adenine, cytosine,
guanine and thymine. These nucleotides are represented usually by their initials: A, C, G and T. During its
lifecycle, the cell reads and translates the DNA into other molecules. The cell does not translate the entire
DNA into molecules: certain regions are non-coding.
Organisms translate the DNA into molecules by following the genetic code. The DNA molecule is read
in units of three nucleotides, referred to as codon. Each codon is translated into one amino acid, as shown in
Figure 2.2. The resulting succession of amino acids is the result of translating the DNA into a new molecule
(e.g., insulin).
2.1 Inheritance of genetic material and mutations
Organisms using sexual reproduction produce sexual cells through a process known as meiosis. The genetic
material is duplicated and then divided twice. The result is four sexual cells. Sexual cells have only one copy
of each chromosome, either a copy of the genetic material of the mother or of the father. Upon fecundation,
this will lead to an egg with the usual pair of chromosomes.
The inherited copies are, however, altered. During the duplication process of the genetic material, errors
can occur: an error can substitute individual nucleotides (e.g., a nucleotide A replaces a nucleotide C), can
insert nucleotides, can delete nucleotides, or can copy nucleotide subsequences multiple times. The process
can even relocate nucleotide subsequences to other locations. Due to the quantity of nucleotides, it must be
assumed that errors will occur.
During the division process, the copies exchange genetic material. The copies are not any more entirely
from the father or the mother: it is still mainly a copy of the genetic code from either one, but it contains
genetic material from the other.
As the cell translates the genetic code into molecules, alterations in the code can cause alterations in the
resulting molecules. These differences could imply advantages or disadvantages as the mutations improve or
deteriorate the sequenced molecules.
By analyzing the genome of as many individuals as possible [4, 5, 6], researchers have published, and
continue publishing at regular intervals, a reference genome of the human species. This reference genome
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Figure 2.1: Karyotype of a female human From the wikimedia https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mapa_genético_o_cariograma.jpeg
Figure 2.2: Genetic code From the wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA_codon_table
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Figure 2.3: The pipeline to analyze the genome
represents the most usual sequence of nucleotides. Any human will have almost the reference genome, but
with some key differences. The set of differences an individual presents is unique. It corresponds to the
combination of the differences inherited from the mother and the father and any new mutations.
In order to understand a genetic disease, we will compare the genome of each patient with the reference
genome. We can also compare the genome of a cell involved in a disease with the genome of a healthy cell of
the same patient. In this case, we discover a somatic change in the genome: a difference with the reference
genome not present in other cells. The exposure to external factors (e.g., radiation, smoke) can cause these
new differences. The study of these differences is relevant to understand the cause of certain cancers [7].
2.2 Genes and alleles
We have seen how we inherit mutations from our parents. Furthermore, we have seen that the genome
encodes the metabolism of the cell: the proteins the cell generates and at which rate. Geneticists have
defined the concept of gene: a unit of inheritable material the cell can transcribe into a protein or which the
cell uses to regulate the expression of other genes. Researchers have estimated that there are 21000 genes in
the human genome [8].
Since we inherit some of our parents’ mutations, there are, throughout the population, multiple instances
of the same mutation. Therefore, there are well-known variants of the nucleotides sequence corresponding
to a gene. We will refer to each of these variants as an allele. The effects of some of these alleles are familiar
to us: some of the common examples are the shape of the thumb, the hair color, the blood type. In some
cases, both copies of the gene (a copy corresponding to a chromosome) must share the same allele so that
the effect appears (we refer to this as homozyguous), in other cases the effects of the mutation are already
visible if there is only one copy of the mutated allele (we refer to this as heterozyguous).
The frequency at which each allele appears throughout the population is different. The study of the
different alleles, their effects and frequencies has led to the creation of databases [9] documenting the currently
known mutations in the human population and the diseases to which they might be linked.
2.3 Sequencing the genome
In order to understand the genome of a specimen, we follow steps in a pipeline as represented in Figure 2.3.
First we must sequence its genome [10, 11]. To do that, we use genome sequencing devices, such as Illumina
devices [12].
A biological sample is treated chemically in order to obtain many fragments of DNA. A sequencing
machine then reads these fragments. This type of device sequences the genome by reading subportions of it:
from the previously mentioned DNA fragments, the machine reads contiguous nucleotides. The sequencing
technology used determines the length of this subsequence. It is unknown to which genomic region the
subsequence corresponds. Some sequencing technologies generate two of these subsequences at a time. In
that case, we refer to them as paired reads, and we know that the two subsequences correspond to close
locations on the genome. Besides identifying the nucleotides, the sequencing machine also attributes a
quality grade to each nucleotide. This grade corresponds to the confidence with which the sequencing
machine has called the nucleotide.
The result of sequencing the genome is a list of (paired) reads with their qualities. This information is
represented usually in a FASTQ file [13], which is formatted as follows.
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@SRR001666.1 071112_SLXA-EAS1_s_7:5:1:817:345 length=36
GGGTGATGGCCGCTGCCGATGGCGTCAAATCCCACC
+SRR001666.1 071112_SLXA-EAS1_s_7:5:1:817:345 length=36
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII9IG9IC
@SRR001666.2 071112_SLXA-EAS1_s_7:5:1:801:338 length=36
GTTCAGGGATACGACGTTTGTATTTTAAGAATCTGA
+SRR001666.2 071112_SLXA-EAS1_s_7:5:1:801:338 length=36
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII6IBI
For each read, there is:
1. a line starting with ’@’ stating the name of the read followed by some other optional information
2. a line containing the called nucleotides in order
3. a line with a ’+’ marking the end of the nucleotides line and the beginning of the quality information
(if applicable, accompanied by optional information)
4. a line containing the quality symbols, one per nucleotide.
2.4 Aligning the genome
Once the sequencing machine has generated enough reads, the information can be combined to reconstruct
the genome of the individual. We refer to this step as alignment. A program aligns each of the reads to
the reference genome. The process is performed either without a reference genome (a de novo alignment) or
with a reference genome. The objective is to determine each read’s position (i.e., the chromosome and the
position on it to which the read corresponds).
Locating the read on the genome also allows to obtain further information. We might detect that the read
aligns well to different locations of the genome, thus requiring multiple alignments. We can give a quality
grade to each of the mappings. The aligner can also recalibrate the sequencing qualities of each nucleotide
when taking into account all reads mapped to the same location.
The default format to represent aligned information is the Sequence Alignment/Map (SAM) format [14],
which also has a binary and compressed counterpart, the Binary Alignment Map (BAM) format. This format
extends the information provided in the FASTQ file with the information generated in the alignment phase.
This new information includes, but is not limited to, the read’s position, the position of the read paired to
the current read if such is the case, the quality of the mapping, and any differences with the original genome.
These differences are represented in a list, encoded in a so-called CIGAR string [14] (Compact Idiosyn-
cratic Gapped Alignment Report). Each entry in the list is composed of a number (the operation’s length)
and a letter (the operation’s type). The usual types of operations are the following:
• A mapped operation is represented with the character ’M’. Each nucleotide associated with the oper-
ation maps to a nucleotide in the reference genome. The nucleotides in the read and in the reference
genome are not necessarily the same. In order to differentiate between the two cases (i.e., the case
where there is no evidence of mutation and the case where there is evidence for a mutated nucleotide),
new versions of the CIGAR string specification have subdivided this operation into an operation ’=’
and an operation ’X’, corresponding to equal and different to reference genome respectively.
• An insertion operation is represented with the character ’I’. The corresponding nucleotides of the read
do not appear on the reference genome, i.e., there is evidence that a mutation has inserted nucleotides
in the individual’s genome when compared to the reference.
• A deletion operation is represented with the character ’D’. The corresponding nucleotides of the ref-
erence do not appear in the read, i.e., there is evidence that a mutation has deleted nucleotides in the
individual’s genome.
• A softclip operation is represented with the character ’S’. It can only appear as the first or the last
operation and indicates that the corresponding nucleotides of the read are different from those of the
reference.
Table 2.1 shows an example CIGAR. In this instance, we have aligned a fake read to a fake reference.
The meaning of the values of the CIGAR operations row in Table 2.1 are as follows:
• The first two nucleotides of the sequence match the ones from the reference (i.e., we have two M
operations represented by =, because they are equal to the reference).
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• A nucleotide is inserted (i.e., we have an I operation).
• A nucleotide matches the reference (M operation).
• A nucleotide from the reference is not present in the read (D operation).
• A nucleotide matches the reference (M operation).
• A nucleotide in the read replaces the nucleotide in the reference (M operation represented with X
because the nucleotide differs from the reference).
Finally, all operations are collapsed into one representation indicating the type of operation and the number
of nucleotides to which the operation applies, as shown in the ’Read CIGAR’ row in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: CIGAR example
Reference
(example chromosome) A C T G A C T G A C T G
Read C T A G C A
CIGAR operations = = I = D = X
Read’s CIGAR
(as stored in SAM) 2=1I1=1D1=1X
An example of SAM file is provided next.
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If we take the first line, we see, among other things, the following elements:
1. the read name: HS25_09827:2:2215:4133:22216#49
2. the chromosome to which the read is aligned: 1
3. the position to which the read is aligned: 10001
4. the CIGAR string: 100M
5. the chromosome to which the mate read is aligned: in this case it is the same and is therefore marked
with ’=’
6. the position to which the mate read is aligned: 10028
7. the nucleotides of the read : ’TAACCCTAACCCTAACC[...]CCTAACCCTAACCCTAAC’.
2.5 Calling variants
Based on the information gathered during the alignment phase, we can analyze the genome in search of
mutations. We refer to this process as calling variants. The main issues faced during this operation are
possible errors in the alignments (the aligner wrongly placed a read on the genome), the sequencing machine
misread a position [15, 16], or there is not enough information for a given position.
By combining all available information, the variant caller determines which mutations are present (i.e.,
their position and type) and whether the mutations are present on both chromosomes or just one.
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Chapter 3
State of the art
In this chapter we analyze the state of the art in the different fields relevant to this thesis: current
encoding strategies and their respective file formats; encryption strategies, repository protection
strategies, and watermarking technologies for genomic data; and for each of the main genomic
data repositories its respective metadata schemas and the associated semantics.
3.1 Current formats
3.1.1 Binary Alignment Map
The BAM format [14] is the binary and compressed counterpart of SAM. Each read is stored separately
in binary format. The binary information is to be read from a unique stream compressed using Blocked
GNU Zip Format (BGZF), a compression mechanism similar to GNU Zip (GZIP) [17]. This compression
mechanism creates blocks of data which are each compressed independently of one another.
Although this should mean that BAM offers out-of-the-box capabilities to skip portions of the file, the
bytes corresponding to a given read can end up being stored in more than one block: if placed close to the
end of a block, the information will be stored there until the block is full; the remaining information will be
stored in the next block. If a read is too long, i.e., if its binary representation exceeds the maximal size of
uncompressed information for a block, it might be stored in three or more blocks.
In other to circumvent this problem and offer random access capabilities, a BAM file can be accompanied
by a Binary Alignment Index (BAI) file [14]. This file indexes the information stored in the BAM file by
creating a tree of bins. The read is associated to the finest grained bin where the read is entirely contained.
For each read the BAI file then stores the virtual offset position: this virtual offset comprises both the real
offset within the file (i.e., the position of the first byte of the block relative to the beginning of the file) and
the first byte of the read within the decompressed block storing it. This approach avoids the issue of not
knowing where each read starts if not reading from the beginning of the file.
3.1.2 Compressed ARchiving for GenOmics
In the SAM structure, there are multiple fields per record. Each one of these fields uses different types of data:
ASCII-character arrays, integers, nucleotide strings among others. By compressing all of this information
into one unique stream, we are losing the possibility to use our knowledge of the different fields to optimize
the compression.
Compressed ARchiving for GenOmics (CARGO) [18] addresses this issue by allowing the user to define
how the information is interpreted. A metalanguage is used to specify the different fields of information, their
elementary data types and the algorithms used for their compression. This metalanguage is then translated
to an actual program. CARGO is not a specification per se, but upon sharing the configuration defined in
the metalanguage, the content of the file can be understood and returned to its original format.
As mentioned previously, the encoding process divides the input information into the different fields
defined using the metalanguage. Each of these new streams of information is then compressed as specified.
The compression occurs in blocks.
3.1.3 Compressed Reference-oriented Alignment Map
As we have said, the majority of any individual genome is the same as the reference genome. Therefore
only those nucleotides which differ from the reference genome should be stored. The Compressed Reference-
oriented Alignment Map (CRAM) format [19, 20] takes advantage of this fact. As only the differences with
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the reference genome are stored, the original reference genome must be provided to decode the content of
the file.
The CRAM specification segregates the information into different blocks, and each block can be com-
pressed with one of multiple compressors available.
CRAM does lose part of the adaptability of CARGO as there is no metalanguage to tailor-fit the file
according to the needs, but the information is already segregated in order to reduce heterogeneity, there is
no issue in interoperability as everybody uses the same segregation in types and CRAM further reduces the
need for memory storage by allowing to remove all the information equal to the reference genome.
3.2 Securing the genomic information
As we have seen, the genomic information reveals facts about our parents, our identity and the diseases we
might face. Furthermore, as the genome is inherited by the offspring, a breach of confidentiality concerning
the genome of one generation also carries consequences for the next and for the previous generations. The
research community is carrying out studies on possible attacks and ways to protect against them.
Currently, one of the approaches to protect genomic information is by the use of beacons [21]. In a
beacon, the genomic information of multiple individuals is stored in the form of the diagnosed mutations.
This then allows to query information about the mutations: a query to a beacon might for example concern
the frequency of a given mutation in the part of the population with a given disease, or the question whether
at least one patient presents the mutation. The beacon approach is intended to protect the information of
any given patient as the information of one individual cannot be obtained, only information relating to the
whole population is accessible.
3.2.1 Proposed attacks
3.2.1.1 Based on correlations within the genome
One approach which has been considered for the release of genomic information while maintaining certain
levels of confidentiality is to simply not publish one part of the genome. This approach was taken in 2008,
when the genome of Dr. James Watson was published without the data corresponding to the APOE gene
linked to Late Onset Alzheimer Disease. However, using statistical information about which mutations are
usually inherited together, the non-published information can be obtained by inference, as was done in [22].
The proposed attack led to erasing 2-Mb worth of information around the region of interest in Dr. Watson’s
published genome.
In 2015, Samani et al. [23] proved that such an attack could also be carried out using another mathe-
matical approach. The authors built a Markov model which tries to represent the probability to see a given
allele on the basis of the knowledge about the previously seen alleles.
The danger of such techniques can be lessened by taking into account those same statistics, as proposed in
[24], where the authors propose to maximize the utility of the published information (e.g., publish as much
relevant information for research as possible) while ensuring that certain features which have to remain
private cannot be inferred.
3.2.1.2 Based on population statistics
Some attacks have been proposed against the beacon approach. In [25] a technique for detecting the presence
of an individual in a group is proposed. In the publication, the authors consider the case of forensic analysis,
but they also prove the validity of their contribution regarding DNA sequences from the HapMap repository.
The objective of the contribution is to detect the presence of the genome of one individual in a sample
containing the genome of many individuals. By sequencing the DNA in the sample, they have access to
the allele frequencies within the group. They also have allele frequencies for a reference population. In
order to determine whether the genome of the individual is in the sample they compare whether his or her
frequencies are more similar to the reference population or to the sample. With a statistical test they give
the probability that the individual is in the sample.
As the frequency of Single Nucleotide Permutations (SNP) might be affected by ancestry, the authors
propose solutions to reduce this influence. One of them consists in using SNPs which are known to be less
tied to ancestry. The other solution is to adapt the reference population to the individual who is being
searched. By knowing, or discovering through SNPs, which reference is better suited, we are better equipped
to correctly assert whether the individual is in the sample or not. Since blood-relatives share at least some
DNA, this attack can be reformulated to detect someone close to the studied individual in the mixture.
This technique can be generalized to the case of beacons. In this configuration, there is no sample any
more, but instead, the mixture of genomes is the beacon. The frequency of each mutation is not measured
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in the sample, but rather queried from the beacon. This technique is considered as privacy threatening since
being in a beacon might be an indication of a disease or similar. A straightforward implementation of a
beacon where every frequency request is answered without any control enables such an attack.
The publication by Homer et al. [25] led to further improvements on the strategy. For example in [26],
a mathematical reformulation of the attack was proposed which also allowed to include prior knowledge to
further enhance the reliability.
Due to various factors, the probability of finding a certain mutation is possibly not independent of
finding another. Jacobs et al. stated in 2009 [27] that at that point, for their method to behave correctly,
they needed to be in linkage equilibrium. In other words, the mutations had to be uncorrelated until the
underlying dynamics were better understood. Wang at al. prove in [28] that linkage disequilibrium is in fact
a powerful tool to further improve re-identification attacks in Genome Wide Association Studies. According
to the authors, just with the results which are usually published after such a study it could be possible to
discover the presence of one individual in the case group. Wang et al. describe the likelihood of such an
attack as "even more realistic than expected".
The previous reference methods need inputs which are not trivially obtained. Besides access to the
beacon, the genome of the target of the attack and a reference population statistics are required. Moreover,
in case of just having access to an anonymized genome, the negative effects of the attack are greatly reduced.
In [29], the authors show that the attack presented in [25] has good sensitivity, but that it lacks in
specificity. False positives are too likely, which undermines the effectiveness of [25]’s method.
The attack published in [25] is based on frequencies. In [30], a variation is proposed which is based on
answers to yes or no questions. The idea is that certain beacons allow to query whether, for a given position,
they have a certain mutation in the aggregation, whereas the question was previously about the minimum
allele frequency for that position (i.e., what is the probability to see the least common variation). The attack
proposed in [30] can be interpreted as an adaptation of a Bloom filter to the attack proposed in [25].
3.2.2 Differential privacy
A key element to succeed in attacks like those proposed in [25] is the accuracy of the frequency measurements.
Differential privacy [31] defends against such attacks by adding noise to the results. There is a trade-off in
the amount of noise added: the more noise the system adds, the more it preserves privacy, but the less useful
the information becomes. We want to achieve a situation where the result of a query over the aggregated
data is virtually the same as the result of the same query over the same data with one individual more or
one individual less. We achieve this by adding noise to the result obtained from the aggregated data.
We define a parameter  which gives a sense of the privacy we are striving for. For two neighboring sets,
the results of the aggregation function should not differ more than by a ratio of exp . We then need to
balance the levels of noise in order to reach a compromise between privacy and utility. This balance is the
critical point of differential privacy (see Figure 3.1). An example of this can be found in the pharmacogenetics
study published in [32]. In this publication, the authors try to establish what the correct dosing of warfarin
would be, using differential privacy as a protective method for the privacy of the patient. Their conclusion
is that if the trade-off between privacy and utility is set in such a way that we do prevent attacks, the dosing
is so far off that "patients would be exposed to increased risk of stroke, bleeding events, and mortality".
One solution to ensure high privacy and high utility at a time is to increase the number of participants
in the study, but this might not be feasible. In [33] we are introduced to the idea that by better assessing
the attackers’ knowledge we will be able to use less noise: we have the required privacy levels, without the
loss of accuracy.
As we have seen, differential privacy has been used to protect minor allele frequencies, but also chi-square
statistics as in [34] (an idea which was further extended in [35] with the introduction of χ2 statistics with
variable numbers of individuals in the case and control groups).
3.2.3 Homomorphic encryption
We are considering how to execute some computation on information which has to be private due to its
sensitivity. This use case is not a specificity of the genomic data. The ability of executing a computation
over private data is a feature needed in many different fields: for example a web search engine where the
server shall not know what the submitted query is, or just a database with very limited access to the query
being run and the data which is stored (e.g., CryptDB [36]).
Homomorphic encryption’s goal is to allow the execution of a computation over encrypted data. The
result of the computation is obtained when the result is decrypted. In other words, the final decrypted result
is the same as the result obtained when the computation is executed over the plaintext data, yet the data is
never decrypted.
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Figure 3.1: Visual representation of differential privacy. Three aggregation values are represented: one for
N individuals and two for the neighboring sets (i.e., removing one individual or inserting one). The noise
which is added creates a likely segment of values. As can be seen, these segments overlap for the neighboring
sets: this makes it harder to guess from which set the result originated. This illustrates the idea of privacy.
We also lose track of the real value: this is the loss of accuracy.
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In [37] homomorphic encryption is used to perform pattern matching over genomic data. The method
returns the Hamming distance, executing the computation securely on the cloud using Somewhat Homo-
morphic Encryption. In the proposed system the genomic data and the pattern to search for are encrypted
using the same key.
A similar problem is the question whether there is a specific marker in a given DNA string. [38] presents
a secure computation to detect the presence of a given marker at a given location in the genome. On the
one hand nobody other than the person in possession of the DNA should learn which markers were detected,
and on the other hand nobody other than the provider should know the test being performed (i.e., which
substring is searched for, and at which position). The motivation behind protecting the test is plainly
defending the interest of the Intellectual Property (IP) of the company whose test is being executed.
[39] also contemplates the need to protect the IP. In this proposal there are two parties: a Data Center
attempts to defend the patient’s data it holds, and a Medical Center executes a request to this data in order
to obtain a measure for a given patient but wants the request to remain secret. In the proposed construction,
the Medical Center sends an array of weights: the response of the Data Center is the scalar product of the
SNPs and the weights. In this model, both players can be the attacker or the defender. The attack of
the Data Center is logging which SNPs are requested. In order to defend itself against this, the Medical
Center can add dummy weights. The Medical Center could perform an attack on the Data Center by only
including one non-zero weighted SNP, thus discovering its value, or use a sequence of powers of the same
number, revealing multiple SNPs. When sending the request, the Medical Center generates, for each weight,
what the authors call a commitment: this can be viewed as a hash of the weight. The Data Center then
randomly selects two commitments and asks for the weights: the Data Center checks whether the numbers
might indicate an attack by the Medical Center. If the Data Center has suspicions, this step can be repeated.
Ultimately, the scalar multiplication is executed homomorphically. As the authors state, the Data Center
could deviate from the protocol and request more verification rounds, but the Medical Center can detect
this and abort the procedure. Similarly, if too many weights appear to be non-legitimate, the Data Center
can decide to stop the query.
[40] describes a method of computing the χ2 statistic securely on the cloud. The proposal uses a secret
and a public key: every participant in the study encrypts his data with the public key and sends it to the
cloud. The cloud then computes the result which is subsequently decrypted by the research team using the
secret key. The researchers generate the key-pair used. Therefore, there is a risk that they could obtain
the data sent by the patients: if the cloud provider and the researchers collude, the cloud could send the
encrypted inputs to the researchers, who could easily decrypt the data using the secret key.
3.2.4 Multiparty computation
[41] proposes two solutions for computing the χ2 test for genomic data. The proposal considers multiple
computation parties and multiple parties holding genomic information that must remain private. Each
party holding information computes a contingency table summarizing the number of instances for a specific
combination of genome and phenotype. All contingency tables are secret-shared with all computation parties.
The computation parties then compute whether the χ2 test is positive when compared to a given threshold.
The computation parties combine all computed secrets to reveal a table of true/false results indicating
whether, for each position, there seems to be a correlation with the phenotype.
[42] also uses multiparty computation. Multiple individuals share their genome with multiple computation
parties using secret-share. The parties perform the Genome-Wide Association Study (GWAS) by retrieving
multiple statistics and computing Primary Component Analysis (PCA). Each computation parties computes
over the secret-shared information. The final solution is revealed to the computation parties when they
combine the results of their computations. The contribution considers the computation parties to be curious
but honest: the computation parties are expected not to diverge from the protocol, i.e., not to collude to
retrieve the original input.
3.2.5 Proposed secure formats
The most frequent formats [14, 43] for storing genomic information do not provide confidentiality mechanisms,
and thus no attacks can be proposed against them. To palliate this shortcoming, other formats have since
been introduced: Cryfa [44] for unaligned data, Global Alliance For Genome and Health (GA4GH) File
Encryption Standard [45] and Selective retrieval on Encrypted and Compressed Reference-oriented Alignment
Map (SECRAM) [46] for aligned data. To the best of our knowledge no attack has been proposed against
these.
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3.2.5.1 Cryfa
Cryfa uses an approach of dividing the input data into different streams of information. Each of these
streams are treated separately in their representation. In a step the authors refer to as compacting they
represent multiple symbols of the stream with one output symbol. The result is then shuffled and encrypted.
The rationale behind the shuffling is to increase the difficulty of a brute-force attack. If the first bytes to be
decrypted were a known fixed sequence of bytes, it could be used to identify the moment when a brute-force
attack has found the correct key. However, as the content is shuffled, the first bytes to be expected are
not known, therefore such an approach cannot be straightforwardly used to identify the successful end of a
brute-force attack.
Although the publication presenting Cryfa is turned towards protecting FASTQ, the approach could also
be used for the information provided in an aligned file.
3.2.5.2 SECRAM
As previously mentioned, SECRAM [46] is designed for aligned data. While SAM [14] stores the alignment
information for each read, as already described, SECRAM [46] stores the information per position: for each
position, all alignment results are stored together. In other words, the information provided in a SAM read is
broken down into the alignment information for each of the mapped positions, and each of these subunits of
information is appended to the list of alignment results per position. This restructuring of the information,
akin to the transposition of a matrix, allows the encryption of the information for certain positions. To the
best of our knowledge, no attack has been proposed against this. However, using a database such as [9] and
assuming that the user will only encrypt a mutated position, the original data might be recovered.
SECRAM does not use a compression approach as in CRAM that avoids to give information already
present in the reference genome. However, the restructuring of the information increases the likelihood of
having the same nucleotide repeated multiple times, thus improving the compressibility, as reflected in the
results.
3.2.5.3 GA4GHCrypt
The Global Alliance For Genome and Health (GA4GH) is specifying a new container ensuring the privacy
and the integrity of the information during file transports. This new container, called GA4GHcrypt [45],
relies on dividing the content of the original file into smaller units of information. These smaller units do
not need to correspond to semantical units of the original file. They correspond instead to the units of
encryption and integrity verification.
This approach allows encrypting any file format, regardless of its content or representation. From this
point of view, GA4GHCrypt is similar to other formats, such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [47].
GA4GHcrypt relies on the combination of different keys, which shall yield, through a specified compu-
tation, the key used to encrypt the different blocks of data. There are four different asymmetric keys: both
for the writer and for the reader, the algorithm uses both the public and the secret keys. Whereas in PGP,
the public key of the sender must be made available at an earlier stage and outside the scope of the file
transmission, or using open registries, in GA4GH, the writer’s public key is stored within the file.
On the writer’s side, the tool encrypts the content with a random key KS . The tool then stores the
key within the output file in an encrypted format. The algorithm obtains the key used to encrypt KS in a
two-step computation: first, it combines the secret key of the writer with the public key of the reader using
Diffie-Hellman, and then hashes the result of this computation with the two public keys. Figure 3.2 shows
the process.
On the reader’s side, the tool executes a similar algorithm. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm now takes
the reader’s secret key and the writer’s public key as inputs, and the tool does not generate a random key.
Instead, it decrypts the key to read the content of the file. Figure 3.3 shows the process.
GA4GHcrypt defines that the file format can transport multiple keys. In that case, the tool can encrypt
any one of the file portions with any one of the keys. On the reader side, the tool will attempt to decrypt
the portion until one of the keys verifies the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
3.2.6 Access rules
3.2.6.1 ADA-M
Currently, each repository of genomic information must decide how to resolve each access request.
GA4GH aims at providing a format to represent the access rules. They propose a format which encap-
sulates for a given resource the different requirements which have to be met to authorize a request. They
refer to this format as Automatable Discovery and Access Matrix (ADA-M) [48].
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Figure 3.2: Encryption process used in GA4GHCrypt
24 CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART
Figure 3.3: Decryption process used in GA4GHCrypt
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ADA-M’s authors list five main goals:
1. Through the definition of a broadly applicable access rule description format, they intend to consolidate
the approach.
2. Creating one unified approach also helps in the creation of storage tools.
3. Transmission is also simplified, as the two parties can use ADA-M as lingua franca between them.
4. Having access rules following the same format bound to every resource simplifies querying the rules
governing a specific one.
5. ADA-M entries allow a tool to resolve, potentially, a request automatically.
The specification divides the structure of an ADA-M profile into two main parts: a header and a body. The
header conveys information on the resource to which the ADA-M profile regulates access. The specification
further divides the body into three sections:
1. permissions
2. terms
3. meta-conditions.
3.2.7 Watermarking
3.2.7.1 Watermarking in genomics
Watermarking techniques can be used for a broad set of tasks. In [49], the authors list different use cases
which could be covered with the use of watermarking in the context of healthcare, specifically when the
watermark is applied to an image. These use cases include:
• simplifying the access control (If the image’s metadata – e.g., information about the patient – is stored
within the image by the means of the watermark, protecting the image and controlling the access to it
also protects and controls access to the metadata.)
• moving identification information present in the image to a watermark only accessible through a key
• improving the captioning of the image in order to open new ways of attaching information to it
• using a watermark to carry information identifying the origin, such as a signature.
In [49], the new channel obtained thanks to watermarking is used to merge an identification of the receiver
into the genomic information.
As in the case of multimedia information, the watermarking may be more or less obtrusive (depending
on the significance of the introduced changes). There are different criteria to compare watermark methods,
for example:
• the easiness to be recognized by a computer
• the decrease in value of the data
• the resistance of the detection of the watermark to file alterations.
Following with the multimedia analogy, these points would correspond to the following questions:
• Is the watermark visible at plain sight, or is it hidden, for example, using steganography?
• Is the watermark adding known content which can be easily searched for, or is it just adding noise?
• Is the watermark still present if the image is downscaled, rotated or otherwise modified?
On the other hand, the modifications can be more or less intrusive: methods can limit their effects to
less significant regions, or, on the contrary, modify the content without considering its impact. In [50] we
find an example of modifications in images with limited effect, as the proposed algorithm only modifies the
least significant bits of certain elements.
The modification of the least significant bit is also employed in [51]. The authors include a new signal to
the wireless transmission of an electrocardiogram (ECG): the proposed new signal is to indicate the identity
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of the patient within the ECG signal. The effect of the least significant bit modification is mitigated by
upscaling the values of the signal.
Another strategy is the one employed by the authors of [52]: their contribution addresses the need for
watermarking images. In order to preserve the clinically relevant portions of the image, they discriminate
between regions of interest (Region Of Interest, ROI) or not (Non-Region Of Interest, NROI). By applying
the watermarking techniques to the NROI regions only, the potential drawbacks due to the file modification
are mitigated.
In order to know whether the watermark will be resistant to file modifications, we first identify a number
of actions which can be performed when modifying a genomic file and then consider their implications on
the security method:
• exporting portions of the file, e.g., data for one chromosome
The effects of the watermark should be present in the entirety of the file, so that it is unlikely that any
significant portion has not been modified.
• importing other (portions of) files
The watermark should not be invalidated by the presence of new non-watermarked data.
• modifying without semantic changes (i.e., the file is changed but not its meaning, e.g., the read iden-
tifiers are changed)
The watermarking method should rely on a minimal set of information, unlikely to be modified.
• modifying with semantic changes (i.e., certain mutations have been added or deleted)
The watermarking method should limit the input from the file’s data, so that sparse modifications
have as little effect as possible.
Additionally, the watermarking strategy could be defeated by collusion: if multiple instances of the
same file (with different watermarks) are obtained, they can be compared in order to determine the non-
watermarked version.
As previously referred to, a watermarking technique might alter the original host signal. The magnitude
of the modification could render the signal unusable. One approach to mitigate this issue, further than just
constraining the magnitude of the modification, is to ensure that the modification as a whole is reversible.
This is done for example in [53], where two images are merged together, and both are recoverable. The host
signal is an image to which a logo is associated, without notably altering the original image. When received,
and if the necessary side information is also available, both the image and the logo can be recovered.
3.2.7.2 Use of watermarking in genomic information
The process to sequence and align the genome is important for many use cases. It can be used to perform
research on diseases, to identify the best treatment or even to find better crops. Thus, it is important to be
able to share the genomic information, but we might want to retain some control on the shared data: either
to respect intellectual property or to hold bad actors accountable in case of data leaks. To this end, it is
interesting to be able to modify the data in some way (i.e., to watermark it), in order to identify leakers in
case of an audit. We have to make clear the difference between watermarking a DNA molecule of a living
cell and including a mark in the result of sequencing such molecules.
[54] and [55] describe an algorithm to introduce content in the genome of a living organism. The infor-
mation is introduced by changing some nucleotides (specifically the last nucleotide of each group of three
nucleotides). Each changed nucleotide allows to encode two bits of information (as there are four different
nucleotides). The nucleotides to be changed are decided according to the consequences of changing the nu-
cleotide. In the process of translating the DNA into a protein, each group of three nucleotides is translated
into an amino acid, and for certain combinations of the two first nucleotides, the translation will result in the
same amino acid, no matter the value of the third nucleotide. Only those changes which do not change the
protein synthesized from the edited portion of the DNA are possible. This procedure ensures that the living
organism will still produce the same proteins. As the modifications are meant to be present in a living cell,
and DNA replications might occur, the authors propose to integrate error detection and correction schemes
into the message being encoded in the DNA: the method and the length of the correction strategies are
determined by the likelihood of a mutation affecting the modified region. Therefore, the authors of [54, 55]
focus on ensuring that the modifications do not affect the living cell.
On the contrary, we are focusing on watermarking the representation of the result of sequencing DNA
molecules. There are other authors with similar objectives, as those of [56]. They modify sequential data
before sending it to every recipient in such a way that the possibility to reconstruct the original data is
minimal, the modifications are unique for each recipient, and it is hard for the recipients to collude and
revert the modifications. Furthermore, the number of modified nucleotides is a constraint given as an input.
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[56] uses the concept of sequential data as a sequence of data points where each point can take one value
from a fixed pool of values. The data points (nucleotides which could be modified) they use are the locations
of well-known mutations, and the pool of values comprises the situations where the mutation is present in
none, in one or in the two chromosomes of the individual. [56] does not address one specific genomic file
format but rather the genomic data as an array of properties. This array of properties resembles more the
data represented in a Variant Call Format (VCF) file (limited to mutations affecting only one nucleotide -
Single Nucleotide Polymorphism, SNP), but it could also be used for sequenced data files (such as a SAM file),
if all reads covering one position modified by the watermark are modified. Based on the knowledge of what
has been shared before and the modifications applied, the authors use an optimization problem represented
as an Integer Linear Program (ILP) to decide what modifications should be operated on the data before
sending it to the next recipient. The optimization minimizes the probability of the recipients being able to
collude and deduce the watermarked positions, under the constraints guaranteeing certain levels of utility.
Each modification is deliberate (the ILP minimization can select each data point independently). This
allows the authors to perform such actions as to repeat certain modifications across multiple watermarked
instances to fight off collusions. The authors consider the utility as a fraction of modified data: if the number
of modified data points compared to the number of total points is low, the authors consider the utility to be
high. A limitation of this algorithm is that the watermark cannot be undone.
3.3 Metadata
In order to make sense of the information, it must be accompanied by metadata. This metadata can range
from facts about how the information was obtained and how it was processed to facts about the study in
which it was generated and information about the individual (such as phenotypical information).
3.3.1 SAM header
The SAM header, which is also present in BAM and CRAM, provides certain information in the form of
metadata. This information includes:
• the version being used and information on the sorting and grouping of reads
• information on the sequences used for the alignment (their name, their length, hashes to identify them
in the future)
• description of each of the read groups:
– the library from which the group has been sequenced
– the name of the center where the group has been sequenced
– a description of the sample
– the programs used in the processing of the information
– information about the platform used for sequencing (technology name, platform model, platform
unit)
• each of the programs used in the post-processing of the information, with the parameters used and the
order in which the pipeline was executed.
3.3.2 EGA
As we have seen, the SAM header covers many of the specific needs required to document an aligned file.
However, we have also seen that there are other formats involved in analyzing the genome. In the case of
a whole study (i.e., a purposefully built collection of individual genomes) there is more information to be
represented which, instead of affecting each one of the genomes, concerns the collection of them. This might
for example be the centers involved in the study. These might not coincide with the centers performing
the actual sequencing of the genomes. To this end, the European Genome Archive (EGA) [9] has created a
broad set of metadata specifications. The metadata is encoded with eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
and specified using XML schemas [57].
The metadata specification used by the EGA aims at documenting each one of the following aspects:
• data access committee
It lists the contact information for each member of the data access committee. In case of wanting
access to the dataset, the corresponding data access committee must be contacted.
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• dataset
It groups different run and analysis results. The dataset can have a type attached to it (e.g., whole
genome sequencing, exome sequencing).
• policy
It marks which usages are allowed for the data contained in the dataset.
• analysis
It represents a sequence analysis result (sequence alignment, sequence variation or sequence annota-
tion).
• experiment
It specifies how the sequencing will be performed (this includes the experiment’s design, the platform
being used, and the processing strategy).
• run
It represents a group of reads generated.
• sample
It specifies the sequenceable material being used (information on the taxonomy, its provenance if not
anonymized or the anonymization procedure).
• study
It defines the purpose of the study and the framework in which the experiments are conducted.
Figure 3.4 depicts the dependency relation between the different elements. This structure allows re-
searchers to upload datasets with the results they have obtained, alongside information on how the datasets
can be reused (dataset access committee). This structure also permits the creation of studies which will use
one or more of these datasets to obtain the data required for the research.
This metadata specification also documents the evolution of the genomic material (FASTQ) by logging
how the information was sequenced in a ’run’, and how this information has further evolved into more
complete material (SAM or VCF files) through ’analysis’. The ’run’ is then linked to a sample with a
documented phenotype, and the different ’analyses’ are linked to the original material.
data access committee
dataset
policy
analysis
run
experiment
sample
study
platform
processing
library
Figure 3.4: Relation between concepts used in the EGA metadata specification
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3.3.3 National Cancer Institute: Genomic Data Commons
The Genomic Data Commons (GDC) [58] portal helps to navigate the library of medical results obtained in
the context of different projects investigating cancer. The results are available as files, and multiple formats
coexist. The GDC portal contains, among other things, alignment results in the BAM format, variation calls
in the VCF format, and even images of the different samples.
The portal groups different results according to multiple criteria. Each result originates from a project.
The portal identifies and references each project through a unique ID. For each project, the portal provides us
with the main characteristics (the anatomical site under investigation, the type of cancer, and the employed
strategy).
The repository ties each result to a case. Each case belongs to a clinical entry. A clinical entry is a
combination of different factors:
• demographic (for example, the gender and the indication whether the patient is still alive)
• diagnostic/treatments (the diagnostic and further information such as the affection’s severity, the age
of the patient when diagnosed, or the date of a relapse)
• exposures (a grouping by external factors, such as alcohol consumption).
The Genomic Data Commons relies on having the provided information interlinked. A Universally Unique
Identifier (UUID) identifies every entry regardless of the type: the project, the case, the demographic, the
diagnostic and the exposures are all identified. The IDs enable searches such as finding all cases belonging
to the same demographic.
3.3.4 Genomic Standards Consortium
The Genomic Standards Consortium [59] has specified a metadata representation for genomes (MIGS),
metagenomes (MIMS) and marker genes (MIMARKS). The specification defines a list of fields which have
to be present, or could be present. For each field, its name, meaning, expected format and occurrences
(among others) are provided. The encoding format is not specified: the specification only defines the fields
to provide. The authors refer to this as checklists. For each one of the broader goals, the specification defines
multiple environments. For example in the case of metadata for genomes (MIGS), there are five different
environments defined (eukarya, bacteria or archaea, plasmid, virus, organelle). Whether a field has to be
present or not depends on the environment.
The specified set of fields is what the consortium considers to be the minimal set of information required.
In order to extend the capabilities of the format, there are so-called environmental packages which add new
fields to the checklist in order to document, for example, where the sample was obtained (e.g., the human
gut).
This basic metadata representation can be extended in two ways: either a new core checklist can be
introduced, or new extensions can be defined.
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Chapter 4
MPEG-G compression
This chapter presents the encoding strategy for sequenced genomic data adopted by the Moving
Picture Expert Group (MPEG), resulting in ISO/IEC 23092, Genomic Information Representa-
tion, MPEG-G [60]. In the context of this thesis, we have not contributed with new technologies
to this encoding, but we have pointed out errors in it (cf. [61]). We have also contributed to the
development of two tools implementing MPEG’s encoding, as published in [62, 63]. We comment
on the adopted approach and propose possible future improvements.
4.1 Standardization procedure
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a body whose aim is the definition and promotion
of standards. ISO divides itself into different technical committees that dedicate themselves to different
subjects of standardization (e.g., the technical committee ISO/TC 17 publishes standards on steel, ISO/TC
117 on fans). The committee dedicated to information technology is a joint committee (ISO/IEC JTC 1)
resulting from the merging of ISO’s and the International Electrotechnical Commission’s (IEC) groups on
information technology.
If the area of standardization is too broad, technical committees can structure themselves into subcom-
mittees, each corresponding to a finer-grained area of standardization.
Within a technical committee or subcommittee, there are multiple working groups. Each one has an
even finer-grained topic of standardization. This thesis describes work carried out in the Moving Picture
Expert Group (MPEG), the working group dedicated to "Coding moving picture and audio". MPEG is the
11th working group within the subcommittee for "Coding of audio, picture, multimedia and hypermedia
information" (SC29) of the previously mentioned joint committee ISO/IEC JTC 1. As such, MPEG can
also be referred to as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 29/WG11.
Working groups are composed of delegates. Delegates are specialists on their topics who are sent by their
respective national bodies to participate in the crafting of the international standard.
In some cases, different working groups cooperate in the crafting of a standard, if the standard in question
intersects their respective working areas.
When the need for a new standard is perceived, a new standardization activity is opened. The relevant
working group starts by collecting requirements. Once it has identified the needs, a Call for Proposals is
issued. The Call for Proposals specifies the requirements which all propositions must meet. The process
expects the different actors from both industry and research who have relevant technologies for the upcoming
standard to answer the call.
The working group builds the standard from the different received proposals. In order to make the most
informed decision, the working group can define a Core Experiment: the delegates evaluate the different
proposals against the defined criteria.
From the evidence gathered during the Call for Proposals and the Core Experiment, the delegates start
writing the actual specification. Each one can submit new evidence and material to be reviewed by the
working group during the next meeting. Based on the prior work and these contributions, the working group
refines the specification.
The standard passes through different phases. The initial one is the Working Draft (WD), which suc-
cessively becomes a Candidate Draft (CD), then a Draft International Standard (DIS), and finally an Inter-
national Standard (IS). There might even be an additional stage in between DIS and IS, called Final Draft
International Standard (FDIS).
For the standard to pass to the next stage, the national bodies must agree to it in a voting process. They
can vote yes or no, or abstain. A vote can be accompanied by comments (in the case of a negative vote, the
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comment is obligatory.) Comments can be either general, technical or editorial. At the next meeting, the
working group gathers all comments and addresses each one of them. A comment can be taken into account
or discarded, and the working group must state what has been changed (or not) in the draft and why.
As previously mentioned, the here presented work has been performed within the scope of MPEG and the
Data processing and integration group within ISO TC 276 Biotechnology. We contributed to the standard
as delegates of the Spanish national body. The standard focuses on genomic information representation. As
this information must be compressed to be usable, the standardization activity corresponds to the area of
two working groups: MPEG due to the need for compression, and the Data processing and integration group
within the Biotechnology technical committee for the bioinformatics component.
MPEG usually divides its standards into different parts. Each part undergoes the previously described
stages. In the case of the here described standard for genomic information representation (MPEG-G [60] or
ISO/IEC 23092), there are currently five different parts:
• Part 1 Transport and storage of genomic information
It describes the file and transportation format.
• Part 2 Coding of genomic information
It describes the decompressing and decoding of the genomic information.
• Part 3 Metadata and application programming interfaces (APIs)
It describes the metadata, the security mechanisms and the programmatic interfaces offered by the
standard.
• Part 4 Reference software
It provides a reference implementation of the standard.
• Part 5 Conformance
It provides testing material to check the conformity of new implementations of the standard.
We have mainly contributed to Parts 1 and 3.
4.2 Data structuring in Part 2
In order to decode the information we need it to be represented in a form priorly agreed upon. MPEG-G
Part 2 defines this representation as a sequence of Data Units of which there are three different types:
1. Parameters Data Unit
It provides the parameters required during decompression (e.g., binarization used and its configuration)
and decoding (e.g., maximal number of reads per record, whether the reads have constant length, and
if so which length).
2. Reference Data Unit
It provides the reference information to be used while decoding.
3. Access Unit Data Unit
It provides the actual information to be decoded. This structure contains the compressed information,
alongside indexing information on the content of the Access Unit.
Thus, similarly to CRAM, MPEG-G uses both the idea of breaking the information to be decoded into
independent units and the use of an externally provided reference genome to storing redundant information.
4.3 Information decoding
Similarly to how CARGO and CRAM compress the information, the different fields of the record are sepa-
rated into streams. We refer to each of these streams as descriptors. Some of the descriptors are:
• the position descriptor (referred to as ’pos’)
As the name indicates, it is meant to store the position of the record. But as we previously indicated,
in a record there might be multiple reads. This descriptor indicates the position of the read within the
record appearing first in the genome.
• the pair descriptor (referred to as ’pair’)
This descriptor is used for multiple purposes. On the one hand it allows to determine whether there
are multiple reads within the record. In the case there are, it stores the information of where the paired
read is placed (i.e., the position of the read within the record appearing second in the genome).
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• the read name descriptor (referred to as ’rname’)
• the read length descriptor (referred to as ’rlen’)
In the case where the reads have variable lengths, this descriptor is used to decode the length of each
one of them.
• the mutation position and type descriptors (referred to as ’mpos’ and ’mtype’)
These streams are used to store the differences with the reference genome: the combination of both
descriptors allows to recover the original sequence. The process to recover the read’s nucleotides
sequence is to execute each of the operations deduced from the mutation position and mutation type
streams: change one nucleotide, introduce new nucleotides, or delete nucleotides.
• the quality value stream (referred to as ’qv’)
It stores for each of the nucleotides the quality value associated to it.
We illustrate how the different streams and substreams are used by referring back to the instance provided
in Table 2.1. In our example we would have the following Descriptor Streams:
• the position of the read (’pos’)
This stream contains the value 1, as the first and only read begins at position 1 of the reference.
• the operation positions (’mpos’)
This stream contains the values 2, 4 and 6, as these correspond to the positions where the read differs
from the reference.
• the operation types (’mtype’)
This stream uses multiple substreams:
– The actual operation is stored in a dedicated substream. This substream contains the values
Insertion, Deletion and Mutation.
– The inserted nucleotides are stored in another substream. This substream contains the value ’A’,
as it is the only inserted nucleotide.
– The mutated nucleotides are stored in yet another substream. This substream contains the value
’A’, as it is the only mutated nucleotide.
However, depending on the record not all descriptors are required: for example, in the case where all
reads in a record are identical to the reference genome, the streams dedicated to operations are not required.
Based on this approach the decoding process specified by MPEG-G Part 2 defines different classes of data,
which allows to avoid providing certain streams. The class of the data is defined for the entire Data Unit
Access Unit, and the approach is meant to segregate the information. For each region of the genome, the
data is separated in as many classes as required, with one Data Unit Access Unit per class. The different
classes defined are:
1. Class P
It contains only reads which are mapped to the reference genome with only an equal operation (i.e.,
perfectly mapped, leading to the class being named P). This implies that there is no need to store the
position of the operation, its type, and which nucleotides are inserted or which substitutions there are.
2. Class N
It contains only reads where some nucleotides could not be identified represented with the symbol ’N’
(leading to the class being named N). With respect to class P, we only need to add the descriptor for
the operation positions (as we already know that all operations will be a mutation to ’N’).
3. Class M
It contains only reads where there are only mutations (leading to the class being named M). With
respect to class N, we only need to add the descriptor for the mutated nucleotide.
4. Class I
It contains all remaining reads (i.e., reads containing insertions and deletions, also known as indels,
leading to the class being named I). In this class, all descriptors must be present.
We should also note that, for those cases where information is unmapped or half-mapped, MPEG-G provides
the classes U (Unmapped) and HM (Half-Mapped), but they are not relevant for the present case.
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Figure 4.1: Structure of encoded information
4.4 Information decompressing
In each of the Data Unit Access Unit, the information of each of the streams is compressed. The decompressor
used in MPEG-G is the Context-Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding (CABAC) [64] entropy decoder, an
entropy decoder devised and still used for the video formats developed by MPEG.
The CABAC entropy decoder needs to be initialized with certain parameters which are provided partly
in the Parameters Data Unit and at the beginning of each of the streams. CABAC only works with binary
information (i.e., the symbols being decoded are bits), therefore a binarization is also parametrized in order
to recover from the bits the original symbols to be used while decoding the records.
Finally, and in order to improve the compression, additional transformations and processes are defined
in MPEG-G Part 2. Some of the processes are based on a rewrite of the information: for example in the
case of the position descriptor, the information is not stored in absolute values but as delta values (i.e., the
distance to the previous value) as this helps to increase the repetition of symbols.
Another type of process used in MPEG-G Part 2 to improve the compression of information is to break the
information into substreams or subsequences. An example of this is the pair descriptor: Its first substream
indicates the type of pairing information (whether the record has paired information or not and if so,
whether the paired read is close by, on the same chromosome but further away, or whether it is on a different
chromosome). Then there are substreams for each of the cases (one substream to provide the position delta in
case of close-by pair, one substream to provide the absolute position in case of same sequence but distanced
pair, and one substream for the sequence and one substream for the position for the remaining case). The
subdivision into streams and subsequences is shown in Figure 4.1.
4.5 Thoughts on adopted approach
Certain aspects of the decoding process of the encoded MPEG-G information can be convoluted. Let us
address two of the origins of this complexity.
4.5.1 Data classes
One of the complexities arises from the existence of multiple classes. The motivation for using classes was
to improve both random access capabilities and compression. Let us reflect on both aspects.
4.5.1.1 Random access
The MPEG-G specification supported classes before supporting multiple alignments. After the inclusion of
secondary alignments, the group did not redefine the classes: the class still indicates the type of the first
alignment pair stored in the record. Depending on the record, this could correspond either to the primary or
the secondary alignment. Thus, if the parameters indicate the presence of multiple alignments, the decoder
cannot rely on the class of the Access Unit to determine all types of alignment present in it.
We have also seen that MPEG-G defines mechanisms to store multiple segments in one record, yet it
does not enforce the use of this feature. In some instances, e.g., when the aligner has mapped the segments
to different sequences, the segments have to be stored separately. When stored together, the Access Unit
containing the record must be of the most general class required. Yet, the same logic is not applied when
storing the information in different records. Let us clarify this with an example: We have two paired
segments, the first maps without mutations to the reference (this would correspond to a class P), the second
4.5. THOUGHTS ON ADOPTED APPROACH 35
maps to the reference, but has an insert (this would correspond to a class I). If the two segments were stored
together, the record would belong to an Access Unit of class I (dictated by the needs of the second segment).
If the encoder represented the two segments in two separate records, then the first one would be of class P,
and the second of class I. Since the encoder has no means to signal the encoding strategy to the decoder,
the decoder is forced to access all Access Units to retrieve the class P specific segments.
Although in the first versions of the specification, the separation in classes might have been useful in
creating new options for random access, this is not the case anymore.
4.5.1.2 Encoding
The primary motivation behind the creation of classes was to reduce the needs of descriptors when encoding.
For example, if we encode all reads mapping without any mutation to the reference, we can spare the need
to include the descriptors for mutation position, mutation type and similar. Although this reasoning seems
sound, the reduction in required memory is minimal. In the current specification, the first subsequence of
the descriptor for mutation positions encodes whether there are further mutations for the segment. If there
are, the subsequence returns the symbol 1, otherwise the symbol 0. If all segments stored in an Access Unit
were to have no mutations, the first subsequence of the mutation position would only contain a repetition
of the symbol 0. Such a sequence of symbols is trivially encoded using repetitions. We can apply this
reasoning to the other streams. Therefore, the gain in compression is not due to the existence of classes in
the specification. Instead, the segregation of the information is the root of the gain in compression.
4.5.1.3 Conclusion
We have seen that the benefits obtained from the specification defining classes are debatable. The use of
classes does not provide real gains in terms of Access Units. We would also obtain the same compression
result just by segregating the data without explicitly relying on classes. Yet, the concept of classes is central
to the decoding process: the specified process increases in complexity as the classes become less specific and
requires frequent conditional jumps based on the class.
We proposed to remove the concept of classes, but we made our contribution too late to have the
specification changed.
4.5.2 Stream decoding process
The MPEG group performed the majority of late-stage corrections to the MPEG-G specification on the
sections describing the decoding processes. Most notably, the corrections have focused on the less tested
parts of the standard, such as the decoding of multiple alignments. We have also contributed to some of
the corrections, for example, by proving that some ill-formed but still compliant input could cause errors
in the specified decoding process. We must therefore face the possibility that through seeking decoding
processes that lead to a better compression across different test cases, the group has created a hard to debug
specification.
Let us propose an alternative approach to the decoding process which should obtain if so wanted the
same compression levels, yet allows us to define a much easier decoding process. We must first see some of
the techniques currently used. To do so, we review the respective decoding processes of two of the streams.
4.5.2.1 Current specification
4.5.2.1.1 Quality values For each nucleotide of each read there is a metric of the quality of the sequenc-
ing (i.e., the degree of confidence with which the nucleotide has been sequenced). The encoding strategy
specified in MPEG-G relies on the idea that by grouping qualities by position, the encoder can detect similar
quality distributions, which leads to better compression results.
The encoder can specify multiple quality books. The first descriptor subsequence indicates which quality
book is used for which position of the genome. On the basis of this information, the decoder identifies the
corresponding subsequence and reads the symbol encoding the quality value.
Figure 4.2 shows this process and highlights the division between the information provided by the file
and the decoding process defined by the specification. We can see that the file is just a conveyer of encoded
symbols.
4.5.2.1.2 Mutation types When decoding the mutation type, we must, in fact, recover two pieces of
information: the mutation type and, if applicable, the nucleotide detected in the read (in case of a deletion,
per definition, there is no detected nucleotide).
The process of decoding the detected nucleotide relies on the decoded mutation type. If the mutation is
a deletion, no further reading is required. If the mutation is an insertion, the decoder reads the nucleotide
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Figure 4.2: Decoding of quality values
in the corresponding subsequence. If the mutation implies a change of the nucleotide, the decoder must
identify the stream which corresponds to the current genomic position: to obtain better compression, the
encoder has grouped the nucleotides according to the reference. Figure 4.3 shows this process.
4.5.2.2 Proposed changes
In Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the specification uses the decoding process of the stream to retrieve the element
marked in green. A valid solution, yet costly in terms of compression, would be storing all information for
the stream in one subsequence. Figure 4.4 shows this approach.
The benefit of this type of encoding is to lower the complexity of implementing an encoder. But this
makes it impossible to use any strategy based on the nature of the data (as we have seen, grouping specific
values improves the compression).
Let us draw a list of the building blocks of the decoding process we have seen:
• substream selection (as seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, we select from multiple substreams the correct one
on the basis of a value external to the decision)
• use of a contextual value highlighted in orange in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 (the decoding process has access
to specific genomic information used in the process)
• lookup tables (as in the case in the decoding process of the quality values, the decoding process retrieves
specific values from lookup tables).
Let us imagine a specification with substreams of two types. The first type, similar to the current
ones, represents encoded symbols. The second one, which has no equivalent in the current specification,
corresponds to a logical decision. Regardless of the type, the subsequence is identified. Some of the identifiers
are well-known, for example the ’identifier for quality value stream’. The streams with well-known identifiers
correspond to the elements highlighted in green in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
Like regular streams, the logical streams also return symbols. But as the name implies, the choice of the
returned symbol relies on a logical decision. To execute this decision, we need variables. Variables are also
identified. A subset of these identifiers is well-known. They correspond to the values represented in orange
in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
A logical decision can take the following form: "if variable A is true, read from stream B; otherwise, from
stream C". Similarly, logical streams can be defined to represent stream selection and lookup tables.
With these mechanisms in place, we can shift the complexity of the decoding process to the file. Figures
4.5 and 4.6 show the result of this rewriting. As we are still using the same encoding approach, we obtain the
same compression result. Yet, as the complexity of the decoding process is not defined in the specification,
the latter could be more straightforward, which simplifies its debugging.
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Figure 4.3: Decoding of mutations
Figure 4.4: Proposed easy decoding of quality values
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Figure 4.5: Proposed decoding of quality values
Figure 4.6: Proposed decoding of mutations
Chapter 5
File format
MPEG identified the requirements for MPEG-G´s file format. This chapter presents the result of
our work to meet these requirements. Our proposal is a container-based file format which creates
a layering in the information and allows to encapsulate sequenced genomic data (cf. Chapter
4), the metadata (cf. Chapter 6) and the security parameters (cf. Chapter 7). We describe the
finally adopted approach, which is a combination of our proposal with other inputs. We comment
on the adopted approach and propose possible future improvements. The result of our work has
been published in [65, 66].
5.1 Requirements
Alongside the definition of the compression mechanism, the MPEG-G group called for proposals on how to
transport the information. Transport refers both to the local representation of the data (e.g., as a file in
the local file system) and to the streaming of the genomic information over the network. The first identified
requirements were related to the needs of ensuring the integrity of the information, its privacy, and, generally,
the access control mechanism.
The initial requirements were later on extended to encompass other features required by the use cases:
random access based on position, random access based on certain features of the information and random
access for unaligned information.
5.2 Our proposed solution
Our first proposal submitted to MPEG in October 2016 was based on the ISO Base Media File Format [67].
Using this technology as the basis for our proposed file format had the main advantage of creating an easy-
to-parse file, with a clear tree-like structure of elements where containers for different types of information
could coexist. The ISO Base Media File Format (ISO BMFF) defines a structure based on a Key Length
Value (KLV) approach. The specification defines the syntax of the different containers, for example, whether
a given container holds another container.
We used the features of ISO BMFF to propose a file format able to carry different types of information:
uncompressed or compressed information of diverse nature (FASTQ, SAM, VCF). In this proposal, we
introduced the idea of grouping multiple files in one container: this allowed us to have one study constituted,
for example, by multiple alignments (i.e., SAM-like data), accompanied by VCF files. Our proposal thus
had three different layers: the Study level, dedicated to grouping together different sets of information; a
second level (which we called ’Dataset level’) corresponding to a sequencing, an alignment or a variant call;
and a third level allowing the subdivision of the information into multiple Streams akin to what has proven
effective in CRAM and CARGO.
Our subdivision of the information into multiple layers also proved key to meet the requirements defined
by MPEG. At each of these levels, we included the required elements to provide information on the privacy,
integrity and access rules settings. Metadata relevant for the Studies, Datasets or Streams also accompanied
this additional information.
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5.3 The adopted approach
5.3.1 Overview
The solution finally adopted by MPEG-G adopts many characteristics from our approach. Although the
final approach is not based anymore on ISO BMFF, the final approach takes its main characteristics: a tree
of containers is the basis for the format, containers which are represented, as in our contribution, with a KLV
syntax. Also taken over from our proposal, different layers structure the format: a Dataset represents each
SAM-like or FASTQ-like file to be contained in the MPEG-G file, and Datasets can be grouped in Dataset
Groups, akin to what we proposed with the Studies. The final proposal also includes our approach of taking
leverage on the hierarchical structure of the file when including metadata and security information.
5.3.2 Representation of the data
The file format defined for MPEG-G only transports MPEG-G encoded information, diverging from our
proposal. This fact streamlines the requirements faced by the transport format. We know that the encoder
structures the genomic information in a conceptual grid: the columns would be the different streams used for
the encoding, the rows the different regions of the genome. In other words, each cell in this grid corresponds
to one encoding block: for example, this block could correspond to the stream ’pos’ of the class P for
the region corresponding to chromosome 1 from nucleotide 1000 to 50000. Figure 5.1 shows the grid-like
understanding of the encoded information.
Figure 5.1: MPEG-G encoding represents the information as a grid, dividing both in regions of the genome
and descriptor sequences.
MPEG-G proposes two different ways to structure the information provided in the grid:
1. Access Unit Contiguous (AUC)
An Access Unit Container groups all blocks which correspond to it. Figure 5.2 shows how Access Unit
Containers group the blocks represented in Figure 5.1.
2. Descriptor Stream Contiguous (DSC)
A Stream Container groups all the blocks corresponding to it. Figure 5.3 shows how Stream Containers
group the blocks represented in Figure 5.1. We store the blocks contained in the Stream Container
without a header: to understand where a specific block starts in a Stream Container, we need external
information. The indexation table indicates for each Access Unit the offset at which each block starts.
When the user requests the decoding of a set of regions, the tool must restructure the information in
Data Unit Access Units. Each of these Access Units must contain all required blocks. We have seen that
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Figure 5.2: MPEG-G encoded data grouped in Access Units
blocks associated with an Access Unit are either grouped as a container when in Access Unit Contiguous
mode (AUC), as shown in Figure 5.2, or the indexation information is used to perform this grouping when
in Descriptor Stream Contiguous mode (DSC).
To retrieve the information relevant to a specific query, we need to know which set of blocks corresponds to
which region of the genome. When the file is in DSC, the indexation information structure also provides this
information. In AUCmode, we either use similar indexation information, or we provide a more comprehensive
header with the Access Unit Container to store the mapping on the genome.
However, due to subsequent changes in the requirement list, the file format was modified. The MPEG
group decided that MPEG-G should include some of the auxiliary tags defined by SAM. The encoding did
not reflect this change. Instead, a new file format element, the Access Unit Information, now stores this
data. This Access Unit Information unit must be stored in an Access Unit Container, consequently there
must be an Access Unit Container independently of the file mode (AUC or DSC)
5.3.3 Format summary
We have seen that the MPEG-G file format relies on a Key Length Value mechanism, as we proposed. The
specification defines a set of containers that can, in turn, aggregate other containers. As in our proposal, the
MPEG-G file can aggregate multiple SAM-like contents (to which we refer as ’Datasets’) in a higher-level
element we call ’Dataset Group’ (equivalent to the study in our proposal).
In our proposal, if the encoding was stream-based, the encoded information was always stored in streams.
The MPEG-G format leaves the choice between the AUC and DSC mode, which leads to two different file
structures (cf. Figures 5.4 and 5.5). The syntactic level reflects the concept of the Access Unit, regardless
of the mode used.
5.3.4 Indexation mechanisms
MPEG-G uses a subdivision of the information based on regions of the genome, in the case of aligned data.
In the case of unaligned data, it offers the user the possibility xto give a list of nucleotides subsequences that
will be associated with the Access Unit: all records belonging to the Access Unit should then share these
subsequences.
The information to be stored in the indexing tables and for each Access Unit is thus the following:
• Which information does the Access Unit store? In the case of aligned data, this means the tuple of
the chromosome, start and end position on the chromosome and the class of the Access Unit (e.g.,
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Figure 5.3: MPEG-G encoded data grouped in Descriptor Streams
perfectly matched, matched with some unread nucleotides), whereas in the case of unaligned data, this
could mean a list of subsequences of nucleotides.
• Where are the blocks corresponding to the Access Unit? In AUC mode, the Access Unit Container
stores the blocks. In the case of DSC mode, the tool must retrieve the blocks associated with the
Access Unit from the stream. Therefore we need to know the offset at which the block starts in the
stream. The indexing table provides this information, in case of the file being in DSC mode.
• Where is the Access Unit Container stored? Even in DSC mode, the Access Unit Container is still
needed to retrieve some of the auxiliary tags. The indexing table must establish the link between the
region on the genome and the Access Unit Container. An integer corresponding to the offset in the file
where the Access Unit Container associated with the region begins constitutes the link.
To parse and decode the contents of the Access Unit, we must identify each block. In AUC mode, the
block header helps to identify the content. The block header gives the size of the block and the nature of
its data (to which descriptor it corresponds). In DSC mode, there is no need for block headers. All blocks
stored within the same stream store the same type of information. Therefore, the syntax records the nature
of the information only once. This difference introduces an overhead: the file size in AUC mode is higher
than in DSC mode, due to the block headers.
5.3.5 Extending the format to other use cases
From the beginning, the security requirements were the first identified. We then also introduced the require-
ments of transporting metadata and of labeling regions of the genome. The MPEG-G specification handles
these requirements by introducing new structures at each level:
1. Dataset Group level
• A Dataset Group Protection element encapsulates the required information regarding the privacy
of the Dataset Group’s specific information, the authenticity of this information, and the access
control rules applied to it.
• A Dataset Group Metadata element encapsulates all metadata information relevant to the Dataset
Group.
• A set of Label elements encapsulates collections of regions that the user has associated with a
specific label represented with a string.
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2. Dataset level
• A Dataset Protection element encapsulates the required information regarding the privacy of the
Dataset’s specific information, the authenticity of the same information, and the access control
rules applied to it.
• A Dataset Metadata element encapsulates all metadata information relevant to the Dataset.
3. Access Unit level
• An Access Unit Protection element encapsulates the required information regarding the privacy
of the Access Unit information and the authenticity of this information.
4. Descriptor Stream level
• A Descriptor Stream Protection element encapsulates the required information regarding the
authenticity of the Descriptor Stream’s information.
As access control rules specify which API actions are allowed to be executed by a given user under specific
consequences, and API actions only apply to Dataset Groups and Datasets, there would be no use for action
rules at the Access Unit and Descriptor Stream levels. Therefore, access control rules are only specified at
the Dataset Group and Dataset levels.
5.4 Thoughts on the adopted approach
5.4.1 Removing the DSC mode
One can give two main reasons to justify representing the information in the stream approach. The first
reason is that since the encoder and the decoder operate using Descriptor Streams as outputs and inputs
respectively, the Descriptor Streams are a natural choice for the construction of the file format. The other
reason is that it might be useful to access some subset of streams without accessing the others. For example,
if one had decoded only the information of the ’pos’ descriptor, in the early versions of MPEG-G, this would
have yielded a list of distances between reads. This information could then have been used to draw statistics
for the coverage. However, after several reworks of the MPEG-G encoding specification, the Descriptor
Streams are interleaved: for example, it is not possible anymore to decode the position descriptor correctly
without knowing how many alignments there are for a specific read. Therefore, the previously presented use
case is not useful anymore.
Furthermore, to decode each block of data, the parameters used for the entropy encoder must be known,
but this information is only available through the parameter set bound to the Access Unit. It is now
impossible to retrieve information from the streams without accessing first information on the Access Unit
and possibly also other streams relevant to the one which shall be decoded.
Based on this observation, we proposed twice to the MPEG group to remove the possibility of representing
the file in Descriptor Stream Contiguous mode. Our proposal was not accepted. On the first occasion, the
group rejected it because the use case was still valid (this was before modifications in the encoding hindered
the use case). On the second occasion, the group rejected the modification as it seemed too significative for
a late change. Nevertheless, the concerns we expressed are more valid than ever. Removing the Descriptor
Stream Contiguous mode would simplify the standard by removing a mode which intrinsically makes access to
the information more complicated and would, in turn, simplify the development of software for the MPEG-G
file format.
The fact that, in AUC mode, each block signals its nature causes overhead. We can also address this
issue. The specification could be modified to force the order of the blocks to be always the same and to use
always the same list of blocks. If we introduced these criteria into the standard, there would be no further
need to indicate the nature of each block, thus removing one reason for the overhead.
5.4.2 Creating new structure options
Another issue that was not yet raised in the MPEG group is the point that the hierarchical structure might
not be sufficiently refined in some instances. Let us imagine a study that compares, for each subject, the
DNA observed in healthy tissue and the DNA observed in cancerous tissue. In that case, we would prefer
the following structure: Dataset Group (study), patient container, Dataset (DNA). In the current state, this
hierarchy is not possible as the grouping by patients does not exist. This lack of information representation
features obliges to use metadata in order to obtain the intended grouping.
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Similarly, we can imagine a study where control and case patients should be separated. This requirement
could also be combined with the previous one. This highlights the need for an even more adaptive file
structure.
Meeting this requirement could be as easy as creating a new grouping container, which would be placed
within the Dataset Group as a substitution of the Dataset. A grouping container could contain either a
collection of further grouping containers or a collection of Datasets. The semantic meaning of the grouping
could then be discovered by using specific metadata fields.
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(a) AUC mode without indexing information
(b) AUC mode with indexing information
Figure 5.4: Basic MPEG-G file structure when in AUC mode
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Figure 5.5: Basic MPEG-G file structure when in DSC mode
Chapter 6
Metadata
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the sequenced genomic data must be accompanied by its metadata.
We present our approach for metadata encoding. We rely on a core schema which can be extended
to match each repository’s requirement. We simplify the compatibility with the genomic data
repositories by defining a profile mechanism. MPEG has adopted our work (published in [68]) in
the standard.
6.1 Requirements
The MPEG-G file format defines a layered structure for the representation of the information. At the highest
level of the hierarchy, there is the Dataset Group. Within the Dataset Group, MPEG-G stores Datasets.
Datasets contain access unit containers. Only the Dataset is equivalent to currently existing formats: it
represents either aligned or unaligned data, similar to SAM and FASTQ, respectively.
The access unit is a construction intended to provide a smaller working unit for codification, random
access and security. The access unit is not a unit designed to exist outside the scope of MPEG-G. Its
existence should be as transparent as possible to the user. Thus there are no requirements to document it.
The Dataset is the representation, in an MPEG-G file, of the content stored currently in a SAM or
FASTQ file. We know that the SAM specification provides a schema for metadata relevant to its content.
We have also seen that databases such as EGA specify metadata schemas for such a type of information.
There is only a partial overlap between the SAM header and the EGA schema. There is thus the need to
document, with metadata, the content of the Dataset. It is, however, unclear which fields the specification
should include in the documentation. Requiring too many entries might make it impossible to use MPEG-G
documentation if the information is not available (for old genomic files which have been generated without
this information) or non-existent (the genomic data has been sequenced with another use case in mind, a
use case with different documentation needs).
The Dataset Group does not have an equivalent in current file formats. As we have seen, the Dataset
Group is intended to group multiple Datasets into a unit of similar Datasets. The MPEG-G specification
does not define which criteria of similitude to use. To inform the recipient about the clustering criteria, we
require means to document the Dataset Group with metadata information. Databases such as EGA also
specify similar groupings of results. In these databases, the cluster itself also requires its documentation. As
in the case of the Dataset, it is unclear which set of fields to use, as the relevant specification might vary
between use cases.
We have seen that two of the three layers (the Dataset Group and the Dataset) in the hierarchy of
the MPEG-G file require documentation. In the case of the Dataset level, in the absence of a metadata
structure, information currently provided in the SAM header would be lost when converting from a SAM-
like file to MPEG-G. To be compatible with existing databases of genomic results, MPEG-G also requires
to be consistent with their metadata specification. Nevertheless, this metadata specification might not be
relevant to every use case, or the information might not be available in all instances.
The specification for metadata representation must meet the following requirements:
• The Dataset Group and Dataset containers must provide structures for the encoding of metadata.
• Compatibility use cases with current metadata specifications both from current formats and existing
databases must be representable in the metadata specification.
• The user must not be forced to meet another unrelated compatibility use case to meet one compatibility
use case.
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6.2 Our proposed approach
6.2.1 Concept
We have proposed a metadata representation based on XML. In our proposal, there are two XML schemas,
each one defining one of the metadata structures required, i.e., one for the metadata of the Dataset Group,
the other for the metadata of the dataset. As we have seen, the metadata specification needs to be adaptable
to the different use cases. We achieve this by defining, in our XML schemas, a standardized list of metadata
fields and a way to provide extensions. The motivation behind the shared standardized list of metadata
fields is to have only one representation of the most common metadata fields across the different use cases.
Our proposal represents the specificity of each use case with extensions. An extension is a new element,
specified outside the definition of the core metadata representation.
As the Dataset Group is intended to group related datasets, we expect to have redundancy across the
metadata of the different datasets. For example, the same sequencing center may have sequenced all datasets.
If we want to store this information in the metadata of the dataset, we will be forced to store the same
sequencing center name in each dataset’s metadata. To overcome this, we have included in our proposal a
mechanism to represent the shared field’s value only once.
6.2.2 Inheritance
To limit the overhead introduced by the metadata representation, we want to reduce the number of repetitions
of values across the datasets. We propose to resolve this issue by specifying a mechanism through which the
dataset’s metadata inherits values from the Dataset Group’s metadata.
In the previously considered example, all datasets’ metadata elements had to include a field specifying
the sequencing center where the information stored in the dataset was sequenced. Let us imagine the case
where the value of this field is the same across all datasets. With our inheritance mechanism, our proposal
stores the sequencing center’s name only once. The Dataset Group metadata provides the value for this
field, and each dataset inherits this value.
The syntactical level does not represent the inheritance. Only the semantic level takes into account the
inherited values. If we were to retrieve the bytes encoding the metadata of any one of the datasets, we would
not see the sequencing center’s name. Yet an MPEG-G compliant tool shall, when retrieving the metadata
of the dataset, extract all inherited fields from the Dataset Group and return them within the remaining
dataset’s metadata XML document.
The inheritance mechanism would not allow that one or more datasets differ from the metadata defined
in the Dataset Group. Therefore, we included in our proposal the idea of overwriting. If a dataset and a
Dataset Group both provide a value, the dataset does not inherit it, but rather the one provided by the
dataset is used.
6.2.3 Core metadata specification
With ’core metadata’, we refer to the set of metadata fields that belong to the base schema. There are two
instances of core metadata: one for the Dataset Group and one for the dataset. Our objective when defining
the core was to enforce the presence of necessary information and to provide one storage location for the
most common fields in the different databases. As can be seen from the specification of the core metadata
shown in XML source 6.1, we mark the difference between the mandatory information and the common but
non-mandatory fields by the optionality of the element in our schema. In the case of the dataset, as the
information provided by the Dataset Group is inherited, we do not place any fields as mandatory, as can be
seen in XML source 6.2.
XML source 6.1: Specification of the core metadata for the Dataset Group
1 <xs:element name="DatasetGroup" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:DatasetGroupEncryptedType"/>
2
3 <xs:complexType name="DatasetGroupEncryptedType">
4 <xs:sequence>
5 <xs:element name="Title" type="xs:string"/>
6 <xs:element name="Type">
7 <xs:complexType>
8 <xs:attribute name="existing_study_type" use="required">
9 <xs:simpleType>
10 <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
11 <!--[...]-->
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12 </xs:restriction>
13 </xs:simpleType>
14 </xs:attribute>
15 <xs:attribute name="new_study_type" use="optional" type="xs:string"/>
16 </xs:complexType>
17 </xs:element>
18 <xs:element name="Abstract" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:AbstractString" minOccurs="0"/>
19 <xs:element name="ProjectCentre" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:ProjectCentreType"
minOccurs="0" />↪→
20 <xs:element name="Description" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:DescriptionString" minOccurs="0"
/>↪→
21 <xs:element name="Samples" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:SamplesType"/>
22 <xs:element name="Extensions" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:ExtensionsType"/>
23 </xs:sequence>
24 <xs:attribute name="profile" type="xs:anyURI" use="optional"/>
25 </xs:complexType>
26
27 <xs:simpleType name="AbstractString">
28 <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
29 <xs:maxLength value="1024"/>
30 </xs:restriction>
31 </xs:simpleType>
32
33 <xs:complexType name="SamplesType">
34 <xs:sequence>
35 <xs:element name="Sample" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:SampleType" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>↪→
36 </xs:sequence>
37 </xs:complexType>
38
39 <xs:complexType name="SampleType">
40 <xs:sequence>
41 <xs:element name="TaxonId" type="xs:int" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
42 <xs:element name="Title" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
43 <xs:element name="Extensions" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:ChildExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>↪→
44 </xs:sequence>
45 </xs:complexType>
46
47 <xs:complexType name="ProjectCentreType">
48 <xs:sequence>
49 <xs:element name="ProjectCentreName" type="xs:string"/>
50 <xs:element name="Extensions" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:ChildExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>↪→
51 </xs:sequence>
52 </xs:complexType>
XML source 6.2: Specification of the core metadata for the dataset
1 <xs:complexType name="DatasetType">
2 <xs:sequence>
3 <xs:element name="Title" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
4 <xs:element name="Type" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
5 <xs:element name="Abstract" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
6 <xs:element name="ProjectCentre" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:ProjectCentreType"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>↪→
7 <xs:element name="Description" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
8 <xs:element name="Samples" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:SamplesType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>↪→
9 <xs:element name="Extentions" type="mpg-meta-data-gr:ChildExtensionsType" maxOccurs="1"
minOccurs="0"/>↪→
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10 </xs:sequence>
11 <xs:attribute name="profile" type="xs:anyURI" use="optional"/>
12 </xs:complexType>
6.2.4 Extensions
Certain genomic repositories, such as EGA (see Clause 3.3.2), require a broader set of fields than the ones
provided in the core metadata sets. In order to address this issue, we propose to use the concept of extensions,
which the Genomic Standards Consortium proposal (see Clause 3.3.4) also considers. As the name indicates,
the objective of an extension is to extend the scope of the metadata structure by providing new fields. We
specify an extension (XML source 6.3) as an element providing a type identifier and a value. MPEG-G
compliant tools are to use the type identifier to relate the provided value with the corresponding semantics.
We expect MPEG-G tools to implement well-known extensions, such as the ones we provide as informative
material in our proposal, yet there is no requirement on supporting every existing extension. To mitigate
the possible issues which could be caused by this, we have also added a documentation pointer to the
schema of the extension. If a party generates an MPEG-G file with an extension which is not well-known, a
human-readable documentation will maintain the usability of the field.
We have seen that in order to reduce the overhead, we have specified an inheritance mechanism. As
some extensions provided in the Dataset Group’s metadata structure might be only relevant to the Dataset
Group, we define an attribute in the extension schema to indicate whether said extension is to be inherited
by the dataset or not. Extensions can also appear at the dataset level (to correct information provided in
the Dataset Group level) and within certain elements (as in the sample description). The schema does not
define the ’inheritable’ attribute in these cases, as the inheritance mechanism does not apply for them.
XML source 6.3: Specification of the core metadata Dataset Group
1 <xs:complexType name="ExtensionType">
2 <xs:sequence>
3 <xs:element name="Type" type="xs:anyURI"/>
4 <xs:element name="Documentation" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/>
5 <xs:element name="Inheritable" type="xs:boolean"/>
6 <xs:any minOccurs="1"/>
7 </xs:sequence>
8 </xs:complexType>
Alongside the specification of the schemas and the definition of the mechanism, our proposal also in-
tegrates examples of extensions allowing an MPEG-G file to meet the requirements of specific use cases.
We define one extension to maintain the SAM header in the case of a round-trip from a SAM-like file to
MPEG-G and back. The extension is a translation of the SAM header specification in XML format, thus
making it compatible with our proposal.
We also propose a specification of extensions to include information to make the metadata of an MPEG-G
file compliant with the EGA repository. This specification consists of two schemas: one for the information
relative to the sample, the other relative to the experiment to which the current information belongs.
6.2.5 Profiles
The extension mechanism allows us to increase the representation capacity of the core metadata set, yet
at the possible cost of harming the interoperability of the file. We have seen that our proposal integrates
identifiers of the extension and signaling mechanism to convey the semantics of the extension. However, to
meet specific use cases, such as uploading an MPEG-G file to EGA, multiple extensions are required.
Our proposal defines the concept of profile to signal the compatibility with the more complex use cases.
Both the Dataset Group and the dataset can signal that they comply with a profile’s specification. The
profile attribute must be equal to the profile identifier. When a Dataset Group or a dataset indicates the
compliance with the profile, all extensions necessary to the profile must be present.
The MPEG-G file does not define the profile. The MPEG-G compliant tool must retrieve the requirements
of the profile and its semantics through other channels.
In our proposal, we define the profile for the EGA compatibility. The definition specifies which extensions
the Dataset Group and the dataset’s metadata must provide to meet the requirement. However, our discus-
sion with the EGA team has highlighted that extensions are not enough to guarantee full compatibility with
existing services. Moreover, additional requirements must be placed on the schema for the core metadata
set. In the case of the EGA profile, the sample’s taxonomy has to be equal to that of the human species and
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the description element of the core metadata set must be populated. We also define a profile for the GDC
compatibility.
6.3 The adopted approach
The retained solution was our proposal, and it has been taken over in section 6 of Part 3 Metadata and
application programming interfaces of ISO ISO/IEC 23092-3 [60].
52 CHAPTER 6. METADATA
Chapter 7
Security
After having presented the encoding of the sequenced genomic data and its metadata in chapters
4 and 6, we present now the main contribution of this thesis: how to protect both the sequenced
genomic data and its metadata in their respective encoded representations. In the case of the
metadata, we take advantage of its XML encoding to protect it: we use XML encryption and
XML signature. This approach was adopted by MPEG. In the case of sequenced genomic data, we
present the evolution of our approach. We initially proposed mechanisms for key transportation
and for encryption parameters transportation for every container in the file. When MPEG
formulated new requirements, we reviewed our proposal to specify the encryption parameters in
terms of genomic regions and store them at the Dataset level. MPEG adopted our final approach.
The encryption is partly covered in [66].
In this chapter, we also prove the deficiencies of the initial encryption proposal: in case the
encryption is done per stream, using the properties of MPEG-G’s encoding permits to deduce
the content of a theoretically encrypted stream on the basis of the contents of other unencrypted
ones. A paper on this attack has been submitted [69].
Encryption strategies cannot prevent information leakage: a user who has been granted access
to a file could unlawfully publish an unencrypted copy. To address this issue, we propose a
watermarking algorithm for genomic data. The modifications introduced by this algorithm are
virtually undetectable and reversible if the data holder reveals the watermarking key. However,
if multiple users were to collude, they could unlawfully reverse the watermarking. We present a
variation of the algorithm which addresses this issue. This watermarking approach is compatible
with any current sequenced genomic data encoder. We published this algorithm in [70].
7.1 Protecting the metadata information
7.1.1 Use cases to meet
We have seen that the information in the metadata can be sensitive, either because it might affect the
private sphere, or because it affects the intellectual property. In order to address this issue, we need to have
a mechanism to protect the privacy of the metadata information.
The metadata might be a key element in the process executed in a pipeline. Modifying a Metadata
element might be used as the vector of an attack affecting the correct functioning of services. Therefore we
need to protect not only the privacy but also the integrity of the information.
One of the objectives of MPEG-G is to provide a file whose information is entirely encrypted. A party
can offer a service with the MPEG-G file without having any access to it. Such services might be the hosting
of the file and offering access to it to the intended users. Such services could be offered, for example, by a
company recollecting the data from sequencing centers and giving access to them to a practitioner. In such
a situation, the company would not have any rights to access the file, but it is in everybody’s interest that
the company can determine if an adversary has compromised the integrity of the metadata information. The
service provider should be able to perform the integrity test without having to unencrypt the content in
order to meet the requirement.
We have also seen that multiple entities might have an interest in the same MPEG-G file. For example,
a sequencing center might generate an MPEG-G Dataset and sign the contents of its metadata. Upon
reception, the researcher will validate the metadata and then sign it, alongside the metadata of the other
Datasets, and maybe even of the Dataset Group grouping all this information together. We can extract from
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this that the signature mechanism of the metadata content should allow the information to be signed any
number of times and by as many parties as required.
7.1.2 The solution we have proposed
7.1.2.1 The selected technologies
As MPEG-G stores the metadata information in XML format, the most straightforward approach is to use
XML security [71, 72] to implement both encryption and signature needs.
XML signatures allow signing information from an XML document. The standard defines how to identify
the keys, how to reference the content, and which settings are available (e.g., the hashing method used, the
signature algorithm employed). We have proposed, and it has been accepted, to use XML signatures to
provide the signature use cases. We do not place any requirements on the number of provided signatures:
each signature can be used independently of the others. Furthermore, thanks to the internally referencing
mechanisms provided in the specification of XML signature [72], our approach requires minimal modifications
to the defined metadata schemas.
XML encryption [71] enables us to substitute an element with an encrypted element in an XML document.
This encrypted element provides the ciphertext and the parameters which have to be used to decrypt the
content: the encryption algorithm, the padding algorithm and the identifier of the key used. Upon reception,
the receiver follows the specification of XML encryption to revert the changes: the encrypted elements are
decrypted, yielding the original element, which is then placed within the XML document in substitution
to the encrypted element. We thus proposed to MPEG to use XML encryption for the handling of the
encryption of metadata, proposal which was accepted.
We should also note that the signature element can refer to the encrypted content, thus allowing us to
sign encrypted content.
7.1.2.2 The implementations
We materialized our proposal in an updated schema for the metadata content. For the different elements
of the metadata schema, we had to enable the choice between the regular element or an encrypted element.
We then added new signature_elements to provide the place holders for the signature mechanism. There
are no restrictions on the number of signature elements, allowing as many parties as necessary to provide
their confirmation on the quality of the information. In order to make the signing of the content as easy as
possible, we included in each metadata element an optional ’id’ attribute, which can then be used within
the signature element to refer to it while signing.
We have chosen not to specify the mechanism by which the mapping between the key names used in the
XML signature and the encryption elements and the key value is signaled. The distributor of the file has to
give the key and its identifier to the end user, using an external signaling mechanism.
The solution we have proposed conforms to every use case we have identified. The solution is also easy
to integrate into future MPEG-G tools, as there are libraries available to handle these mechanisms.
7.2 Protecting the data
7.2.1 Requirements
The information obtained from the DNA is extremely sensitive as it not only reveals sensible information on
the patient, but also on his family. The same information can also be useful when understanding a specific
genetic disease: by comparing the genome of a pool of individuals not presenting a given disease and a pool
of individuals which do present this disase, we can draw conclusions on which mutation might be at the
origin of the illness. We see that there are incentives both to protect and to release the genetic information.
We have met the requirement for fine-grained privacy settings.
Some regions might be of interest for a doctor, other regions might be of interest to a researcher, and
some others to both. Therefore we need to be able to select which set of recipients has access to which region
of the file, and the set of recipients might differ from region to region.
Harm could also be done if the results came to be altered. For example, if the results obtained by a
sequencing center are altered before being received by the medical team, the results of the diagnosis could be
modified. Therefore we also have the requirement of being able to guarantee the integrity and authenticity of
the information. The requirement for fine-grained authenticated information is less clear than in the case of
privacy. Nevertheless, we should consider the case of a party receiving a file, or transmitting a file to another
party, such that the final recipient will have access to a file with some encrypted portion for which the key
is unknown and will remain like that. In this case, there is no purpose in keeping the encrypted information
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or transmitting it, and it would be preferable to remove it altogether in order to lessen the burden on the
storage system or the network. This should not affect the signatures for the accessible information. Therefore
we also have the requirement for fine-grained units to be authenticated.
7.2.2 Our proposed solution
7.2.2.1 Early proposal
In our first proposal, we used the subdivision into blocks to provide both encryption and signatures. As a
specific region of the file was being accessed, the corresponding blocks were to be retrieved from the respective
streams (i.e. one block per stream). While accessing each block, the signature had to be checked, and, if
required, the privacy settings had to be followed to retrieve the block as plaintext.
This approach readily complied with the identified requirements: as the settings were provided at the
block level, the authenticity and privacy of the information were already provided at the genomic width of
the block (i.e. the size of the genomic region associated to the block). It was thus a matter of the encoding
process to generate encoding units, materialized with their corresponding blocks, which would correspond
to the privacy and authentication requirements. In order to guarantee that only the correct set of recipients
came to have access to the region, the key used to guarantee the privacy was to be adapted for each region:
a key known to only those recipients who were to have access to it.
Due to the fact that we proposed a file format with a hierarchy in multiple layers — and at each layer
supplementary material such as metadata, indexation information and similar was present, we had also the
need to protect those elements, both in terms of privacy and authenticity of the information. The same
techniques apply: in the protection element, for example of the Dataset, we specified that the Dataset
Metadata element was encrypted. We also used the protection element to protect the protection element
of a layer below. For example, the protection element at the study level was used to encrypt and sign, if
needed, the protection element of the Datasets. The encryption and signing of each element could be done
independently.
7.2.2.2 Revised proposal
As the idea of having one block header per block in the stream was not taken over in MPEG-G, the foundation
of our proposal was removed. Instead of creating additional structures at the block level, the structuring
of information in MPEG-G is such that there are additional elements at the Access Unit level. This level,
which was semantically but no syntactically present in our first proposal, is equally relevant to the currently
discussed use case.
We modified our proposal to indicate at the level of the Access Unit the parameters to guarantee the
privacy and authenticity of the information. This information was stored in an Access Unit Protection box,
stored within the Access Unit Container element. In the case of the file being in Access Unit Contiguous
mode, the Access Unit Protection box would indicate how to interpret the blocks stored in the same Access
Unit Container. In the case of Descriptor Contiguous Mode, the Access Unit Protection box would provide
the configuration on how to interpret the blocks associated to the Access Unit, albeit stored in the Descriptor
Stream Container.
Whereas in the case of protecting the metadata we relied entirely on existing technologies, namely XML
encryption and XML signatures, it was not possible to do the same here, at least not at the full extent.
Since XML encryption is meant to encrypt elements of an XML document, and not external resources such
as, in our case, the blocks stored externally we had to propose an alternative. Some of the aspects of XML
encryption were interesting. Most notably the fact that it relies on a list of well-known ciphers, just provides
a container for the required parameters, and defines ways to derive keys from other keys. We have thus
proposed an alternative which takes over these concepts, but which was intended to specify the encryption
parameters which have been used for an external resource.
As in the case of XML encryption, our approach represented the configuration in XML, for which we
show the schema in XML source 7.1. From the schema we can see the similarities with XML encryption:
there is a field to specify which cypher has been used (Advanced Encryption Standard -AES- 128, 192 or 256
bits in Counter -CTR- mode or Galois/Counter Mode -GCM-), which key has been used (identified with a
string), the Initialization Vector (IV) used, if required, and the TAG used for integrity check if supported
by the cipher. The location of the cyphertext, and thus the semantics of the encrypted content, is derived
form the URI attribute ’encryptedLocation’. The specification defines a list of possible URIs, each mapping
to a specific Value of one of the elements in the file internal tree structure.
For example, at the Dataset level, the encryptedLocation URI could point to one of the parameter
elements, if the latter needed to be encrypted.
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XML source 7.1: Encryption parameters schema
1 <xs:complexType name="EncryptionParametersType">
2 <xs:sequence>
3 <xs:element name="cipher" type="CipherURIType" minOccurs="0">
4 <xs:element type="xs:string" name="keyName"/>
5 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="IV"/>
6 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="TAG" minOccurs="0"/>
7 </xs:sequence>
8 <xs:attribute name="encryptedLocations" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
9 </xs:complexType>
7.2.2.3 Key transport
One of the requirements for the privacy settings was that the right set of recipients was granted access to the
content of an element. The entity in charge of distributing the file will have to distribute the keys used to
the entitled parties. However, in order to simplify the process of distributing keys, we have defined multiple
structures which can help reduce the need to distribute keys: from a shared secret, the remaining keys can
then be recovered.
Let us imagine the case where an entire Dataset Group is meant for a specific recipient, individual A.
One of the Datasets within the Dataset Group can also be accessed by individual B. The party generating
the file will encrypt the entire Dataset Group except the Dataset also meant for B with key K1, while the
specific Dataset which should be accessible to both A and B is encrypted with key K2. Key K1 is then
revealed to individual A, and K2 to individual B. The file then also indicates how to obtain the value of K2
based on the value of K1. This can be done either by deriving the value of the key or decrypting. In order to
transport this configuration, we have proposed the schema for an XML element (element ’KeyTransport’),
which ties together a name for the newly obtained key (’keyName’) with the value of this new key. In our
proposal, we define two main ways to retrieve the value of the new key;
1. computation
The Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) algorithm defined by the Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF) in Release For Comment (RFC) 8018 [73] allows to generate deterministically
a new secret from a previously known secret. An example of the proposed settings to transport this
configuration is shown in XML source 7.2. The secret used as the input for generating a new secret
is the key identified with ’passwordName’, the remaining elements used correspond to the different
inputs to the algorithm defined in the RFC.
2. decryption
The key can also be provided in an encrypted form. There are standards both for symmetric and
asymmetric key wraps, and we include in our proposal the schema to transport the settings for both
solutions as shown in XML sources 7.3 and 7.4.
In order to allow more complex structures we do not place any requirements on which keys can be used
to retrieve a new key. A derived key can be used to derive a second new key, as shown in XML source 7.5.
XML source 7.2: Key transport: key derivation
1 <KeyTransport xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:dataset-group:2019">
2 <keyName>derivedKey1</keyName>
3 <KeyDerivation>
4 <PRF>urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:hmac-sha256</PRF>
5 <passwordName>password</passwordName>
6 <salt>AQIDBAUGBwg=</salt>
7 <iterations>10000</iterations>
8 <length>32</length>
9 </KeyDerivation>
10 </KeyTransport>
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XML source 7.3: Key transport: key symmetric wrap
1 <KeyTransport xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:dataset-group:2019">
2 <keyName>wrapped1</keyName>
3 <KeySymmetricWrap>
4 <kek>sharedSecretKek</kek>
5 <wrappedKey>1FcMIMa0QhOTgNMpkn+j3THvWp7bgCwFJ64FEn+/D6z6VoCLx6xKeA==</wrappedKey>
6 </KeySymmetricWrap>
7 </KeyTransport>
XML source 7.4: Key transport: key asymmetric wrap
1 <KeyTransport xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:dataset-group:2019">
2 <keyName>wrapped2</keyName>
3 <KeyAsymmetricWrap>
4 <hashFunction>urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:sha384</hashFunction>
5 <maskGenerationHashFunction>urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:sha1</maskGenerationHashFunction>
6 <publicKeyName>testRSAPublic</publicKeyName>
7 <wrappedKey></wrappedKey>
8 </KeyAsymmetricWrap>
9 </KeyTransport>
XML source 7.5: Key transport: key transport chaining
1 <KeyTransport xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:dataset-group:2019">
2 <keyName>derivedKey2</keyName>
3 <KeyDerivation>
4 <PRF>urn:mpeg:mpeg-g:protection:hmac-sha256</PRF>
5 <passwordName>derivedKey1</passwordName>
6 <salt>AQIDBAUGBwg=</salt>
7 <iterations>10000</iterations>
8 <length>32</length>
9 </KeyDerivation>
10 </KeyTransport>
7.2.2.4 Final proposal
As we have seen, our proposal was based on the idea of using the Access Unit as the minimal unit of encryption
and signature when it came to protecting the actual genomic data. Due to the process of sequencing genomic
information, the data might overlap over different regions of interest. One reason for this, is the size of the
actual read, which already creates an atomic unit which can span over regions intended for different sets of
recipients, and the fact that two reads can be paired together, increasing the chances of the record belonging
to two different regions. In our proposal this was handled by using three different Access Units: the first
Access Unit would be encrypted so that the first set of recipients would have access to it, the third Access
Unit so that the second had access to it, and the second Access Unit would be encrypted as desired by the
patient, for example, so that the intersection of the two sets would have access to the data. This approach
is summarized in Figure 7.1.
The MPEG group decided, however, that this approach was too complicated for the end user. The
intention of the group was that if the encoding party submitted encryption requirements as in the first row
of Figure 7.1, then a decoding party should be able to retrieve the same settings, as this could be considered
more meaningful than the end configuration of each Access Unit, as shown in the last row of Figure 7.1. In
order to avoid contradictions, and obtain a unique place to retrieve the privacy configuration, the encryption
by regions would be defined at the Dataset level. As we have seen, the main problem when encrypting regions
of the genome is which action should be taken when a record belongs to two regions with different recipient
sets. One solution we proposed was to forbid region definitions which meant that Access Unit would be
addressed to two sets of recipients or more. In other words, we proposed to force the user to give as input to
the encryption process the depiction of the last row of Figure 7.1, instead of the first row. Our solution was
rejected as this would imply that the configuration might not match the biological meaning of the region
(e.g. encrypting the content of a gene). The group preferred rather that if an Access Unit intersects the
region authorized for one user, then the user shall have access to the Access Unit. We did not favor this
approach, as if the entity encrypting the file has no means to modify the content of the Access Unit, this
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Figure 7.1: In our approach the configuration of recipients for each Access Unit is given at the Access Unit
level, independently of any other configuration.
could force to release more information than originally intended. In other words, if in our approach the
encryption of the second unit shown in Figure 7.1 was not fixed (the entity encrypting the file could choose
any configuration including the intersection of the two sets, their union, or any other alternative), the new
requirements fixed the encryption to be addressed to the union of the two sets.
Our final proposal thus has to meet a new additional set of requirements:
• There shall only be one place where the configuration per region is defined.
• The settings used during encryption should match exactly what is stored in the configuration and not
be just semantically equal.
• Any Access Unit belonging to multiple regions should be accessible by any user belonging to one of
the sets the Access Unit maps to.
Our proposal maintained our idea of encrypting any element within the same container. We used this
approach, for example, to encrypt the indexation table, or to encrypt the Access Unit Header (in the case
of Access Unit Contiguous without indexation table), in order to hide where on the genome are placed the
encrypted elements. We also enabled the possibility to encrypt the list of labels, as the name given to the
regions could be a vector of attack: if only the regions of interest of the patient are named, the fact that
a region is named and encrypted could prove sensible. The MPEG group placed, however, yet another
additional requirement in the form that the security settings should not have any negative effects on the
extraction of the data. In other words, a tool implementing only Part 1 of the standard should be able to
extract the required blocks, albeit the blocks might be encrypted.
We thus had to revise our proposal in order to meet the new requirements. The first step is to address the
issue of letting adversary parties discover which regions are encrypted. We define new metadata extensions to
this end: the names given in the MPEG-G Part 1 structures might be syntactically correct but meaningless,
and the extension would give the translation between the meaningless information and the real information.
For example, an Access Unit could be mapped to the sequence ’k5f32’, from position 0 to 10000, and
the metadata would then indicate that the sequence ’k5f32’ does in fact correspond to the sequence of
chromosome 2, starting from position 10 000 000. Of course this implies that the reference sequence used
for encoding and decoding the data must reflect these fake names. Similarly, the true content of the label
can be hidden by providing a fake name, which is then corrected in the metadata. As we have mechanisms
to encrypt the metadata, we can maintain this information secret and still maintain the MEPG-G Part 1
functionalities. We should note, however, that queries such as retrieve records from chromosome 2, will not
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yield results from our fake sequence, even if the Access Unit is stored as plaintext, in the case the mapping
is unknown, as would happen in an MPEG-G Part 3 agnostic tool.
In order to match the new requirements, we also move the definition of the encryption regions from the
Access Unit Protection element to the Dataset Protection element. As requested by the group, the definition
is expressed in terms of regions. The ’encryptedLocation’ URI will, in the case of encrypting the encoded ge-
nomic information, match the following syntax: "genomic_region/{auType}/{sequenceName}/{start}/{end}".
As we can see, there are multiple degrees of freedom: the class which shall be encrypted, the sequence which
shall be encrypted, and between which positions on the genome shall the data be encrypted. As expressed
in the new requirements, there can be as many such entries as necessary, and there is no restriction on how
these can intersect or not. As we have seen in XML source 7.1, these URI will be provided in conjunction
with other parameters: most notably the Key to be used while decrypting.
However, due to the new requirements, we could face a situation where there are multiple Encryption-
Parameters elements which provide contradictory information on how to decrypt one or multiple Access
Units. In order to do so, we must disambiguate the situation. We update our proposal by modifying the
interpretation of the settings. The Access Unit will be encrypted with a key, which might be independent
of all other keys. Every party who has access according to what is defined in the EncryptionParameters
encrypting the Access Unit shall have access to the key. In order to ensure this, we use the symmetric key
wrap approach we had already implemented. The Access Unit is encrypted with a key, which is provided
multiple times in symmetrically wrapped form, once per EncryptionParameters with an URI intersecting
the range associated to the Access Unit.
In order to achieve this, we have to update our structures, as shown in XML sources 7.6 and 7.7. As
the information provided at the Dataset level might not be used directly to decrypt anymore (but only to
unwrap the key provided at the Access Unit Protection level), the Initialization Vector (IV) element and the
’cipher’ element become optional. And, as there might be multiple different keys used for the unwrapping,
we add a ’configurationID’ attribute which will be referenced from the Access Unit Protection element.
In the Access Unit Protection element, we define the structure shown in XML sources 7.7, with the
following elements:
• an unbound list of wrapped keys
Each of the wrapped keys is extended with a new ’configurationID’ attribute, which links to the key
specified for the range at the Dataset level. In the case where only one encryption range intersects the
Access Unit range, there is no need to wrap the key: in this case there is no wrapped key provided,
and the key belonging to the configuration is directly used.
• cipher
As at other levels of the file, the encryption parameters specify which cipher is in use.
• initialization vectors
Two IVs are provided, one for the block encryption, the other for the Access Unit Information’s
value encryption. This simplifies the specification as to how the ciphertext must be obtained prior to
decryption.
• TAG
Similarly to the IVs, and if required by the cipher, the TAGs are provided both for the blocks and the
Access Unit Information’s value.
The result of the key wrap is shown in Figure 7.2, where we show the case when the user requests three
Access Units to be encrypted according to two regions. Two of the Access Units map to only one region,
thus there is no need to wrap the key: the key of the region can be directly used. The third Access Unit
maps onto the two regions, therefore a new specific key for the Access Unit is generated, and provided in
wrapped form twice, once for each of the privacy regions.
In order to perform the decryption of the ciphertext, the ciphertext in itself must be defined. When we
are encrypting the value portion of one of the Key-Length-Value elements of the file format, the ciphertext
is already well defined: while encrypting, the bytes of the value are replaced with the value of the ciphertext,
whereas during decryption, the bytes of the Value are the ciphertext which is to be decrypted. In the case of
Access Unit Contiguous mode, although the blocks of data do not correspond to the bytes of a Value, they do
correspond to a clear syntactical group, which can be referred to in the specification. However, in Descriptor
Stream Contiguous mode, the blocks are not stored within the Access Unit. Furthermore, there are multiple
syntactically independent blocks, yet we need to have just one ciphertext to decrypt. Our proposal thus
specifies how the different blocks are concatenated together in one ciphertext, which is then encrypted and
stored at their original location. As the cipher we use in our proposal does not cause a variation in size
between the plaintext and the ciphertext, there is no issue in modifying the indexing mechanisms. Figure
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Figure 7.2: Visualization of the key wrapping result
7.3 shows how the different blocks are grouped to form one plaintext which is then encrypted, and again
broken down in order to replace the original blocks.
Figure 7.3: Reordering of blocks in Descriptor Stream Contiguous in order to perform encryption
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XML source 7.6: Revised encryption parameters schema
1 <xs:complexType name="EncryptionParametersType">
2 <xs:sequence>
3 <xs:element name="cipher" type="CipherURIType" minOccurs="0">
4 <xs:element type="xs:string" name="keyName"/>
5 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="IV" minOccurs="0"/>
6 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="TAG" minOccurs="0"/>
7 </xs:sequence>
8 <xs:attribute name="encryptedLocations" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
9 <xs:attribute name="configurationID" type="xs:integer"/>
10 </xs:complexType>
XML source 7.7: Revised Access Unit encryption parameters schema
1 <xs:complexType name="AccessUnitEncryptionParametersType">
2 <xs:sequence>
3 <xs:element name="wrappedKey" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
4 <xs:complexType >
5 <xs:simpleContent>
6 <xs:extension base="xs:base64Binary">
7 <xs:attribute name="configurationID" type="xs:integer"/>
8 </xs:extension>
9 </xs:simpleContent>
10 </xs:complexType>
11 </xs:element>
12
13 <xs:element type="dg:CipherURIType" name="cipher"/>
14 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="aublockIV"/>
15 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="auinIV" minOccurs="0"/>
16 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="aublockTAG" minOccurs="0"/>
17 <xs:element type="xs:base64Binary" name="auinTAG" minOccurs="0"/>
18 </xs:sequence>
19 </xs:complexType>
The proposed solution for authenticity of the information, which was not modified since our original
proposal, relies on XML signature. We define in our proposal a set of URIs which can be used from the
XML signature elements to resolve the signed content. As in the case of the URI used for encryption, these
will resolve to either the value element of the KLV structures used in the file structures, or in the case of the
Blocks, to the result of a defined process which restructures the collection of related blocks in a determined
way.
7.2.3 Retained solution
The retained solution was our proposal, and it has been taken over in clause 7.1 and 7.2 of Part 3 Metadata
and application programming interfaces of ISO/IEC 23092-3 [60].
7.2.4 Thoughts on final solution
The additional requirements imposed by MPEG, albeit the quorum decision of the group, are hard to justify.
Let us address each one of them.
• There should be only one place where the configuration per region is defined.
Although persons more concerned with privacy might be interested in encrypting as much as possible,
it is fair to assume that for the less engaged user, an encrypted region will be equivalent to a region
with a mutation in it. If there is only one place to provide the encryption settings, there is no way to
hide this fact to an attacker without blocking access to much more information: as the settings will not
be accessible anymore, the decryption will not be possible and we are not meeting the requirements.
As we have seen, we have proposed a work-around to this issue. However, our work-around increases
the complexity of the random access. Therefore, in order to preserve the user experience on one front,
we have to deteriorate it on another front.
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• The settings used during encryption should match exactly what was stored in the protection elements
and not be just semantically equal.
Our understanding of the genome improves as research is carried on. If a patient requests the genes
related to a given disease to be encrypted, this will lead to a given set of regions to be encrypted. If in
the future another patient has the same request, it is possible that the set of regions will be different,
as our knowledge of the genome has increased. These two different settings are, however, motivated
by the same requirement. Nevertheless, when analyzing which regions are encrypted in the first file,
we might not identify the expressed requirement, as it no longer matches the current knowledge. We
thus have an example of a situation where the encryption boundaries should not be used to draw
conclusions, yet the MPEG group wants to maintain this possibility.
• An Access Unit belonging to multiple encryption regions should be accessible by any user having access
to at least one of the regions the Access Unit maps belong to.
With this requirement the group is forcing to have some information being leaked (information which
should only be accessible to one set, and now has to be accessible to other sets of recipients because
it also intersects those regions). The magnitude of the leak can be minimized by creating additional
Access Units which are meant for the overlapping information, but the leakage is only mitigated, not
resolved.
We have also seen how complying with these new requirements has pushed us to increase the complexity
of the signaling mechanism, which in turn makes misunderstandings of the standard likelier, so that erroneous
files being produced or incorrectly decoded.
7.2.5 Side-channel attack
7.2.5.1 Introduction
In our initial file format proposal, we used a container for each encoded block. For each one, there was a
block container grouping all related information, including information on security settings. The MPEG
group rejected the concept of a container per block. Instead, in early versions of MPEG-G, security settings
for an entire Stream replaced the per-block security settings.
Whereas our file format was intended to transport different encoding, each one with different properties,
the MPEG-G file format is meant only to address the MPEG-G encoding. We know that one specificity of
this encoding is to generate, for the same Access Unit, interleaved blocks. With interleaved, we refer to the
fact that the information provided by one block is dependent on the information provided by another one.
For example, the descriptor ’mmpos’ will inform of the number of mutations and their positions. In order
to decode the type of mutations from ’mmtype’ correctly, we need to know the number and position of the
mutations.
As the encoder interleaves the information provided by the different Streams, we can assume that by
combining the information of some of the Streams, we can infer the content of another Stream. Inferring the
content of one Stream is not useful for decoding purposes, but it would prove that encrypting only individual
Streams is not enough and even provides a false sense of security. We will attempt to defeat the security
mechanism of encrypting one Stream by using the information provided by side-channels.
The rest of this clause will show how we tested the hypothesis that at least one type of side-channel
attack is possible. We presented the result of this experiment to the MPEG group. As a consequence, the
specification abandoned the mechanism to encrypt individual Streams for the final specification. Instead,
encryption encompassing all blocks related to the same Access Unit, regardless of the file format mode
chosen, is used.
7.2.5.2 Method
7.2.5.2.1 Available information We will attempt to revert to the first proposed privacy mechanics of
MPEG-G. We will be playing the role of an actor having received a copy of an MPEG-G file, with two Access
Units (AU), one of class P and the other of class M, both encoding information from the same portion of
the genome. This consideration is not unrealistic: if we are able to intercept a file, we will receive multiple
Access Units, and it is reasonable to assume that many among those will be of class P or M, and that, in
many cases, we will be able to pair them according to the encoded region.
We also suppose that all reads have the same known length. As previously introduced, the privacy-
relevant informations are mainly the differences of each read with the reference. Therefore, we will assume
that the information stored in the AU of class P is stored in plaintext and the information stored in the
AU of class M is partly encrypted: the information storing the position of the reads is stored as plaintext,
whereas the information storing the position and type of the mutations is encrypted. At first glance, this
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approach of partial encryption is secure, as without the position of the mutation the original information
cannot be reconstructed. However, we will attempt to discover where the mutations are and if the mutations
affect one or the two copies (chromosomes) of the genomic region.
7.2.5.2.2 Signal processing interpretation We know that for each read stored in an AU of class P,
all nucleotides of the read are equal to the reference genome. Therefore, each read in an AU of class P gives
us evidence that there are no mutations for a sub-region of the genome in one of the copies. This sub-region
is delimited by the first mapped position and the known length of the read. In order to obtain the best
compression, a read should only be stored in an AU of class M if there is at least one changed nucleotide (but
no other operations such as insertions, deletions, or clips). Therefore, we will take the presence of a read in
an AU of class M as proof that there is at least one mutation in one of the copies for the same sub-region
(as per our assumed initial state, this information is available).
Our attempt at deducing mutations will now revolve around contrasting all provided evidence and deduc-
ing which hypothetical mutations could best explain the observed results. Let us propose an interpretation
of the attack using signals. To do this, we will diverge from nature’s reality and imagine for a moment
that there is only one copy of the information, i.e. there is only one chromosome. Furthermore, we will
pretend that there cannot be any insertion or deletion of nucleotides. We will interpret this copy, i.e. the
chromosome, as a discrete time signal which can take only two possible values. Each value of the signal is
mapped to a nucleotide on the reference genome. If for one position there is no mutation, then the signal is
equal to 0, but if there is a mutation, the signal is equal to 1. We will refer to this signal as the genomesignal.
We can now define to which class a read belongs, given its initial position. We sum all values of the signal
for the region the read corresponds to. If the sum is greater or equal to 1, there are one or more mutations
with respect to the reference, hence the read belongs to class M as otherwise it could not be represented due
to the lack of Descriptor Streams. If the sum is equal to 0, we will assume that the read belongs to class
P, as this is the choice yielding the best compression. Let us define a new signal classsignal as the signal
indicating to which class a read starting at that position would belong: we will use 1 as class M and 0 as
class P. See Figure 7.4 for an illustration.
Figure 7.4: Illustration of classsignal value (plotted as a solid line), based on a genomesignal (plotted as
dots), in the case where the read length is equal to 10. classsignal is equal to one if a read starting at that
position would include at least one mutation, i.e. a position at which genomesignal is equal to 1.
We can see how classsignal can be obtained by convoluting genomesignal with a rectangular signal
integrating over the current and future values. However, the result of the convolution is clipped. Thus we
lose the information of how many mutations are present.
The last step will be to calculate the expected ratio of class M and class P information for a given
position. We know the reads’ length, therefore we can compute a signal ratiosignal, such that for each
position p we store the average value of genomesignal. The average is computed on all reads whose starting
position implies that they cover the position p. This computation can be understood as a convolution with
a rectangular filter, integrating over the read length position prior to p. See Figure 7.5 for an illustration.
This signal does not have any equivalent in nature, but it gives a metric on the likelihood of there being
a mutation at position p: if the value of ratiosignal at a position p is 0, it is very unlikely that there is a
mutation close-by, and if the value is close to 1, it is very unlikely that there is none.
As previously introduced, a read belongs to class M if there is one or more mutations, therefore classsignal
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Figure 7.5: Illustration of ratiosignal value (plotted as a solid line), based on a genomesignal (plotted as
dots), in the case where the read length is equal to 10.
loses the information on how many mutations are involved. This implies that there are cases where different
genomesignal generate the same ratiosignal. See Figure 7.6 for an illustration of the case where two mutations
are separated by a length inferior to the read length, leading to the possibility of a third mutation being
hidden.
Figure 7.6: If the distance between two mutations is inferior to read length, other mutations might be present
between the two without altering the value of ratiosignal
If we now go back to our initial assumptions, we can see that we know the first position of each read,
and the class it belongs to. In other words, we can compute an experimental version of ratiosignal. By
deriving the inverse operation allowing us to go from ratiosignal to genomesignal, we should be able to
apply the same procedure to our experimental signal and retrieve a guess for the mutations in the genome,
which was supposed to be protected through the encryption of certain fields. Of course, in nature there
are two chromosomes, thus we need to add some complexity to our schema to allow for this. We will
assume that sequencing technologies sequence from either chromosome with the same probability. Thus,
from genomeMothersignal we can derive ratioMothersignal as we have shown, and the same for the father.
The observed ratiosignal will then be equal to the average of both.
In order to reverse the convolution, we will need to derive which signal reverts the convolution with a
rectangle. We will first derive the representation of a rectangle signal in the z domain. To do this, we defined
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the rectangle signal as the difference of two Heaviside signals, with the second signal offset by t1 time steps:
Z{u[n]− u[n− t1]} =
(
z
z − 1
)
−
(
z
z − 1
)
1
zt1
(7.1)
=
z
z − 1
(
1− 1
zt1
)
(7.2)
=
z
z − 1
zt1 − 1
zt1
(7.3)
We need to find which signal y[n] reverts the convolution with the rectangle signal, in other words signal
y[n] must verify the following equation:
(u[n]− u[n− t1]) ∗ y[n] = δ[n] (7.4)
We translate the problem into the z domain and resolve the equation:
Z{(u[n]− u[n− t1]) ∗ y[n]} = Z{δ[n]} (7.5)
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In order to resolve the equation we perform the polynomial division:
zt1 zt1 −1
−zt1 +1 1 +z−t1 +z−2t1 +z−3t1 +...
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With this derived we finish the resolution of the equation.
= [δ[n]− δ[n− 1]] ∗ Z−1
{
zt1
zt1 − 1
}
(7.14)
= [δ[n]− δ[n− 1]] ∗ Z−1 {1 + z−t1 + z−2t1 + z−3t1 + ...} (7.15)
= [δ[n]− δ[n− 1]] ∗ (δ[n] + δ[n− t1] + δ[n− 2t1] + δ[n− 3t1] + ...) (7.16)
y[n] = δ[n]− δ[n− 1] + δ[n− t1]− δ[n− 1− t1] + δ[n− 2t1]− δ[n− 1− 2t1] + ... (7.17)
With this solution we are now able to reverse the convolution with the rectangle signal, i.e. to derive the
genome from the observed signal ratios. This process is summarized in Figure 7.7.
In our experiments, however, this approach is too sensible to irregularities in ratiosignal. Figure 7.8
shows how the noise increases with each convolution. The higher the coverage, the less noise there is, and
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Figure 7.7: Summary of convolution interpretation of the attack
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(a) Recovered first position mutation detected, coverage
10000
(b) Recovered first position mutation detected, coverage
50000
(c) Recovered genome, coverage 10000 (d) Recovered genome, coverage 50000
Figure 7.8: Examples of genome reconstruction using convolutions
the better the prediction is. We can further improve the prediction by reducing the noise by rounding to the
closest possible value as shown in Figure 7.9. Using this approach, we test the performance of the attack
across different coverage values. The results of the performance, represented with the f1-score, are provided
in Figure 7.10. The results obtained are not good enough to present a significant risk for the privacy, even
with unrealistically high values of coverage.
7.2.5.2.3 Neural network In Figures 7.4, and 7.6, we can see that through visual inspection the mu-
tations in the genome can be inferred. The problem we try to solve is a classification problem: for each
position, we use a signal as input to determine to which class the test data belongs.
We have constructed a neural network and trained it to retrieve, from a shorter experimental version of
the ratiosignal, whether there is a mutation at the central position of the corresponding genome. For a given
readlength, the neural network receives as input readlength∗3∗2+1 floating point values bounded in the range
[0; 1] : this correspond to the readlength ∗ 3 ratio values prior to the point of interest, to the readlength ∗ 3
ratio values after the point of interest, and to the ratio value at the point of interest. Furthermore, it also
receives readlength ∗ 3 ∗ 2 + 1 floating point values bounded in the range [0; 1] and corresponding to the
likelihood of a mutation at that position. The output of the neural network is a value equal to either 0, 1 or
2. Value 0 indicates that the neural network considers that there is no mutation, 1 indicates a mutation on
one of the copies of the chromosome and 2 indicates a mutation on both copies.
As previously defined, the ratiosignal concerns the entire genome, and we want to obtain the entire
genomesignal. Therefore, to accomplish the initial goal, we would need to apply the neural network to every
position. Furthermore, Figure 7.6 shows that we can see that there are possible transient effects. In order
to ensure that these effects are as limited as possible (and thus closer to what is possible using the entire
ratiosignal) we use an input window size big enough to guarantee that no mutation outside the window could
have an effect on the currently studied position.
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(a) Prior to noise reduction
(b) Noise reduced (c) Recovered genome
Figure 7.9: Proposed noise reduction
The information we use for training and testing the neural network is obtained by randomly generating
material from real information. The process is the following: from the online database ensembl.org [9], a
gene is randomly chosen, and the list of known mutations for the gene is obtained. For each position, we
retain only the most frequent mutation. We also consider all mutations to be independent of one another.
For each generated case, we select randomly one position p with a known mutation and generate two fake
chromosomes: the chromosomes have size readlength + readlength ∗ 3 ∗ 2 + 1 and are an array of 0’s, except
for those positions corresponding to a location on the reference genome with a known mutation, where we
randomly put either 0 or 1, following the distribution indicated in the retrieved statistics. The mapping
between the fake chromosome and the statistics is done in such a way that after dropping the first readlength
values, the central position of the signal corresponds to p. The data dropped ensures that we have the
transient effect of data prior to the input window present in the input window.
The distribution of reads is then simulated: using as input a target coverage (i.e. an average number of
reads mapped to a given position), we determine how many reads are to be generated. Then, for each of
these reads, we select one of the two fake chromosomes, randomly select an initial position for the read and
determine whether it belongs to class P or class M. The neural network is trained to classify whether the
given position includes no mutation, one mutation in one of the chromosomes or a mutation in both. The
neural network uses an output layer of three neurons, while there are five internal layers of sizes 256, 128,
64, 16, and 8 using the ReLu activation function (Rectified Linear Unit) [74].
We trained the neural network against different situations by varying the value of read length and
coverage.
7.2.5.3 Results
As we have two chromosomes for each position (i.e. each entry in our testing material), there are three
different possible outcomes: neither chromosome has a mutation, one has a mutation nor both have it. We
take the arbitrary decision to refer with ’positive’ to the fact that there is at least one mutation. However,
when measuring accuracy we consider necessary to report the correct number of mutations for a given
position (either 0, 1 or 2, depending on the mutation being present on neither chromosome, on one or on
both). We report here the obtained results after training the neural network on 16 batches of 200000 cases
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Figure 7.10: F1-score obtained by the convolution attack
for 240 iterations each. The reported numbers are obtained by testing the neural network on an additional
batch of 50000 cases.
Figure 7.11 shows the fraction of accurate results obtained across the different read lengths and coverages.
However, as the input statistics we use leads to a low probability of having mutations, we should not take
into account the correctly predicted negative results, as this will be correct in approximatively 93.44% of the
cases. Therefore we turn ourselves to the f1-score as shown in Figure 7.12.
7.2.5.4 Discussion
It is worth noting that the smaller the read length, the fewer doubts there are about the position of a
mutation. For example, in the case of a read having a length of two, there are only two possible positions
which can be mutated. Results need to be compared with our longer simulated reads of 100, where the
evidence applies to 100 different positions. We can expect to obtain better results with smaller reads, and
indeed it is the case.
Similarly, if the coverage is higher, i.e. the average number of reads mapping to a position is higher, we
can expect to have more evidence in the form of more reads. For example, in the case of testing a region
with only one mutation which is not at the point of interest but where both positions (the one of interest
and the one with the mutation) could be mapped with one unique read, it is unclear for the classifier if the
detected mutation originated from a mutation at the position of interest or another one. A higher coverage
will translate in more evidence, which will increase the likelihood of having evidence for the absence of a
mutation at the position of interest, thus simplifying the decision. We expect the results to improve with
higher coverage, and this is a trend we observe in the results.
Nevertheless, we do not deduce every result correctly. As previously mentioned, some of these errors can
be linked to the problem of two mutations possibly shadowing a middle mutation. In this kind of situation,
the network can only do a random guess. Figure 7.13 shows an example of this situation, where the neural
network wrongly predicts a mutation (the circle indicates the input genome, the cross the classification
output for the position of interest, and the plotted line the ratio of mutated reads for the given position).
As there are more negative results than positive results, the neural network is likelier to return a negative
result, as shown in Table 7.1.
Furthermore, this type of input where the position of interest is windowed, appears only in 0.67% of the
cases with read length equal to 100, and even less for data with shorter reads. Therefore this cannot be the
main source of false categorizations.
70 CHAPTER 7. SECURITY
Figure 7.11: Accuracy results obtained
Table 7.1: Results for read length = 100, when the position of interest was within the window formed by
two mutations
Prediction is correct Prediction is incorrect Total
Predicted no mutation 90.20% 2.61% 92.81%
Predicted mutation 1.63% 5.56% 7.19%
Total 91.83% 8.17%
If we observe the results which were misclassified, we can see that many of them share the same char-
acteristics of having a mutation close by, as shown in Figure 7.14. If we take all misclassified outputs and
observe the distribution of the distance between the closest mutation and the point of interest, we notice
that the majority of incorrect results can be linked to close mutations: in more than 90% of the cases the
closest mutation was 4 positions away, as can be observed in the distance histogram presented in Figure
7.15.
Although we are not recovering all the data, we believe that these results are proving that, in the studied
settings, the privacy of the information is at risk. On the one hand, we have obtained high F1-scores, and,
on the other hand, we have proven that, if we wrongly classify an input, it is likely that there is indeed
a mutation in the neighboring positions. A read length value of 100 would be what is generated with an
Illumina sequencer [12].
The recommended coverage can vary depending on the objectives. However, it appears that the recom-
mendations [12, 75, 76, 77] for a broader set of tests are between 33 and 100, as summarized in [78]. At
these recommended coverage levels, we consider the attack to recover too much of the supposedly protected
information to consider the initial settings as privacy preserving.
7.2.5.5 Future work
In order to improve on this method, other neural networks could be employed. For example, and if the
memory requirements can be met, a neural network predicting the classification at multiple locations at a
time and using a prior round of predictions to refine the results of the next one could improve the obtained
results.
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Figure 7.12: F1-score obtained
In the exercise presented here we have not considered linkage disequilibrium: this metric measures the
likelihood that two mutations appear together. If this information could be represented as input to the neural
network alongside the classification of a linked mutation, the point of interest could be better predicted.
Finally, this work makes the assumption that the read length is constant and known. However, the read
length might be variable. In order to take this into account, the Stream giving the read length should either
be available as plaintext or a maximum value for the read length should be assumed. Furthermore, we have
not taken into account the possibility of paired reads: in this configuration two reads are paired together
in the most general class necessary: if the two reads would have belong to class P, then the pair belongs to
class P, if the two belong to class M then the pair belongs to class M, and if one of the reads belongs to class
P and the other to class M, then the pair belongs to class M. This could be modelled in the neural network
presented here by considering the two reads as one very long read, but as we have seen the length of the read
reduces the amount of information recovered. Alternatively, both reads could be treated separately, but in
this case one read might be mislabeled as providing evidence for mutations, increasing the noise present in
the input.
7.2.5.6 Conclusion
In the initial approach of the privacy protection of MPEG-G, it was possible to encrypt only some of the
blocks of information for a given Access Unit. We have here shown that taking advantage of this option,
one could create a file where the mutation types and mutation positions are hidden, and consider the data
to be private. We have shown, however, that this information can be partly recovered. The magnitude of
the recovery depends on the read length and the coverage.
In order to defeat the here presented attack, the easiest path is to encrypt also the first position of each
read. However, other attacks might be possible: other non-encrypted information might be used to recover
other encrypted information. This fact led the privacy approach of MPEG-G to be redefined in order to
impose all blocks in an Access Unit to be encrypted.
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Figure 7.13: Example of a wrongly predicted mutation within the window formed by two mutations.
7.3 Possible wrongdoings: Fingerprinting
7.3.1 Introduction
MPEG-G defines multiple mechanisms to protect the security of the conveyed information: both for the
genomic data and the metadata, the specification provides privacy and integrity for the information. We
will also see how a tool can determine which actions a user is allowed to execute. These mechanisms ensure
that only those recipients who are authorized to receive the information stored in the MPEG-G file are able
to decode it.
These mechanisms do not protect against wrongdoings posterior to the transmission and decoding of the
file. A party could receive a copy of the file and retransmit its content to new, unauthorized recipients. This
situation could happen if the party is an adversary, or also if due diligence is not respected: for example, the
MPEG-G transmitted file might be converted to BAM, thus losing all security mechanisms, and be recovered
by an external actor who has gained access to the BAM file.
Once a party has leaked the information, no mechanism will be able to remove all unauthorized copies.
In order to prevent the leak in the first place, it can be useful to integrate into the file a mechanism to
identify the origin of the data.
We here present a possible algorithm intended to modify the genomic data in a controlled way. The
objective is to send each recipient a slightly modified version of the file. In the case where a leak is detected,
the file owner can conduct an audit. The audit consists in detecting which unique version has been leaked,
thus leading to the recipient responsible for it. The goal is that the threat of the audit will force the users
into compliance.
As this algorithm alters the genomic information, we have not proposed its inclusion to the MPEG-G
specification. The result of the algorithm is aligned genomic information. Thus, any encoder for aligned
data, including an MPEG-G encoder, can be used to represent the output of the algorithm.
7.3.2 Fingerprinting of reads with mutations
7.3.2.1 Introduction
The aim of the presented method is to be as less intrusive as possible. We focus on watermarking reads
with some mutations, considering them more likely candidates for an exportation of data. The reads with
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Figure 7.14: Example of two misclassifications probably caused by the close proximity of a mutation
Table 7.2: Example of description construction
Read CIGAR 5M 2I 3M 4D 1M
Aggregated position 0 5 7 10 14
Information stored in description 5-I-2 10-D-4
mutations are independent subsequences of DNA read by the sequencing machine where the alignment has
detected differences between the read and the reference genome, as introduced in chapter 2. Each read is
treated separately, so importing other information will not make the watermark disappear.
On the other hand, the proposed method results are hard to detect if the reads are modified. This,
however, is limited by the cost of the modification: introducing or removing mutations could alter possible
conclusions drawn from the file, thus rendering this approach as a non-suitable solution to defeat the finger-
printing. An important feature from our approach is the fact that the user holding the watermarking key
can reverse the modifications.
The proposed method consists of four steps for each read:
• generate a description for it
• verify that it is a suitable candidate for the fingerprint method
• decide whether we can perform the modifications based on a secure transformation over the description
• perform the modifications in case of a positive result.
The four steps are described in detail in the following four subsections.
7.3.2.2 Description
The assumption on which this method is built is that the valuable information within a genomic file are
the positions of the modified nucleotides (i.e. the positions of an insertion, deletion or skipped nucleotide
base). Therefore, we assume that no such operation will be added or removed, and that we can use them to
construct the description.
To do so, we propose to use a 256 bits long description. For every modification (insertion I, deletion D,
skipped N and mutation X) and in the order of the read, we append to our description the position of the
modification, for example as an 8 bits unsigned integer (which is enough to store the position in the case of
a file with a maximum read length of 150 base pairs), followed by another byte encoding the modification
operation (first four bits) and the number of nucleotides to which the operation applies (last four bits). The
remaining bits are left with a 0 value. An example is shown in Table 7.2, where we separate with hyphens
each field used for the description.
7.3.2.3 Suitability of read
As we have seen, the method works on the information contained in the CIGAR sequence of each read (i.e.
the list of operations in respect to the reference such as insertion or deletion).
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Figure 7.15: Histogram of distance between the point of interest and the closest mutation, when the mutation
was wrongly predicted and the read length is 100
Under the conditions introduced in the previous subsection, we can neither overflow the 256 bits of
description (limiting to 16 operations) nor the four bits operation length (limiting to 16 the maximum
length of each operation). We consider suitable those reads for which we can construct the description.
Non-suitable reads are disregarded: by changing the size of the description and its fields the number of reads
taken into account varies.
7.3.2.4 Secure transformation
In order for this algorithm to be secure, we need to obtain a secret from the previously constructed description.
This secret will define how to apply the fingerprint. Furthermore, in order to be able to undo the modification,
the result of this secret must always be the same given the description. With secure transformation we refer
to such an operation which, given a description, generates deterministically a secret.
Both during the watermark auditing and the watermark removal we want to obtain the same result from
the secure transformation. We do not consider the numbering of the read to be a suitable input to this
end since this input is lost if, for example, the user generates at some point a new file containing only a
subset of the reads (perhaps all the reads aligned to only one reference sequence). As we would require an
initialization vector per read (in order to maintain the independence of reads), such a transmission would not
be reasonable. Therefore, the only input to the transformation will be the previously constructed description.
One candidate for the transformation is the AES cipher in electronic codebook mode. In this mode, the
cipher is stateless and takes only the plaintext block and the key as input: the consequence is that the same
input always returns the same output. There are flaws in this secure transformation which has repercussions
on the fingerprinting method. This is discussed in clause 7.3.3.
7.3.2.5 Perform the modifications
The result of the fingerprinting will be a modification of the soft clipping at the beginning of the read (see
clause 2 for details). As soft clipping is not considered in the description’s formulation, the process will not
affect the description. The method can be readily extended to support also modifications at the end of the
read.
As explained later, we interpret the result of the secure transformation as the conditions to be met and
the output of the fingerprinting operation. We want the obtained secret to convey the necessary information
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Figure 7.16: Histogram of softclip lengths
to perform and reverse the fingerprinting process. The modification process at the beginning or the end of
the read is the same, the only difference is that the effect is mirrored. The basic idea is that the secure
transformation result will encode the state before and after fingerprinting, the state being the length of the
soft clip operation and its content.
We define a number of bits encoding the length of the soft clip operation. In this case, it is preferable
not to use a straightforward encoding as this would lead to sampling uniformly the pool of possible lengths.
On the contrary, if we plot the histogram of soft clip lengths (Figure 7.16), we observe that short lengths are
far more likely. Therefore, it is preferable to construct the decoding of the length of the soft clip operation
using the observed Cumulative Distribution Function.
With this mechanism, we can now first read from the result of the secure transformation a guess for the
current soft clip operation size (guesssize), and then the length of the one into which we should transform
it (transformationsize). This distribution function is likely to return the value zero for the two random
variables, thus reducing the likelihood of executing a transformation. Additionally, we also decode two
nucleotide sequences: guessstring and transformationstring. For the interpretation of the string we use only
the four base pairs found in nature (’A’,’C’,’T’,’G’). As such, each byte of the secure transformation encodes
up to four base pairs. In Figure 7.17 we show how the bytes are interpreted.
The operation is performed if guesssize and guessstring match the observed operation. This ensures that
if we perform the reverse operation we will have the original soft clip content encoded in the output of the
secure transformation. One exception to this is when the guess is not equal to the observed operation, but
the proposed result of the transformation is. In other words, transformationsize and transformationstring
match the observed soft clip. In this case, if we do not apply any modification, during the reverse operation
we would be wrongfully induced to believe that the watermark operation was performed. In order to avoid
this, we swap the values of guess and transformation. In doing so, we signal to the un-fingerprinting routine
this special case and we are able to correctly reverse the modifications (see Algorithm 1 for an illustration
of this).
The operation is only applied when both guesssize and transformationsize are smaller than the position
of the first non-softclip and non-equal operation. This is to ensure that all the information required to undo
the operation is available in the reference.
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Figure 7.17: Interpretation of the secure transformation output
Data: read, secure_transformation_output
Result: Watermarked read
real_soft_cliplength = getSoftClipLength(read);
real_soft_clipstring = getSoftClipString(read);
guesssize = readSoftClipLength(secure_transformation_output[0]);
transformationsize = readSoftClipLength(secure_transformation_output[1]);
guessstring = readSoftClipString(secure_transformation_output[2]);
transformationstring = readSoftClipString(secure_transformation_output[3]);
if real_soft_clip == guess then
fingerprint(read, from = guess, to = transformation);
else
if real_soft_clip == transformation then
fingerprint(read, from = transformation, to =guess);
end
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for reading watermarking function parameters
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Figure 7.18: Soft clip contraction operation
7.3.2.6 Perform the modifications
In a nutshell, the fingerprinting operation will replace the initial guess content with the transformation input.
This gives us new criteria for the suitability of the read to undergo a fingerprinting operation: there cannot
be a base pair involved in the description in the first max
(
guesslength, transformationlength
)
base pairs of
the read. This ensures that we will only replace soft clip operations (for which the content is encoded in
transformation) or match operations (in which case the content is straightforwardly present in the reference
genome).
See Figure 7.18 for a visual representation of the case where transformationlength < guesslength. In the
inverse case, we would copy the reference genome in the undoing operation. Figure 7.19 shows how a read, its
soft-clipping and its corresponding CIGAR string are modified after applying the transformation operation.
7.3.2.7 Undoing fingerprints
The process to undo the modifications is the same as for modifying. If the read starts with transformation, we
modify back to guess. In the case where it starts with guess, we change the beginning with transformation.
7.3.3 Results and discussion
7.3.3.1 Basic tests
The fingerprinting method needs a clear mapping between each of the file’s recipients and watermarking
keys. In case of auditing leaked data, we would test for each key whether the leaked data matches the
modified result. In case of granting access to the unmodified version, the recipient only the fingerprinting
key to reverse the modification process. If one of the keys is leaked, the corresponding file could be reversed,
but the other files do not lose their watermarking. In fact, using an incorrect key to remove the watermark
from a file would add a new watermark to it.
In order to test the algorithm, we use a file containing the sequencing of a human genome, generated
with an Illumina device [79]. The file has a low coverage (2.3). Coverage refers to the average number of
78 CHAPTER 7. SECURITY
Figure 7.19: Example of application of transformation operation to a read and its associated CIGAR String
identifications for a single nucleotide, as described in [80]. The file is part of the database of test material
[81] used in the standardization of MPEG-G.
The file contains 5.5 · 107 reads, from which 3.8 · 107 are perfect matches and are therefore discarded.
From the remaining reads, the description could be built for 6.2 · 105.
We discard those cases where the change in soft clip length would be too big (arbitrarily defined at 10):
this discards 2.8 · 105 reads. The algorithm can only be applied if both guesslength and transformlength are
less than the position of the first operation which is not a soft clip or a match. This is the case in 3.4 · 105
reads, from which for 3.1 · 105 either guess or transform match the beginning. However, as it is highly likely
to read a null length from the secure transformation, in 2.0 · 105 instances, the ciphertext does not represent
a real transformation. In the end, 1.2 · 105 reads are transformed.
This number has to be compared to the 6.2 ·105 reads which could have been possibly modified. Someone
trying to circumvent the mark would need to work on these 6.2 · 105 in order to reverse the modifications
purposely introduced in 18.6% of them.
7.3.3.2 Resistance to collusion attacks
7.3.3.2.1 Vulnerability Let us assume a collusion attack where all parties suppose that the most fre-
quent version of a read has not been modified. Such situation is more likely if a watermarked read is modified
differently for multiple recipients. In order to test such a risk, we reduce the previous test data to only those
reads mapped to the first chromosome. We then simulate sharing the file with multiple parties: we do this
by executing the fingerprint method with different keys. For each read several outcomes are possible: the
read could not be fingerprinted with any of the keys, it could be fingerprinted with some of the keys, or with
all of the keys. As the probability of a read being modified is fairly low, the most likely outcome is that if
across multiple watermarked instances of the same file there are different variants of the same read, then the
most common variant is the original, non-watermarked one.
In this test, we reduced the number of reads to 4.1·106, and we used seven different keys for watermarking.
On average, for each key there were around 1.8 · 104 reads watermarked, for a total of 6.62 · 104 reads being
watermarked at least once across all instances. For a total of 6.59 · 104 reads, the most frequent variant was
the original, non-watermarked one.
Figure 7.20 shows how the risk of collusion increases as the number of watermarked files rises: as the
number of watermarked files increases, the ratio of cases where the non-watermarked variant is the most
frequent one augments, thus simplifying a collusion attack which only selects the most frequent variant. The
here presented version of the algorithm is vulnerable to such attacks. However, some of the concepts from [56]
could be applied to the algorithm. Although we cannot select each read to be watermarked independently,
due to the way the reads are selected, the algorithm could be executed multiple times, once for each of the
provided keys. As soon as a read is watermarked with one of the keys, the iterations stop.
As for each read, the likelihood of being modified is low, we can think of each key as modifying a distinct
subset of reads, without any overlapping with any other set. In these conditions, we want a configuration
such that, for each recipient, we have selected a unique set of keys, where none of the sets is empty (as
it would imply that the recipient would receive a non-modified version), and that each key is present in a
majority of sets (thus we ensure that the modified version is the most frequent one, even if all recipients
collude). This selection of configuration also needs to minimize the number of keys used in each set, as each
key implies modifications to the file, thus decreasing its utility and possibly harming conclusions. If the
number of recipients is known beforehand, the task is trivial, and the collusion strategy of selecting the most
frequent version will always fail.
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Figure 7.20: Evolution of the ratio of cases where the original non-watermarked variant is not the most
frequent across all watermarked files
7.3.3.2.2 An improvement using an ILP In the case where the number of recipients is unknown,
some concessions have to be made. Let us see how the set of keys for a new user is decided upon after
receiving the new request. We only know which keys were used for the previous recipients.
Similar to [56], we construct an Integer Linear Program (ILP), which aims at minimizing the cost asso-
ciated with the decision. We construct the objective function as a lexicographic search: first we minimize
the risk of leakage, then we minimize the sum of the sizes of sets, and finally the size of the biggest set. As
previously explained, each time a key is used at least once, but is not present in a majority of set, the reads
associated to that key will be recoverable. The ILP decides the set for the new recipient, which has to be
different from all sets previously employed.
Table 7.3 shows the result of this iterative process: in order to obtain a column, all previous columns
are provided as input. We can observe how the solver attempts to maintain the number of keys used as
low as possible, but as soon as all combinations are used, a new key appears in the pool of used keys. This
key is then a potential source of leaking, as it appears in a minority of sets, but in subsequent calls the key
is always selected and eventually reaches a point where it is not a source anymore. However, this happens
when all combinations are used, therefore the problem arises again at the next iteration. The process can
be observed for recipient 2, 4, 8, and 16.
We generate the fingerprints for each of the recipients decided by the ILP; the corresponding results are
summarized in Figure 7.21. We can see that the average number of modified reads increases as the number
of recipients increases. Furthermore, and as previously explained, the introduction of a new key to the pool
creates situation of leaking, which are corrected as soon as the file has been shared with a sufficient number
of recipients.
There is a trade-off between the use of multiple keys to avoid collusion attacks and the computation
needed to generate such files with multiple keys: each key increases the time required to generate such file
as depicted in Figure 7.22.
7.3.3.3 Generalization of the description
Our next step is to slightly modify the behavior of the algorithm in order to improve it. As a result a greater
variety of cases is accepted. We use a file with variable read length, some of which have a length greater
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Table 7.3: ILP iterative decisions
Recipient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Key 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Key 7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Key 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Key 2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Key 5 Y
Key 4
Key 6
Figure 7.21: Number of reads modified and leakage ratio versus number of recipients
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Figure 7.22: Time required to fingerprint a file compared to copying it
than 255 nucleotides (average depth of 8.1 reads per base). Thus, the byte used to store the position of the
mutation is overflowed: we convert its representation to a two bytes system. The maximal length of the
description is kept at 32 bytes; therefore, we are not able to store as many mutations anymore. The observed
likelihood of a read being marked, provided that it had at least one mutation and the description could be
constructed, is 25.5%.
Finally, we test a file with 1.7 · 108 reads [82] for an average depth of 7.74. In this file, there are 1.5 · 108
candidates. For 6 · 107 of them, a description could be built, and in 25.3% the constructed description
resulted in a modification of the read.
The proposed watermarking method has the positive side to be reversible and to limit the alteration of
the file.
The negative aspect is that an attacker can render it useless by modifying the reads. For example, by
shifting all reads one position to the left, or inserting new modifications, the process is broken. Furthermore,
by modifying the length of every soft clip operation the result of the watermarking is removed. On the other
hand, this same approach decreases greatly the value of the published information, as it modifies the data
blindly, thus introducing more noise to the data. In order to have successfully defeated the security method,
the attacker would have to publish a version of the file as close as possible to the original non-fingerprinted
file, without the modifications introduced to identify that instance of the data.
An attacker could also try to reconstruct partially the original file. As the secure transformation will
always give the same output for the same description, the attacker knows that for all reads whose descriptions
are the same, some will share the same soft clip operation due to the watermarking. If there are enough
instances, it would be possible to infer the values of guess and transformation allowing to reverse the process
for those reads.
7.3.4 Conclusions
We have presented a method of modifying a file of aligned genomic information in order to introduce rec-
ognizable changes, which are, however, hard to identify as such without the required parameters. These
changes can be undone in case the original parameters of the method are known.
The proposed method is designed with some assumptions in mind: mainly that the reads to be marked
by the fingerprint operation are those carrying information about mutations, and that a file recipient has
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no incentive to modify blindly and broadly the content of the file showing mutations, as this decreases the
value of the information.
The inner workings of the fingerprint operation can be viewed as separate entities. First, special features
of each data entry are combined, this combination is then used as input of a cryptographic function, and
lastly the ciphertext is interpreted as the modifications to be applied to the data entry. By modifying each
one of these three steps, the proposed method could be adapted to other needs or another set of assumptions.
For example, if modifying the soft clip operations is considered too harmful to the value of the file, a new
interpretation of the ciphertext could be devised to modify the quality values instead.
The algorithms that come closest to what we propose are watermarking strategies as used in the audio-
visual world, e.g. in the case of images (still and video) and audio. Alongside the familiar strategy of clearly
modifying the values of certain regions of an image, other approaches have been proposed as surveyed in [83].
As in the case of image watermarking, we have to be concerned with the possible transformations applied
to the file. However, despite the similarity in the objectives (either mark the ownership of the intellectual
property or identify a specific copy), the data types are quite different. For example, in the case of genomic
information we have multiple reads storing multiple copies of what should be the same information, with
no clear equivalent in the case of an image file. Similarly, a modification not visible to the human eye or
perceptible to the ear is acceptable in the audio-visual world; however, in the case of genomic information it
might be wrongly interpreted as a mutation.
Furthermore, another path which could be explored in order to create a fingerprinting method for genomic
information is exploiting the less significant bits for the qualities. Each read’s base pair comes with a quality
score, a representation of the sequencer device’s confidence when identifying that base pair. Using the less
significant bits could however fail if a new format used lossy compression for the quality scores [60].
Some requirements used in this version of the algorithm could be lifted in case the reversing properties
were not to be used. This could allow a new version of the proposed method where more reads are changed.
Chapter 8
Application Programming Interface
Initial requirements formulated by MPEG included privacy rules. Early on, a need for an Appli-
cation Programming Interface (API) was also identified.
In this chapter, we present our API approach, which was not adopted, but was publicly presented
at [84]. We also present our proposal for privacy rules. It relies on XACML to parameterize
who is under which circumstances allowed to execute a given action specified in the API. To
avoid repetitions, we introduce algorithms that allow the user to define default behaviors and
exceptions. MPEG adopted this approach. It was published in [85, 86]. MPEG-G’s API defines
filtering criteria which are not supported by MPEG-G’s indexing. We propose an alternative file
format allowing to adapt the indexing tables to the foreseen uses: the end-users indicate which
criteria they will apply and our new file format adapts the indexing accordingly. The indexing
relies on multiple output units, each of which corresponds to a permutation of the filtering criteria.
If required, the output unit is also encrypted. We have prepared a draft paper to be submitted
[87].
8.1 Requirements
The MPEG group identified no requirements on the Application Programming Interface (API) in the prelim-
inary work. However, to make MPEG-G consistent with other MPEG standards, MPEG-G has to include
an API.
8.2 Our proposed solution
We based our initial proposal on the foreseeable lifecycle of the MPEG-G encoded information. We identified
six groups of actions:
1. access
The user submits an identification of the content to be retrieved, and the tool returns the data either
in its MPEG-G encoded form, or in the decoded form.
2. modification
The user submits the identification of the content to be modified and the new value of this content.
The tool operates the requested modifications.
3. authorization
The user wants to discover whether a given action is allowed. The tool returns if the action is permitted
or denied based on the user’s context information.
4. verification
The user requests the tool to confirm that the information stored in the file does not appear to have
been altered.
5. conversion
The user requests to convert the information contained in the MPEG-G file into another format or to
include the information provided in another format in the MPEG-G file.
6. beacon-like
The user requests statistics computed across multiple entries in the file (such as multiple Datasets).
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We wanted a consistent approach for each of the actions. We wanted our approach to be usable both with
local and remote tools and to be agnostic to the implementation characteristics of each tool, for example,
its user identification mechanism and the overall work context created and maintained.
We decided to propose a REST-like API, as this addresses our goals:
• REST forces each action to be atomic.
• A tool can use a REST-like API both to work with a local server or a remote one.
• Each actions is independent of the channel transmitting the action request: the channel might be
created using HTTPS, cookies, or another technology, but the specification of the action remains
agnostic.
Each one of the actions is atomic to the user. Although to perform a given action, the tool might require
to perform multiple steps, however to the eyes of the user the action is atomic.
Let us imagine that the user requests some of the reads stored in a given Dataset. In order to perform
this, the tool will need to perform a succession of actions:
• accessing the Dataset Group where the Dataset is stored
• identifying the Access Units corresponding to the requested information
• determining whether the Access Units’ information is encrypted and decrypting it if required
• decoding the information.
For the user, the action is atomic, yet it is composed of a succession of operations.
The usual HTTP action also corresponded to the set of actions we envisaged for MPEG-G. The actions
of requesting data or converting information from or to MPEG-G maps to the HTTP method GET; the
modification action can map to PUT, PUSH, DELETE, POST; the verification action to HEAD. The
remaining can also be mapped to GET methods.
Our approach defined actions of different magnitude (for example, it could retrieve an entire structure or
just a field of said structure), and in order to obtain homogeneity a given action could be used at different
levels of the MPEG-G structure (for example obtaining header information from the Dataset Group, the
Dataset, or the Access Unit level).
8.3 The adopted approach
The MPEG group had several issues with our proposal. The group summarized these issues in three main
requirements:
1. The specification should limit the API to information retrieval.
2. The specification of the different methods should be consistent with the other specifications of the file.
3. The API should not use concepts foreign to the current genomic data representation formats: the
API should, for example, not refer to the stream structure, as this does not have an equivalent in a
SAM-like file.
The final approach adopts two main traits from our proposal. The standard does not specify how the
API creates an execution context. As in our proposal, the user and the tool have started a context through
an external channel. It is within this context that the tool executes the actions. During the instantiation of
the context, the user and the server (either local or remote), shall agree on the content on which the tool
performs the actions, and both parties must exchange the required security information (the user reveals his
identity and provides the keys to the tool if required).
As in our proposal, the final approach uses the idea of atomic operations. As the requirements restrict the
operations to the use of concepts that are similar to the ones available in current genomic formats, the API
focuses on the structure that is equivalent to the current genomic formats, the Dataset. Due to the features
present in MPEG-G, some exceptions must be accepted. The security capabilities of MPEG-G introduce
new outcomes that are, in current formats, impossible. These outcomes include:
• the lack of the proper key to retrieve the information
• an error while checking the integrity of the information
• denial of the query due to privacy rules.
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When performing queries on a Dataset, the user must identify the Dataset which is the object of the query.
To avoid the situation where the user has to find the Dataset’s ID through trial and error, the API also
provides queries to retrieve the structure of the file, i.e., the different IDs of the Dataset Groups and Datasets
present in the file.
The API finally adopted to retrieve information from the Datasets offers more fine-tuning than current
methods. Alongside the usual region definition (i.e., from which chromosome and from which position to
which position shall the tool retrieve data), the API specifies that a conformant tool shall also be capable
of filtering according to other criteria. These criteria include, but are not limited to, the class of the read,
the quality of the mapping, the existence of multiple alignments, or even the size of specific operations.
8.4 Thoughts on adopted approach
The indexation mechanism defined in the file format uses the sequence employed to align the information, the
range on the sequence to which the data belongs, and the encoding class to optimize access times. MPEG-
G has adopted a query interface allowing to use other characteristics when identifying the information to
return. The combination of these facts leads to a situation where, if the user uses these new filtering fields,
the tool will need to fetch, decode and filter many reads that will not be part of the final result.
As we have seen, the issue originates in the difference between the indexation mechanism and the filtering
criteria. One solution would be to include every field present in the filtering criteria into the indexation mech-
anism. There are some issues with this straightforward solution. The first problem is that each indexation
field will be bound to additional signaling: including all filtering fields will lead to an increase in overhead,
and some of these fields might even not interest any of the foreseen recipients. The second problem is the
feasibility of this approach. Some of the criteria can take multiple values per record, and some of the criteria
might have an infinite set of possible values (criteria represented as a ratio).
Therefore, we are interested in a solution that provides additional indexation mechanisms, but which
limits the increase in overhead. We present next an approach which addresses these needs.
8.4.1 Approach and methods
In our approach all parties who will be working with the sequenced genome are to be asked which subset of
the information they intend to use; for example, all the reads having more than 30 inserted nucleotides, or all
the reads having a mapping quality beyond a certain threshold. These intended queries are then translated
into a set of discrimination criteria. If the original information is reordered and indexed taking into account
these criteria, the time required to perform each one of the queries can be greatly reduced, especially for
fine-grained searches with just a few compliant results. Furthermore, the privacy requirements are respected
by separating and encrypting subsets of the information which are to remain private.
We use the API specified for MPEG-G as the collection of queries we want to be able to optimize. Al-
though this API was intended to be used with MPEG-G files, the query interface is agnostic to the underlying
data representation. For the purpose of our experiment, we will be using the Binary Alignment/Map (BAM)
[14] format for the information encoding, due to its easiness. However, as in MPEG-G the information is
stored in records, we use a similar approach by ordering our information by name; thus all the information
related to a same sequencer output is contiguous.
We envision the case where one or multiple shareholders have already a prior guess on which query they
want to perform. Therefore, and prior to distributing the sequencing result, we want to reorder the content
and index it in order to optimize all of the foreseen queries. Furthermore, we want to respect the privacy
concerns of the patient: during the reorganization process, the records are distributed according to the
persons who should be granted access and are encrypted accordingly.
8.4.1.1 Processing pipeline
We propose a single interface where all shareholders can contribute their discrimination criteria (e.g. presence
of mapped information, length of insertions). Furthermore, a listing of access rights (recipient identification
to genomic region) is expected.
Based on these settings and the given input, an output is generated. The output is composed of two
files: a database and one file corresponding to the concatenation of multiple BAMs. These output BAMs
are possibly encrypted.
The content of the original BAM is divided into different output BAMs. Figure 8.1 shows the pipeline
we propose for this. Each record (collection of all alignments of all segments of a given sequencer output)
of the original file is given as input to an annotation process which consists in testing against each filtering
rule whether one or more tags should be associated to the record. Upon completion, all records are grouped
in units sharing exactly the same tags: each one of these groups corresponds to one of the output BAMs.
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Figure 8.1: Record classification pipeline
Figure 8.2: User’s privacy requirements
The content of each output unit is such that all records stored in it share the same tags. Nevertheless, there
might be multiple independent units encoding records with the same tags. The database being generated
alongside the different BAM files allows the querying of the different units: for each one of them, there are
entries documenting each tag related to it.
8.4.1.2 Collaboration among multiple users
For this example, we will suppose that there are three different actors: the owner of the file, a practitioner
and a researcher. The owner of the file wants to distribute a copy, but the practitioner and the researcher
shall have access to only selected parts of the file, as shown in Figure 8.2. Let us also suppose that the
practitioner intends to use those records where one of the reads is unmapped, and the researcher intends to
use those records where a long insert appears.
The presented approach will combine the requirements of all three actors and divide the input into
multiple output units such that each one of the output units corresponds to only one of the permutations
of the criteria. One possible result is shown in Figure 8.3, where both the privacy settings and the filtering
criteria have been taken into account. The number within the cells is the identifier of the output unit.
Figure 8.3: Division in Access Units matching the filtering queries and the security settings
8.4. THOUGHTS ON ADOPTED APPROACH 87
The foundation of the sorting of records in output units is the attachment of tags. Each tag corresponds
to a specific trait which is expected to be of relevance for the future pipelines.
8.4.1.2.1 General tags The criteria are represented as rules, which, for each record, assign a tag: for
example, one rule will add a tag hasMapped, with either a true or a false value, and another rule will add a
tag numInsertions, with the number of insertions. Source code 8.1 shows one example of rules. We expect
every user who will be using the distributed file to contribute to these rules. Each one of these contributions
can be translated to more tags, or finer grained bins.
XML source 8.1: Example of tagging rules
<ns:Rules xmlns:ns="es.upc.dmag.dispatcher">
<ns:markMapped>true</ns:markMapped>
<ns:markUnmapped>true</ns:markUnmapped>
<ns:markHasPairedEnded>true</ns:markHasPairedEnded>
<ns:markHasSingleEnded>true</ns:markHasSingleEnded>
<ns:markHasOpticalDuplicateRule>true</ns:markHasOpticalDuplicateRule>
<ns:markGroup>true</ns:markGroup>
<ns:deletionsLengthFractionBins>
<ns:boundary>0.25</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.5</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.75</ns:boundary>
</ns:deletionsLengthFractionBins>
<ns:deletionsLengthBins>
<ns:boundary>25</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>50</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>75</ns:boundary>
</ns:deletionsLengthBins>
<ns:insertionsLengthFractionBins>
<ns:boundary>0.25</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.5</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.75</ns:boundary>
</ns:insertionsLengthFractionBins>
<ns:insertionsLengthBins>
<ns:boundary>25</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>50</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>75</ns:boundary>
</ns:insertionsLengthBins>
<ns:mismatchedBasesFractionBins>
<ns:boundary>0.25</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.5</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.75</ns:boundary>
</ns:mismatchedBasesFractionBins>
<ns:mismatchedBasesBins>
<ns:boundary>25</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>50</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>75</ns:boundary>
</ns:mismatchedBasesBins>
<ns:numDeletionsBins>
<ns:boundary>1</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>3</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>5</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>10</ns:boundary>
</ns:numDeletionsBins>
<ns:numDeletionsFractionBins>
<ns:boundary>0.01</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.03</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.05</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.1</ns:boundary>
</ns:numDeletionsFractionBins>
<ns:numInsertionsBins>
<ns:boundary>1</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>3</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>5</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>10</ns:boundary>
</ns:numInsertionsBins>
<ns:numInsertionsFractionBins>
<ns:boundary>0.01</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.03</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.05</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.1</ns:boundary>
</ns:numInsertionsFractionBins>
<ns:numSplicesBins>
<ns:boundary>1</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>2</ns:boundary>
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<ns:boundary>3</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>4</ns:boundary>
</ns:numSplicesBins>
<ns:numSplicesFractionBins>
<ns:boundary>0.01</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.02</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.03</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.04</ns:boundary>
</ns:numSplicesFractionBins>
<ns:spliceLengthBins>
<ns:boundary>1</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>5</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>10</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>30</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>50</ns:boundary>
</ns:spliceLengthBins>
<ns:spliceLengthFractionBins>
<ns:boundary>0.01</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.05</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.1</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.3</ns:boundary>
<ns:boundary>0.5</ns:boundary>
</ns:spliceLengthFractionBins>
</ns:Rules>
The currently implemented rules are the ones needed to provide an API similar to the one MPEG-G
offers. Although this API has been designed to work with MPEG-G files, it could be readily applied to
other formats. Its main focus is on allowing more specific filtering on the data: whereas the SAMtools
command line allows to filter per position, the MPEG-G API uses structures allowing to filter according to
certain properties of the genomic information (e.g., the minimal or maximal quality, the number or length
of insertions, deletions, mismatches, among others). Our tagging rules are a translation of these MPEG-G
API’s filtering structures. As using the real value of these properties would result in many output units, the
values are binned together. The size of each bin is user-specified. For example, in one file, all reads having
between 1 and 25 inserted nucleotides can be marked as belonging to the bin 2.
The different rules are translated into tables in the indexation database. This allows to keep track of
which tags are related with which output units, where to find the output unit and whether it is encrypted
or not. The database schema can be seen in Figure 8.4.
Figure 8.4: Indexation database schema
8.4.1.2.2 Security tags Alongside the rules concerning the query optimization, we provide the owner
of the file with a mechanism to set privacy requirements on the data.
The security rule generates the list of recipients to whom access to a given record is granted. The result
can span from no identifier whatsoever (in this case, the data is encrypted with only the patient as recipient)
to open to everybody (in this case, the data is stored unencrypted). Source code 8.2 shows an example of
such a configuration.
XML source 8.2: Security rules: regions open for some recipients
<ns:SecurityRules xmlns:ns="es.upc.dmag.dispatcher">
<ns:securityRule>
<ns:region>
<ns:referenceId>14</ns:referenceId>
<ns:start>38727275</ns:start>
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<ns:end>38728481</ns:end>
</ns:region>
<ns:recipients>
<ns:Recipient>Researcher</ns:Recipient>
</ns:recipients>
</ns:securityRule>
<ns:securityRule>
<ns:region>
<ns:referenceId>11</ns:referenceId>
<ns:start>17392498</ns:start>
<ns:end>17476879</ns:end>
</ns:region>
<ns:anybody/>
</ns:securityRule>
<ns:securityRule>
<ns:region>
<ns:referenceId>9</ns:referenceId>
<ns:start>136673143</ns:start>
<ns:end>136687457</ns:end>
</ns:region>
<ns:anybody/>
</ns:securityRule>
<ns:securityRule>
<ns:region>
<ns:referenceId>9</ns:referenceId>
<ns:start>21994139</ns:start>
<ns:end>22128103</ns:end>
</ns:region>
<ns:recipients>
<ns:Recipient>Researcher</ns:Recipient>
<ns:Recipient>Physician</ns:Recipient>
</ns:recipients>
</ns:securityRule>
</ns:SecurityRules>
In order to generate the list of recipients for a given record, the security rule matches each record against
each region parametrized in the security configuration. The final list of recipients is the list of recipients
common to each of the regions. If the list is empty, it is understood that just the owner of the file is to have
access to it. We use PGP [47] to encrypt the output units. This format allows us to encrypt the unit only
once, yet leaving it available to the entire list of designated recipients.
As the security tag is treated like any other tag, it does not affect the previously described pipeline: all
records being collected in one output structure share the same general and security tags.
8.4.1.3 Filtering
The representation of filtering criteria is similar to the one of tagging rules. For each of the filters, it has
to be indicated whether the filtering criteria applies to one or all reads. In the case where the filtering
criteria is used in conjunction with the query command, the filtering criteria are translated into a database
query, allowing to recover only those output units which seem to be relevant. In case a parameter was not
foreseen as relevant during the encoding phase is, therefore, not included in the indexation information, the
parameter is left out of the query.
XML source 8.3: Filter rules for perfect match
<ns:AndFilter xmlns:ns="es.upc.dmag.dispatcher">
<ns:HasMapped>
<ns:value>true</ns:value>
<ns:forAllReads>true</ns:forAllReads>
</ns:HasMapped>
<ns:HasOptical>
<ns:value>false</ns:value>
<ns:forAllReads>true</ns:forAllReads>
</ns:HasOptical>
<ns:HasUnmapped>
<ns:value>false</ns:value>
<ns:forAllReads>false</ns:forAllReads>
</ns:HasUnmapped>
<ns:NumDeletionsBin>
<ns:lowerBound>0</ns:lowerBound>
<ns:upperBound>1</ns:upperBound>
<ns:forAllReads>true</ns:forAllReads>
</ns:NumDeletionsBin>
<ns:NumInsertionsBin>
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<ns:lowerBound>0</ns:lowerBound>
<ns:upperBound>1</ns:upperBound>
<ns:forAllReads>true</ns:forAllReads>
</ns:NumInsertionsBin>
<ns:NumMismatchesBin>
<ns:lowerBound>0</ns:lowerBound>
<ns:upperBound>1</ns:upperBound>
<ns:forAllReads>true</ns:forAllReads>
</ns:NumMismatchesBin>
<ns:NumSplicesBin>
<ns:lowerBound>0</ns:lowerBound>
<ns:upperBound>1</ns:upperBound>
<ns:forAllReads>true</ns:forAllReads>
</ns:NumSplicesBin>
</ns:AndFilter>
8.4.2 Results and discussion
We use the genomic query API defined in MPEG-G as it is convenient for testing the approach. It provides
us with a well-defined collection of criteria which can be used when searching. We generate multiple files,
from coarse-grained to fine-grained output units, and test four different queries against these files. The
filtering criteria are as follows:
• no rules
The number of records is the maximum one which could be held in memory.
• separate types
The only rules used concern the number of operations: the records without any operation of a given
type are separated from the rest, thus recreating the concept of classes from MPEG-G.
• separate types 25 and separate types 5
The tags are created based on bins of width 25 and 5 respectively (or 0.25 and 0.05 if decimal). Those
reads without any operation of a given type are still separated from all other records.
We test four different queries:
1. retrieving all records having an exact match with the reference
2. retrieving all records having one read mapped and the other unmapped
3. adding to the prior query the requirement of the mapped record being an exact match with the reference
4. querying for those records where at least one record has a number of inserted nucleotides in a given
range.
The time required to perform each query is summarized in Table 8.1. The entry ’reference’ corresponds
to the results obtained when filtering the original BAM file and serves as the benchmark to beat.
As it can be observed from the reference results, there are two main factors contributing to the compu-
tation time: the time to read the entire file and the time to write the results, evidentiated by the variance of
times for the reference, directly imputable to the number of records to be written. The proposed methodol-
ogy allows to reduce the time spent in reading the file. However, there is a trade-off between the granularity
and the overhead caused by accessing more output units.
Table 8.1: Seconds to extract records for filter
Reference No rules Separatetypes
Separate
types 25
Separate
types 5
Perfect match 387 388 398 391 395
Half-mapped 112 114 7 8 9
Half-mapped
perfect match 108 113 4 4 5
Long inserts 109 107 1 0,623 0,746
Mid-long
inserts 110 106 4 5 1
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Figure 8.5: Size of output versus number of output units
As previously stated, we are aiming at recreating the MPEG-G API and thus require all information
relevant to a given template to be contiguous. In order to achieve this, we use, both as input and output,
files which are ordered by query name. This does automatically translates into an increase in the file size,
as the information is harder to compress.
We include the header information in each of the output units, and this represents approximately 6
kilobytes per output unit, thus creating an overhead. However, the result of clustering similar reads is an
increase in the compressibility. This leads to a trade-off between a lower entropy and more output units, as
can be observed in Figure 8.5. Although we have not tested it, it can be assumed that the size of the output
file could be further lowered if the ordering was changed to something more akin to position ordering and if
the header were not included in each of the output units.
8.4.3 Conclusion
We have developed a tool that, given a BAM file as input, generates a new file with optimized querying
mechanisms. We also take into account the file owner’s privacy settings to protect the corresponding file
accordingly. At the moment, our implementation only addresses the queries defined in MPEG-G’s APIs, but
can be readily extended to other use cases.
Our results show that there are important optimizations to be achieved by using our technique. However,
there are caveats: the speed-ups can only be observed if it is possible to avoid reading many records, and
the time required to write can render any improvements insignificant.
8.5 Privacy rules
8.5.1 Requirements
As we have seen in clause 5.1, one of the earliest identified requirements, is the need to control who is allowed
to do what with the content of the file. In clause 7.2, we have defined a method to limit access to some
aspects of the information to individual users. We have done so by encrypting specific regions of the files
with specific keys. This technology gives us the vocabulary to create a key-distribution infrastructure that
controls who has access to what information.
However, the requirement specifies the need to control what the user is allowed to do with the content.
Being allowed to perform a particular task with information of a specific region is different from having access
to the region. For example, the file’s user might be allowed to add the observed mutations to a frequency
database, yet not allowed to deduce information about the patient from this (such as genetic lineage). For
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Figure 8.6: Policy Language Model, figure from [88]
both actions, the user must have access to the content of the file in plaintext, but the patient has given the
researcher permission to perform only one of them: having access to information through the decryption
mechanism and being allowed to perform a given task on this information is not equivalent.
We thus need a mechanism to specify who, and under which circumstances, is allowed to perform a given
task.
8.5.2 Proposed solution
8.5.2.1 XACML
8.5.2.1.1 Definition of Privacy Rules using XACML The eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) standard version 3.0 [88] was specified by the OASIS organization in 2013 [89] and reviewed
in 2017. It is an XML-based language that allows to express authorization policies which can be applied to
digital objects.
The main motivation for the definition of XACML was the big amount of proprietary and application-
specific access control policy languages used to define policies, which once defined cannot be shared across
different systems. To this end, XACML specifies a Policy Language Model, shown in Figure 8.6. The three
top-level elements defined for this model are Rule, Policy and PolicySet. The rule element is the basic unit
of management within an XACML Policy Administration Point (PAP). The policy element consists of rule
elements and mechanisms for combining the results of their evaluation. The PolicySet element enables the
combination of separate policies into a single one. In order to ask for authorization, the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP) have to exchange some information in the form of XACML
request and response. Both information structures are also defined in the standard and contain the required
information to perform the authorization and send its result. Figure 8.6 shows the Policy Language Model
as defined in the XACML standard. It also presents the relationships between Rule, Policy and PolicySet,
as well as the elements that compose them. We briefly summarize them next.
A rule is the most elementary unit of policy. The main components of a rule are:
1. a target
It defines the set of attributes identifying subjects or roles, resources and actions needed to request
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authorization. If this element is not present, it has to be taken from the parent policy.
2. an effect
It indicates what happens when the rule applies. Its value can be Permit or Deny.
3. a set of conditions
Each one represents a boolean expression that refines the applicability of the rule according to the
target. It is an optional element.
4. obligation expressions
They represent actions to be performed after application of the rule; for instance, send an email to the
owner of the information when access to it has been granted.
5. advice expressions
They are similar to obligations, but can be ignored.
In order to be evaluated, rules must be encapsulated into policies, which may contain more than one
rule. The main components of a policy are the following:
1. a target
It defines the set of attributes identifying subjects or roles, resources and actions needed to request
authorization applying to the policy.
2. a rule-combining algorithm-identifier
The algorithm-identifier specifies the procedure by which the results of evaluating each rule have to be
combined to provide a final result at the policy level.
3. a set of rules
4. obligation expressions
They represent actions to be performed after evaluation of the policy.
5. advice expressions
They are similar to obligations, but can be ignored.
Finally, a policy set comprises the following components:
1. a target
It defines the set of attributes identifying subjects or roles, resources and actions needed to request
authorization applying to the policy set.
2. a policy-combining algorithm-identifier
The algorithm-identifier specifies the procedure by which the results of evaluating each policy have to
be combined to provide a final result at the policy set level.
3. a set of policies
4. obligation expressions
They represent actions to be performed after evaluation of the policy set.
5. advice expressions
They are similar to obligations, but can be ignored.
To ask for authorization, an XACML request has to be provided, which contains several attribute values
that have to be checked against the attributes defined in the different rules in order to provide an autho-
rization decision. These attributes have an associated category and identifier that must be identical both in
the request and in the rules of the policy. After checking whether the authorization is granted, an XACML
response is generated which informs of the result. The possible values in the response are: Permit, Deny,
Indeterminate or Not Applicable.
As XACML follows an XML schema, syntactical correctness is implicit, as any policy must follow the
schema to be valid. Regarding the quality and correctness of policies and rules, other aspects must be
considered, as [90] analyzes. In any case, other considerations regarding the validity of XACML rules are
out of the scope of this work.
The XACML architecture presented in Figure 8.7 consists of the following building blocks:
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Figure 8.7: XACML Architecture
1. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
It performs access control by making decision requests and enforcing authorization decisions. This
is the entity that sends the XACML request to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and receives an
authorization decision.
2. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
It evaluates an applicable policy and returns an authorization decision.
3. Policy Information Point (PIP)
It acts as a source of attribute values. Basically, if there are attributes missing in the XACML request
that is sent by the PEP, the PIP will find them for the PDP to evaluate the policy.
4. Policy Administration Point (PAP)
It creates policies or policy sets and manages them.
Our approach is to use XACML to define privacy rules which can be automatically checked, in order to
establish whether a particular use of the data is permitted in a given situation.
8.5.2.2 Using privacy rules to protect the API
We propose to use the methods defined in the API as the list of possible actions a user could perform. We
propose to convey privacy rules at the Dataset Group and the Dataset levels. We include privacy rules
neither at the Access Unit nor at the Stream level, as there are no actions specific to them. We include
a privacy rule by placing an XACML policy element in the schema for the Dataset Group and Dataset
Protection.
The file structure already provides the relationship between the policy and the structure to which it
refers. Therefore, there is no need to link both in the policy.
XACML defines a range of attributes to use in the resolution of a policy. A central attribute is the one
identifying the requested action: the attribute identified as " urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id".
In our proposal, this attribute shall take the name of one of the API methods as value in the request. In
this case we use an attribute with an ID defined by the XACML specification and a value defined by the
MPEG-G specification. XML source 8.4 shows an example using this attribute.
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XML source 8.4: XACML basic deny all getData requests
1 <Rule
2 RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:ejemplo:RuleMPEGG"
3 Effect="Deny"
4 >
5 <Description>Denying all getData</Description>
6 <Target>
7 <AnyOf>
8 <AllOf>
9 <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
10 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\#string">getData</AttributeValue>
11 <AttributeDesignator
12 MustBePresent="true"
13 Category=
14 "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"
15 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
16 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\#string"
17 />
18 </Match>
19 </AllOf>
20 </AnyOf>
21 </Target>
22 </Rule>
The methods defined in the API also use other attributes. For example in the case of "getData", the
user can select whether multiple alignments should be considered in the returned result. This filtering can
be relevant to the privacy rules (must notably when used to delimit the returned region of the genome),
therefore in our proposal this shall also be included in the request. In our example of multiple alignments,
this translates into an attribute with its ID equal to " presence_of_multiple_alignments". To limit the
effects of the rule, the file creator can use attributes whose IDs and values are defined in the MPEG-G
specification. XML source 8.5 shows how the previous example has been refined to take into account the
request for multiple alignments.
XML source 8.5: XACML basic deny getData request, if the presence of multiple alignments is required
1 <Rule
2 RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:ejemplo:RuleMPEGG"
3 Effect="Deny"
4 >
5 <Description>Denying all getData</Description>
6 <Target>
7 <AnyOf>
8 <AllOf>
9 <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
10 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\#string">getData</AttributeValue>
11 <AttributeDesignator
12 MustBePresent="true"
13 Category=
14 "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"
15 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
16 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\#string"
17 />
18 </AllOf>
19 </AnyOf>
20 </Target>
21 <Condition>
22 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">
23 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-equal">
24 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-one-and-only">
25 <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="true" Category="alignment"
26 AttributeId="presence_of_multiple_alignments"
27 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"/>
28 </Apply>
29 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</AttributeValue>
30 </Apply>
31 </Apply>
32 </Condition>
33 </Rule>
We expect file creators to require other attributes to fully represent the desired rules. New attributes
can be identified by using identifiers defined in the XACML specification (for example the role of the user is
identified "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:attribute:role"). Other attributes could require
new identifiers and semantics to be defined (for instance to cover the topic of the research).
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XML source 8.6: XACML basic deny getData request if requested by a researcher and if the presence of
multiple alignments is required
1 <Rule
2 RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:ejemplo:RuleMPEGG"
3 Effect="Deny"
4 >
5 <Description>Denying all getData</Description>
6 <Target>
7 <AnyOf>
8 <AllOf>
9 <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
10 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\#string">getData</AttributeValue>
11 <AttributeDesignator
12 MustBePresent="true"
13 Category=
14 "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"
15 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
16 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\#string"
17 />
18 </Match>
19 </Match>
20 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">researcher</AttributeValue>
21 <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
22 Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject"
23 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:attribute:role"
24 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
25 </Match>
26 </AllOf>
27 </AnyOf>
28 </Target>
29 <Condition>
30 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">
31 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-equal">
32 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-one-and-only">
33 <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="true" Category="alignment"
34 AttributeId="presence_of_multiple_alignments"
35 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"/>
36 </Apply>
37 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</AttributeValue>
38 </Apply>
39 </Apply>
40 </Condition>
41 </Rule>
8.5.2.3 Avoiding repetitions
The MPEG-G file format creates multiple semantic levels within the file: there are multiple Dataset Groups
that group multiple Datasets that collect multiple Access Units. We have seen that the MPEG group has
expressed the requirement that the security mechanisms should not involve concepts foreign to SAM-like
files: therefore, our proposal does not provide privacy rules at the Access Unit level (at least not explicitly).
The API defines methods that are similar for both the Dataset Group and the Dataset. For example,
the user can use the getData method to retrieve information either from the Dataset Group or the Dataset.
There are in fact two different methods, one for the Dataset Group, the other for the Dataset. As we have
seen, this would lead to multiple rules: one for the Dataset Group and one per Dataset. However, we can
expect a certain homogeneity in permissions. For example, in a Dataset Group for research purposes on
Alzheimer, we can expect all requests to Alzheimer related regions of the genome to be granted. To simplify
the rules, we want a mechanism that delegates the permission for the Dataset to the Dataset Group. This
mechanism should not impede one Dataset to diverge from the rules applied to the Dataset Group. In other
words, the permission for a Dataset must be able to rely on a default Dataset Group-wide policy, but the
Dataset Group-wide policy should not hide specificities of the Dataset.
We propose an algorithmic solution to this situation. There are two algorithms: the case where access
to one Dataset is requested and the case where access to all data in the Dataset Group is requested.
As seen in Figure 8.8, when the user requests data from the Dataset, the Dataset-specific rules are
checked. If the rules grant permission, the data is returned. If not, the algorithm checks whether the
equivalent request to the Dataset Group is granted. If so, the algorithm extends the original request to the
Dataset by one additional attribute: grantedByDatasetGroup with value ’true’. The algorithm then checks
the updated request against the Dataset policy. The resulting response is then the definitive answer.
The creator of the rules can use this additional attribute to define new behaviors. In order to meet
the previously defined default policy, a rule could simply return the permission based on this additional
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Figure 8.8: Resolving Dataset permissions
attribute.
We do not want to return information to which the access is denied. However, due to the Dataset Group
policy we might see a request granted: when the user requests genomic information from the Dataset Group,
the API returns the corresponding and accessible information from each Dataset. We must point out the
difference between the request being granted and the information being returned. For example, there might
be no reason at a Dataset Group level to deny a certain request; yet, no patient might be willing to share
this information. An MPEG-G compliant tool shall verify for each Dataset whether its information can be
included. This process is shown in Figure 8.9.
As the Access Unit width is established during the encoding which might not be when the privacy rules
are being generated, we might face a situation where multiple access rules affect one Access Unit. When
performing a getData method on a Dataset, a tool must decode every Access Unit which might contain
relevant information.
One solution would have been to test whether the record’s position conforms to the access rules. Given
the number of records, this would be computationally costly.
Our approach returns information from the Access Unit only if access to its entirety is granted. We
determine this by checking whether a getData request is granted within the boundaries of the Access Unit.
This process is shown in Figure 8.10.
8.5.3 Adopted approach
The retained solution was our proposal and it has been taken over in clause 7.3 of Part 3 Metadata and
application programming interfaces of ISO/IEC 23092-3 [60].
8.5.4 Thoughts on adopted approach
In our approach, we use XACML to provide the privacy rules. There are similar representation methods
such as ADA-M. As we have seen, ADA-M might require the use of natural language, whereas XACML
forces that the rule be represented in a computer treatable way. In order to support all features of ADA-M,
new attributes for the XACML rules might have to be defined by the repository.
Our proposal does not use XACML to protect the data: a non-conformant tool could circumvent the
privacy rule and access the encoded information. In order to mitigate this issue, the cryptography mecha-
nisms must be used. They limit the range of persons who have access to certain units of information, but
they cannot protect against the case where a user has access to the information under certain conditions but
does not respect them. For example, a researcher having access to a given gene for the purpose of studying
a disease but in fact uses it to determine the genetic lineage of the patient.
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Figure 8.9: getData Dataset group resolution
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Figure 8.10: GetData Dataset resolution
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Some alternatives are under development which might further mitigate this issue: for example Ciphertext
Policy - Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [91] and functional encryption [92].
CP-ABE is a type of encryption where each key has a set of attributes associated to it. The ciphertext
can be decrypted by a key if its attributes verify the policy tree integrated into the cipher text. Using
CP-ABE would for example allow encrypting the key used for the digital content: each user holding a key
associated to the required parameters would be able to obtain the key used to encrypt the rest of the file.
This solution has, however, some drawbacks: to the best of our knowledge, there is yet no standardized
cipher to rely on, and the challenge consists in distributing the pool of keys.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Results
Genomic information is sensible. It can reveal the genetic origins of the patient and possible diseases.
However, what makes this information so sensible also makes it so valuable for research and medical purposes.
By sequencing many genomes and cross-comparing the results, we will be able to understand new biological
mechanisms, which will lead to new diagnostic tools and treatments. Due to the magnitude of the required
information, this process requires new compression mechanisms.
The ISO working group MPEG started, in 2016, a new standardization process for genomic data. MPEG’s
goal is to use its knowledge in compression techniques to define the new state of the art compression spec-
ification for genomic information. However, the new standard should not just address the requirements for
compressing genomic data: it shall also represent the information metadata and provide security mechanisms
for the data and the metadata.
Our main work has consisted in answering the question of how to protect the data and the metadata.
We have explained how we have taken advantage of the granularity specified by the encoding process to
segment the genomic data and to provide region-specific encryption and signature mechanisms. We have
also analyzed the level of security of other solutions, thus proving the danger of allowing too fine-grained
security mechanisms.
To convey the security parameters alongside the encoded genomic information, a new file format is needed,
to which we have also contributed. Our solution is inspired by the ISO Base Media File Format. Our format
allows the combination of multiple genomic sources in one file: it thus enables researchers to represent an
entire study in one file, for example.
We have defined the metadata representation and how to secure it. We have adopted an approach based
on a core profile, whose coverage the user can improve through extensions. We have defined this metadata
structure with XML schemas. The XML format has, in turn, allowed us to use existing security mechanisms
to protect the metadata (XML signature and XML encryption).
We have also proposed a mechanism for privacy rules. These rules specify who, and under which circum-
stances, can execute a specific action specified in the MPEG-G’s API. Our definition of privacy rules does not
replace the encryption mechanism but rather extends it. The privacy rules can easily be circumvented by a
non-MPEG-G-compliant tool. Therefore the encryption mechanisms must be used to limit the possible reach
of the circumvention. Our proposed privacy rules mechanism relies on the XACML standard. We use the
file format to identify the resource being accessed and the API to define the actions and the attributes which
can be requested. The mechanism allows to extend the definition easily with new attributes corresponding
to new needs. Finally, our solution avoids to repeat rules by defining two algorithms which combine rules
from different file hierarchies.
Finally, we have proposed two new technologies which go beyond the scope of the current MPEG-G
specification. Presently, if a file is unauthorizedly published, it is not possible to discover who published it.
In order to mitigate this issue, we have proposed a fingerprinting mechanism: for each one of the recipients
of the file, the content is uniquely modified. In case of a publication, the recipient responsible for this copy
of the information can thus be discovered. In order not to harm the utility of the genomic information, the
modifications can be reverted if the key is made available.
Our second proposed technology aims at optimizing user queries. We propose to segregate information
according to the criteria of each user. This segregation then allows to retrieve specific subsets of the informa-
tion. We also segregate the information on the basis of the protection policies: our approach allows specific
segregated subsets to be encrypted for specific recipients.
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9.2 Outputs
The result of the research carried out in the context of this work has taken mainly two shapes: the contri-
butions to journals and conferences and the input documents submitted to MPEG.
9.2.1 Publications
9.2.1.1 Journals
1. "Reversible fingerprinting for genomic information" published in Multimedia Tools and Applications
journal [70]
It presents our work on the fingerprinting technique for genomic information. This contribution is
relevant to clause 7.3 of this work.
9.2.1.2 Submitted
1. We submitted the draft "Side-channel attack on a partially encrypted MPEG-G file" to Multimedia
Tools and Applications journal [69].
This draft presents our work on the side-channel attack. This contribution is relevant to clause 7.2.5
of this work.
2. We submitted the draft "Providing FAIR principles while preserving patient’s privacy" to Methods of
Information in Medicine [93].
This draft presents how XACML can be used to provide privacy within the context of the FAIR
principles [94]. This contribution is relevant to clause 8.5 of this work.
9.2.1.3 Draft to be submitted
1. We have prepared a draft "Improving queries on genomic information by segregation" to be submitted
to Patterns journal [87].
This draft presents our work on an alternative indexing system to optimize query times. This contri-
bution is relevant to clause 8.4.
9.2.1.4 Conferences
1. "Adding security and privacy to genomic information representation" published in Studies in Health
Technology and Informatics, presented at the EFMI Special Topic Conference (Hannover, 2019) [85]
This contribution presents how the XACML approach we previously presented can be applied to
MPEG-G. This contribution is relevant to clause 8.5.
2. "xACS: Management of privacy in genomic and medical information" presented at 6th International
Workshop on Genome Privacy and Security (Boston, 2019) [95]
This contribution presents a generalization of the Picture Archiving and Communication System to
any type of resources, and maintaining access control using rules expressed in XACML.
3. "Metadata to Describe Genomic Information" published in Studies in Health Technology and Infor-
matics, presented at the Medical Informatics Europe conference (Gothenburg, 2018) [68]
This contribution presents our work on metadata extensions and profiles, first in the context of GENIFF
and then MPEG-G. This contribution is relevant to Chapter 6 of this work.
4. "Protecting Privacy of Genomic Information" published in Studies in Health Technology and Informat-
ics, presented at the Medical Informatics Europe conference (Manchester, 2017) [86]
This contribution introduces the use of XACML in the context of genomics. This contribution is
relevant to clause 8.5.
9.2.1.5 Posters
1. "Genie: an MPEG-G Conformant Software to Compress Genomic Data" presented at The International
Conference for High Performance Computing, Networking, Storage, and Analysis(Denver, Colorado,
2019) [62]
It presents the results obtained by the demonstrator for unaligned compression, in the development of
which we have collaborated.
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2. "mpegg 1.0 – the pure java implementation of the MPEG-G ISO/IEC 23092 standard" presented at
ELIXIR All Hands (Lisbom, 2019)[63]
It presents our pure Java implementation of MPEG-G, alongside compression results we have obtained.
3. "Representing compressed and secure genomic information" presented at the Medical Informatics Eu-
rope conference (Gothenburg, 2018) [65]
It summarizes our proposal for a file format that conveys multiple genomic results in one file, alongside
metadata and protection information. This contribution is relevant to Chapter 5.
9.2.1.6 Preprints
1. An introduction to MPEG-G, the new ISO standard for genomic information representation on bioRxiv
(2018) [66]
This pre-print introduces MPEG-G: the different parts, the underlying technology and the features
the standard offers. This contribution is relevant to the entire work. It has been referenced 5 times,
downloaded 2690 times (on 03/02/2020).
9.2.2 Contributions to ISO
MPEG organizes four meetings per year. The national bodies’ delegates can submit, before each meeting,
documents to be reviewed by the working group. The contents of the contribution is possibly approved and
included in the output results of the group. We provide here a list of the contributions which submit results
from our research to the working group. Figures 9.1 and 9.2 summarize our main contributions, the main
outputs of each meeting, and the stage of the standard in the overall process. Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show
our contributions in green and the meeting’s output, to which we have contributed, in blue. The stages
are indicated as requested by MPEG: the result of the vote and thus the possible official change of stage
happened later than indicated.
1. M39175 GENIFF (GENomic Information File Format), a proposal for a Secure Genomic Information
Transport Layer (GITL) based on the ISO Base Media File Format [96]
This initial description of GENIFF introduces the idea of using the ISO BMFF. It covers the idea of
a file being able to containerize any type of compression (uncompressed, ORCOM, QVZ, CARGO)
but specifically CARGO compressed files. The document introduces the idea of combining multiple
genomic results in one file; the idea of having an XACML document within another file; the idea of
having a SAM Header translated into XML. It contains first considerations about EBI metadata and
MIAME metadata and aims at being also able to contain VCF files. Furthermore, it includes first
considerations about encryption. This contribution is relevant to Chapters 5, 6 and clause 7.2.
2. M39939 Genomic Information Compression and Storage CE4: DMAG-UPC’s GENIFF v.2 implemen-
tation[97]
This document is a summary of the work submitted to Core Experiment 4 (CE4, the core experiment
dedicated to comparing the received proposals for file format). The submitted proposal is able to
encapsulate the inputs of the Core Experiment. It proves the feasibility of encryption: each stream
can be encrypted separately. As each stream might be a BAM file, a user can treat a specific subset
of data differently. We obtain granularity by splitting a file into multiple streams (the example given
is splitting a BAM into one stream per sequence). Besides, we propose the use of XACML for the
definition of privacy rules. This contribution is relevant to Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.
3. M39940 GENIFF (GENomic Information File Format) v2 [98]
This document is a summary of changes applied to the GENIFF format. Most notably, and to differ-
entiate from the ISOBMFF, we change the key’s length to 8 characters, and we fix the length’s field
to 64 bits. We propose a draft API. The interface is differentiated in hierarchy levels and allows us
to retrieve entire datasets, headers, or just fields. This version of the API has interfaces to work with
records. We propose a new metadata structure that is inspired by the metadata in use at EGA. We
split information in title, type, abstract, project centers, description, and samples. It introduces the
idea of more complex types to represent such things as Project centers and samples. We introduce
the idea of extensions: if the proposed schema is not sufficient, the elements can be extended to cover
more information. We introduce the idea of encrypting individual blocks of BAM file using AES CTR,
but also splitting a BAM file into multiples subfiles (each one treated as a stream and independently
encrypted). We provide examples of XACML rules. This contribution is relevant to Chapters 5, 6, 7
and 8.
104 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION
4. M39941 User’s Guide for DMAG-UPC’s GENIFF v.2 software used for Genome information CEs[99]
The document describes the usage of the submitted software. It describes how to specify every file which
we need to containerize and how to retrieve the data. The intermediate manifest to serve a GENIFF file
is shown: with it, a server can know where to find the privacy rules and the corresponding information
(which the server might have to decrypt). This contribution is relevant to Chapters 5, 7 and 8.
5. M39943 Genomic Information Compression and Storage CE4: Cross-check of HEGIF [100]
This contribution analyzes the HEGIF proposal. The testing has focused on the generation of the file,
its random access capabilities, the ability to transport the information and the privacy features. This
contribution is relevant to Chapters 5 and 7.
6. M39944 GENIFF (GENomic Information File Format) v2: Security and signature issues [101]
This document describes the challenges when dealing with signatures and the shortcomings of the
current solutions. We introduce the need for the ability to sign the same information multiple times
and with different keys. We also introduce the need for being able to sign only portions of the file.
This contribution is relevant to clause 7.2.
7. M39945 Towards a WD for a format on genomic information compression and storage [102]
This document analyzes the similarities between GenomSys’ file format proposal and ours. This con-
tribution is relevant to Chapter 5.
8. M40494 Genomic Information Representation. Proposal for Part 3 on Protection, Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces and Metadata [103]
This document is the first draft of Part 3. It introduces the idea of security parameters represented
in XML, including information on encryption, privacy rules, and signatures. It presents the idea of
having a "security tree" where a protection box can encrypt the encryption box of the layer below. It
also introduces the idea of using XML encryption and signature, pointing to resources with URI. This
contribution is relevant to Chapters 6 and 7.
9. M41069 Genomic Information Representation. Proposal for metadata representation [104]
This document is a proposal on how extensions should work (i.e., including a URI, a description, and
a value). It introduces to elaborate a proposal to specify whole ranges of required extensions (the
example given is for EGA). This contribution is relevant to Chapter 6.
10. M41070 Comments and issues in current MPEG-G Working Drafts (Parts 1 and 2) [105]
This document analyzes possible mistakes in both Part 1 and Part 2 and proposes solutions for them.
This contribution is relevant to Chapters 5 and 4.
11. M41072 Description of DMAG-UPC’s MPEG-G generation and decoding tool [106]
This document is a user guide for the tool we are developing at the UPC. The guide explains how to
retrieve the contents of a file, how to decode it and access its security features. Furthermore, the guide
lists the implemented operations. This contribution is relevant to Chapters 5 and 7.
12. M41073 Use case for referencing external existing genomic information from MPEG-G [107]
The document proposes a new use case: expanding the features of MPEG-G to be able to document
existing files (e.g., providing the metadata in MPEG-G for a SAM file), in order to use the new features
with old files. This contribution is relevant to Chapter 6.
13. M41730 MPEG-G metadata: Issues and mapping with EGA profiles [108]
This document analyzes how to represent EGA metadata information in MPEG-G files. It details the
differences in approach (EGA has an aggregation level missing in MPEG-G), which fields are missing,
and which fields we have to constrain in order to ensure compatibility. The document also analyzes
how a tool could work to upload and download MPEG-G files to and from the EGA repository. This
contribution is relevant to Chapters 5 and 6.
14. M41731 Genomic Information Representation Metadata [109]
This document presents all the modifications which have been deemed necessary for the metadata. It
covers the core fields of the dataset group and dataset metadata, and the mechanism for extensions
(and the schema of an extension). Additionally, we introduce the profile for EGA: which extensions
are required to cover the EGA’s provided schemas. This contribution is relevant to Chapter 6.
15. M41733 Genomic Information Representation. Proposal for WD of Part 3 on Protection, Application
Programming Interfaces and Metadata [110]
The document shows how the work we have carried out is integrated into Part 3. This contribution is
relevant to Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
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16. M42106 Proposal for CD of MPEG-G Part 3: Genomic Information Metadata and Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (APIs) [111]
This document is our proposal for the Candidate Draft (CD). In it, we separate the API into two sets:
core and extended. This contribution is relevant to Chapter 8.
17. M42588 Proposal for a Study of ISO/IEC CD 23092-3 Genomic Information Metadata and APIs [112]
The document corrects minor terminology and formatting issues in Part 3. This contribution is relevant
to Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
18. M42590 Comments on Draft Text of ISO/IEC DIS 23092-1 Transport and Storage of Genomic Infor-
mation [113]
The document corrects minor terminology and formatting issues in Part 1. This contribution is relevant
to Chapter 5.
19. M43542 MPEG-G Part 3: Proposed Draft DIS [114]
This document is our proposal for the Draft International Standard (DIS), where we include our
proposed algorithms to have default access rules, and not revealing confidential information. This
contribution is relevant to clause 8.5.
20. M43543 MPEG-G Part 3 ballot: Pre-analysis of ballot comments [115]
This document analyzes the different votes received concerning Part 3. We indicate in each case
whether we have included the content of the vote into our proposed draft and justify our choice. This
contribution is relevant to Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
21. M43545 Side-channel attack on MPEG-G in Descriptor Stream Contiguous mode [116]
This document proves that there is a way to attack and recover data from an MPEG-G file if it is
stored in DSC mode. The attack proves that if the pos descriptor is not encrypted, then the position
of the SNPs can be inferred. This contribution is relevant to clause 7.2.5.
22. M44845 Text proposal for ISO/IEC DIS 23092-3 Genomic Information Metadata and APIs [117]
This documents is our proposal for the Final Draft International Standard (FDIS), which now includes
metadata extensions for GDC, an encryption mechanism that is not explicitly based on access units,
and mechanisms to encrypt sequence and label information. This contribution is relevant to Chapters
6 and 7.
23. M45601 Comments on ISO/IEC DIS 23092-1 and ISO/IEC DIS 23092-2 [61]
The document analyzes different issues in the MPEG-G specification, especially the following:
• issue of the need for classes
• issues in the decoding process of mmtype when multiple mutations are given for the same position
• issues in the correct decoding of the cigar and the sequence when mutations are provided through
the rftp and rftt streams
• issues in the identification of the primary read and the computation of the number of alignments.
This contribution is relevant to Chapters 4 and 5.
24. M47222 Draft text proposal for ISO/IEC FDIS 23092-3 Genomic Information Metadata and APIs
[118]
We propose an FDIS draft which includes our latest modifications to the security mechanisms: the
encryption parameters are no longer given at the access unit level, but at the dataset level for the
different regions. In order to decrypt an access unit, the encryption parameters for the relevant regions
must be checked. This contribution is relevant to Chapters 6 and 7.
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Figure 9.1: Evolution of MPEG-G Part 1
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Figure 9.2: Evolution of MPEG-G Part 3
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Chapter 10
Future work
We can view the future work as two distinct sets of tasks. On the one hand, we have the objectives related
to the current version of the standard. On the other hand, we have the aims associated to the future of the
standard.
10.1 The current version of the standard
We have created a specification that can adapt to multiple configurations. As in other parts of the standard,
e.g. the ability to encode the information either with a reference or a computed reference, we have seen that
we have a high potential of adaptiveness regarding the metadata representation, the security parameters,
and the privacy rules.
10.1.1 Improving user experience for security parameters
Tools must offer a more accessible experience, both to represent the intentions of the user and to understand
the content of the file. For example, we have defined how to encrypt according to positions on the reference
genome. Yet, for the average user, these positions will not be representative. New tools have to provide a
user experience such that the patient can choose between an opt-in or opt-out approach (i.e., only specific
regions are more protected or less protected, respectively). The decisions regarding protection regions also
affect the keys used (i.e., the number of keys used and their association with different parts of the genome),
how to transport them (i.e., using the key derivation and wrapping solutions of the standard or relying on
external channels) and how to represent them as privacy rules. Furthermore, these decisions would probably
have to be integrated within existing repositories of genomic data.
We have seen that there are databases of genomic regions related to specific diseases (e.g. ensembl.org
[9]). We could use this information to extract the first list of regions to protect. For example, let us imagine
that we see the following information in the database:
• Disease 1 is related to the region on chromosome 1 going from 1’000’000 to 1’060’000.
• Disease 2 is related to the region on chromosome 1 going from 1’030’000 to 1’060’000.
• Disease 3 is related to the region on chromosome 1 going from 1’060’000 to 1’090’000.
We could create encryption regions corresponding to:
• 1’000’000 to 1’030’000
• 1’030’000 to 1’060’000
• 1’060’000 to 1’090’000.
Each one of these regions would correspond to a new and unique key. If the patient decides to share
information regarding one or more of these diseases, the configuration provides the corresponding keys by
wrapping these pieces of information with a secret shared with the recipients.
This solution provides an opt-out approach: everything is inaccessible unless the patient indicates oth-
erwise. This approach can also adapt to future configurations, as the tool has created the units according
to ranges meant to accommodate future variations. Furthermore, this approach is easily adaptable to entire
groupings of diseases (e.g., all cancers). Although this seems to address the initial objective of simplifying
the user experience regarding the generation of the protection configuration, there are many open questions.
109
110 CHAPTER 10. FUTURE WORK
For example, the user must be made aware of the risks related to linkage disequilibrium: if a given mutation
is usually inherited in combination with another, knowing one of them helps to infer the other.
The proposed solution might also have an impact on the compression efficiency, as there are too many
output units. Therefore, the user would have to be made aware of the possible drawbacks. The user might,
for example, decide to opt for a coarser-grained output if this improves the compression even if it harms the
granularity of the protection.
Proposed tools should also handle the creation of the privacy rules and the key distribution based upon
the user settings. Tools can offer these features without any modification to MPEG-G. The difficulty would
not consist in how to provide the configuration but rather in how to translate the user’s requests into the
corresponding settings.
10.1.2 Improving user experience for metadata
We have provided a mechanism for the metadata definition and inclusion inside MPEG-G files. We have
done so by defining a core metadata set, which we can enhance through the use of extensions. The definition
of a profile permits us to indicate which set of extensions must be present to meet the requirements. We
have developed profiles both for EGA and GDC, and we expect other profiles to be defined.
There is yet no tool that represents the metadata information engagingly. The main challenge with the
development of this tool will be its adaptability to new and unknown extensions. Although the standard
defines a way to convey the documentation related to the extension, this documentation is normally in
human-readable form, which hinders the automatic adaptation of its rendering in a user interface.
10.1.3 Deploying MPEG-G
The main challenge with the current specification of MPEG-G will be to deploy it. We have contributed to
some part of its deployment, but more work is required. Current libraries should support this new standard,
both to read data from it and to write data to it.
We can expect multiple challenges on this front, related to the features that MPEG-G introduces. For
example, current libraries will not expect files which contain multiple results within: the equivalent of a
SAM file is an MPEG-G’s dataset, not an MPEG-G file. Similarly, when writing an MPEG-G file multiple
configurations are expected: regarding the threshold used while creating records, the shape of the access
units or the encryption strategies.
In order to obtain the most out of MPEG-G, this new specification cannot be implemented as a SAM
replacement in existing libraries. Otherwise, many features will be lost.
Genomic archives such as EGA or GDC share several characteristics with MPEG-G, for example, the
combination of multiple results in a larger structure, the use of metadata, or even the use of protection
mechanisms. In order to foster the adoption of MPEG-G, it will be required to define mappings between
all MPEG-G elements and their counterparts in the archival structure. We have contributed to this task in
the form of a mapping between the MPEG-G metadata and the metadata used at EGA, but there are still
other aspects to deal with ; for example, how to translate the privacy rules from ADA-M to XACML or from
XACML to ADA-M.
The deployment of MPEG-G will also require to have it included in existing libraries and tools. We
have contributed to such initiatives (jMPEGG [63] and Genie[62]): these tools offer ways to compress from
existing formats to MPEG-G, or to decompress MPEG-G files into existing formats. However, in order to
further foster the adoption of MPEG-G, the new standard needs to be included in existing libraries and tools
such as htsjdk [119]. This integration will require to consider how to interact with MPEG-G in the context
of libraries originally intended for FAST-Q, SAM or similar file formats. One of the main issues is that
within an MPEG-G file there can be multiple dataset groups, with multiple datasets each. Each one of these
datasets is conceptually equivalent to a FAST-Q or SAM-like file. Therefore, an integration should handle
an MPEG-G dataset as the equivalent of an existing format, rather than considering the entire MPEG-G
file as an equivalent, possibly having to modify the paradigm of simply opening a file to read it.
10.2 Future versions of the standard
In the preceding chapters, we have identified multiple points that might be of concern with the current
standard. We have seen, for example, that the file format might require new layers to accommodate the
structure used in the requirements. We have also seen that the finally adopted solution for protection forces
the decision in edge cases. The return of experience will provide evidence whether these concerns are justified.
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10.2.1 File lifecycle
The current file format does not allow to modify the content of a file easily. In the context of the security
mechanism, this is especially relevant. For example, if new access rules are generated for the file or a new
recipient has to be granted access to specific regions, the entire file would have to be rewritten in order to
update the content of the protection element. The return of experience will determine whether this is an
aspect that needs correction.
For example, we can imagine two situations for the sources of MPEG-G encoded data. We can imagine
the case where, upon reception of a request for a given file, the original file returned is the one submitted by
the patient. This approach simplifies the logic of the repository, but it would require that the copy stored at
the repository be updated to reflect the newest user’s preferences. This situation would benefit from a new
file format allowing modification of the content. Such a file format could rely on buffers of unused bytes.
These unused byte buffers would store the new settings: instead of rewriting a new file with a new size, we
assign bytes originally from the buffer to the structures holding the settings, thus maintaining the file size.
We could also imagine the case where the repository generates the MPEG-G file on the fly. In such a
situation, the repository would store the file in some intermediate state, alongside the privacy settings. As
the repository generates a new file on each occasion, there is no need to update the content of the file.
We have seen that GA4GH is working on multiple activities relevant to different aspects of MPEG-G: for
example, encryption strategies, access rule specifications and API to access genomic content. Concepts can
be contributed in both directions between GA4GH and MPEG-G, in order to improve the different proposals
and ensure compatibility and interoperability.
10.2.2 Future of protection
The MPEG working group will have to update the standard according to the evolution of the different spec-
ifications used (e.g., for key derivation and key wrapping) and the security environment (e.g., the discovery
of new attack vectors).
New technology might also be of interest to the development of the MPEG-G standard. Currently, there
is no mechanism to force the user to comply with the privacy rules. We can improve the situation by
encrypting the information and ensuring that the key management is consistent with the privacy rules. For
example, if we want to give access to region A to only researchers working on cancer, we can encrypt region
A with a key only known to researchers working on cancer. In this configuration, the encryption acts as an
enforcer of privacy rules.
With new technologies such as Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE [91]), we could
combine both the encryption and the privacy rules. Only those recipients who have a key matching the
policy would be able to access the encrypted data. We could also use CP-ABE as the groundstone for a new
wrapping mechanism. This approach would ensure that the user addresses the policy before accessing the
data.
However, both in the current approach and in a future approach using CP-ABE, we are unable to protect
the information against a user accredited for one use case, but executing another one. For example, a
researcher could be interested in both cancer and cosmetics and have the keys corresponding to the two use
cases. Let us imagine a file open for cancer research but closed for cosmetics research. No mechanism can
ensure that the user who gets access to the data using the ’cancer key’ does not use it for cosmetics research.
For MPEG-G to remain a secure and up-to-date solution, further research needs to be conducted, both
to include new features and to secure the standard against newly discovered threats.
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Acronyms
ADA-M Automatable Discovery and Access Matrix. 20
AES Advanced Encryption Standard. 53
API Application Programming Interface. 81
AUC Access Unit Contiguous. 38
BAI Binary Alignment Index. 15
BAM Binary Alignment Map. 10
BGZF Blocked GNU Zip Format. 15
CABAC Context-Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding. 32
CARGO Compressed ARchiving for GenOmics. 15
CD Candidate Draft. 29
CIGAR Compact Idiosyncratic Gapped Alignment Report. 10
CP-ABE Ciphertext Policy - Attribute-Based Encryption. 98
CRAM Compressed Reference-oriented Alignment Map. 15
CTR Counter. 53
DIS Draft International Standard. 29
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid. 7
DSC Descriptor Stream Contiguous. 38
EGA European Genome Archive. 25
FDIS Final Draft International Standard. 29
GA4GH Global Alliance For Genome and Health. 19
GCM Galois/Counter Mode. 53
GDC Genomic Data Commons. 27
GWAS Genome-Wide Association Study. 19
GZIP GNU Zip. 15
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force. 54
ILP Integer Linear Program. 25
IS International Standard. 29
ISO International Organization for Standardization. 29
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114 Acronyms
ISO BMFF ISO Base Media File Format. 37
IV Initialization Vector. 53
KLV Key Length Value. 37
MPEG Moving Picture Expert Group. 29
PBKDF2 Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2. 54
PCA Primary Component Analysis. 19
PGP Pretty Good Privacy. 20
RFC Release For Comment. 54
SAM Sequence Alignment/Map. 10
SECRAM Selective retrieval on Encrypted and Compressed Reference-oriented Alignment Map. 19
SNP Single Nucleotide Permutations. 16
UUID Universally Unique Identifier. 27
VCF Variant Call Format. 25
WD Working Draft. 29
XML eXtensible Markup Language. 25
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